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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation focuses on reexamining the epistemic landscape of Xunzi’s philosophy. 
Starting with the notion of person-in-relationship (to which relationship is a built-in, rather than 
an add-on, element), I part ways with epistemic atomism and explore the most significant aspects 
of the Xunzian conception of knowledge-and-wisdom (zhi) in the communal context: knowing 
how and knowing who. I argue that both knowing how and knowing who in the Xunzi point to a 
certain kind of cultivated responsiveness. While epistemic atomism aims at representational 
accuracy and certainty, Xunzi’s exclusive attention on responsiveness instead of representation is 
intimately associated with the cosmology that reality is a continual transformational process. 
Such an emphasis on responsiveness extends to his positive treatment towards metaphor 
(linguistic responsiveness), imagination (intellectual responsiveness), and wisdom (practical 
responsiveness). Since wisdom is a unifying intellectual virtue and it is almost impossible to 
understand wisdom in an impersonal way, I then return to the very notion of the Xunzian person 
and articulate the core intellectual virtues from Xunzi’s perspective. I argue that Xunzi’s 
regarding of exemplars as epistemic paradigms provides valuable insights for the exemplarist 
turn in virtue epistemology. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 The inquiry of this dissertational project starts from an uncommon interpretative 
approach of a key passage in the Xunzi. In this passage, the relations among junzi 君子 
(exemplary persons), fa 法 (models) and lei 類 (categories for analogical extension) take the 
central stage (K12.1): 
There are lords who produce chaos in their states, but there are no countries that are 
naturally chaotic; there are distinguished persons who can bring order about, but there is 
no model (fa) that will produce order… Thus, the models cannot be established alone, nor 
can their categories apply themselves in particular instances. If proper persons are 
obtained, then the models and categories will survive; if such persons are lost, then they 
will perish. The models are the first manifestation of order; the exemplary persons (junzi) 
are the wellsprings of the models. Accordingly, if there is an exemplary person, however 
incomplete a model may be, it is sufficient to be employed broadly. So too if there is no 
exemplary person, then however complete a model may be, the loss of the proper 
application of the proper sequence of “first and last” and the impossibility of appropriate 
response to evolving affairs is sufficient to cause anarchy.1 
Most of the received interpretations render the main theme of this passage in particular—and the 
whole text of the Xunzi in general—as either socio-political or ethical, with an unchallenged 
                                                
1有亂君，無亂國；有治人，無治法…。故法不能獨立，類不能自行；得其人則存，失其人則亡。法者、治
之端也；君子者、法之原也。故有君子，則法雖省，足以璤矣；無君子，則法雖具，失先後之施，不能應
事之變，足以亂矣。《荀子‧君道》 
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assumption that there is no epistemology in the Chinese intellectual traditions. As a consequence, 
the epistemic aspects of the Xunzi are largely ignored and undiscussed. 
However, I shall argue that—given the fact that there is no ultimate distinction between 
the ethical and the epistemic in the Confucian tradition—the opening passage quoted from the 
Xunzi applies to the epistemic realm as well. The key character lei, roughly translated as 
“categories for analogical extension,” is clearly associated with certain cognitive competence and 
its proper functioning in a community. To discount its significance is to interpret the text in a 
biased way. Taking the epistemic imports of the Xunzi into account implies that those exemplary 
persons are not only the ethical paradigms but also the epistemic paradigms. It also suggests that 
skill knowledge (knowledge how) and inter-personal knowledge (knowledge who), rather than 
propositional knowledge (knowing that), are of central importance in the Xunzian tradition. In 
short, it presents a very unfamiliar and even unintelligible landscape to conventional 
epistemology in Euro-American philosophy. Is the Xunzian vision an antidote, a poison, or just a 
pre-modern and outdated dried herb to conventional epistemology facing increasingly intensified 
internal critics? In this dissertation, I argue that knowing is a conduct in the Xunzi, and that 
Xunzi has envisioned epistemic communities led by exemplary, virtuous and skillful knowers 
who also contribute to the development of moral and socio-political order. 
I. 
Historical Background 
 
Xun Kuang 荀況 ( ca. 305-238 BCE, Master Xun, hereafter Xunzi) is chronologically the 
third of the three greatest Confucians before the unification of China under the reign of the Qin
秦 Dynasty (221-206 BCE); the other two are Confucius (551-479 BCE) himself and Mencius 
(372-289 BCE). Considered as an intellectual rival of Mencius, Xunzi’s doctrine of xing 性 
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(natural tendencies) of humans seemed to go against the teachings of Mencius. As history 
unfolded, it was Mencius, not Xunzi, who won the hearts of the Chinese literati. The first 
commentary of the Xunzi came relatively late compared to the Analects and the Mengzi—
suggesting that Xunzi’s doctrines were not officially promoted as imperial ideology by political 
authorities and largely bypassed by scholars and thinkers.2 Nevertheless, distinguished historian 
Guo Moruo 郭沫若 credits Xunzi as the great synthesizer of all the pre-Qin schools. Even 
though in the 12th century CE Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 canonization of the Four Books, recognizing the 
Mengzi rather than the Xunzi as one of the four essential Confucian texts, seemed to reconfirm 
the marginalization of Xunzi, Zhu is profoundly influenced by Xunzi.3 
 Historically, the rise of different schools of thinking in classical China was associated 
with the disintegration of the kinship-based socio-political system of the Zhou 周 Dynasty (ca. 
1050-256 BCE). It was a long and increasingly bloody and merciless process that lasted 
hundreds of years during which pervasive transformations of sustenance, social-political 
hierarchy, military operations, means of production and commercial activities took place:4 
Through direct taxation on land controlled by the military and hereditary elite, the 
monarchs effectively eliminated the earlier manorial management system. The result was 
                                                
2 Yang Liang 楊倞’s commentary on the Xunzi, the first known serious interpretation of this work, is dated in 818 
C.E. The fact that this commentary comes more than a thousand years after the death of Xunzi seems to resonate the 
neglected history of this text. Such a history is different from the popularity that the Xunzi enjoys within the 
scholarly circle in recent decades. 
3 As Homer Dubs notes, “The fact that Xunzi was later condemned because his teachings about human nature [xing
性] does not alter his influence upon Confucianism, for at the time when that judgment was finally passed by Zhu 
Xi, Xunzi’s teaching had already passed into the orthodox stream of thought and even Zhu Xi himself had been 
influenced by it.” See Dubs, Hüsntze: Moulder of Ancient Confucianism (London: Authur Probsthain, 1927), 136. 
4 The Zhou Dynasty can be further divided into Western Zhou and Eastern Zhou, according to a decisive event of 
relocating its capital. Both Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period overlap with the Eastern Zhou. 
In terms of the scale of military operations, the Warring States Period outweighed the Spring and Autumn Period in 
a scary way. While the battles between two states usually involved less than a hundred thousand soldiers in the 
Spring and Autumn Period, four hundred thousand soldiers of the Zhao 趙 state (i.e. Xunzi’s home state) were 
buried alive in Changping 長平 by the Qin 秦 army in a single battle in 260 BCE. Xunzi was still alive by then. 
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an increase in social mobility in the form of an opportunity for official court 
appointments not based on kin relations. In this context, a lower order of artisans 
emerged and vied for jobs at court. The competition among the states themselves also 
helped foster an environment in which capable individuals could take on roles that were 
previously hereditary.5 
 Sinologists often remark that the social class of “scholar-gentry (shi 士)” played a key 
role in this process of massive transformation. The “scholar-gentry” as a social class originally 
referred to those in the bottom of the royal spectrum, who also served as lower-ranking officials 
performing rituals and other various governmental tasks in peaceful days and executing military 
operations in battles. An ideal “scholar-gentry” had to master six arts (liuyi 六藝), including 
skills of performing rituals, music, archery, charioting, writing, and calculation. Such classical 
education enabled the scholar-gentries to provide service at the royal court before the profound 
socio-political transformation took place. The disintegration of the existing system thus posed a 
real threat to members of this social class who were already on the margins of the kinship 
system. In order to sustain their lives in the process of further marginalization, these scholar-
gentries brought their knowledge of classical learning, including reading and writing, to the non-
royal people in exchange for financial support. Thus, non-royal families had a chance to rise into 
the recast “scholar class” as some marginalized royals sank out of it. As the old sense of the 
“scholar-gentry” faded away, the new “scholars” who were capable of serving at the court 
because of their specialties represented the fruitfulness of the social mobility before and during 
                                                
5. Jane Geaney, On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2002), 2. 
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the Warring States Period. Arguably, there was a gradual shift from a kinship-centered society to 
a skill-focused society; as Joseph Needham notes, 
we must not forget that the conception of the carrière ouverte aux talents, the “career 
open to talent,” which many people date from the French Revolution, was neither French 
nor even European; it had been Chinese for a millennium already.6 
There is no doubt that Xunzi, as well as many other—if not most—thinkers in the pre-
Qin era belonged to this emerging “scholar class.”7  Xunzi was born in the state of Zhao 趙 
(nowadays part of the Shanxi and Hebei Province). There was no reliable historical account 
concerning his early years. According to the Shiji 史記 (Records of the Great Historian), Xunzi’s 
significant career started at the age of fifty, when he went to the state of Qi 齊 (nowadays most of 
the Shandong Province) and became one of the most outstanding intellectuals there. Three times 
he was recognized as the leading scholar of the intellectual community called Jixia 稷下
Academy, “a think tank created by the ruler of Qi to bring together the greatest minds of his era 
to study, teach, and provide advice to the state.”8 Then Xunzi moved to the state of Chu 楚 
(nowadays Hunan, Hubei, and part of the Sichuan and Shandong Province) and was appointed as 
the local chief official in Lanling 蘭陵, where he retired and continued to live until his death.9 
                                                
6 Joseph Needham, Science in Traditional China: A Comparative Perspective (Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
Press, 1981), 24. 
7 Some passages in the Analects exemplify how Confucius himself is situated in the transformation of the scholar-
gentry class. For example, in the Analects 15.39 Confucius says, “In teaching, there are no [social] classes.” In 
addition, in the Analects 7.7 Confucius also says, “I have never yet failed to provide instruction to anyone who come 
to me of their own initiative [even though they could afford no more than] a gift of dried meat.” 
8 Bryan W. Van Norden, Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc. 2010), 164. 
9 In the text of the Xunzi, conversations between Xunzi and the ruler as well as the ministers of the Qin state are 
recorded, suggesting that Xunzi probably visits the Qin state. See Qiangguo 強國, Ruxiao 儒效, and Qubing 去兵 
chapter. 
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 Unlike Confucius and Mencius, whose philosophical thoughts were expressed through 
recorded dialogues and conversations, most of Xunzi’s writing was plain prose. It makes Xunzi’s 
personality much flatter than both Confucius and Mencius—we do not know much about how 
Xunzi interacted with political leaders, fellow intellectuals, and his disciples; on the other hand, 
however, Xunzi was able to convey his ideas with precision and argumentative force, which has 
attracted scholarly attention in Europe and America since James Legge (1893) and Homer Dubs 
(1928). 
 Xunzi was not only one of the founders of classical Confucianism, he also had direct 
relationship with the Legalist School that was responsible for developing feudal-bureaucratic 
systems on the basis of feudalism. Two of the most prominent figures of the Legalists, Han Fei
韓非 and Li Si 李斯 who contributed in theory and practice to strengthen the Legalistic 
governance of the state of Qin before its unification of the warring states, were students of 
Xunzi. Unlike Mencius, Xunzi was comfortable with the idea of running a state with an efficient 
bureaucratic system. And Xunzi’s own work has been at times criticized for being socio-
politically authoritarian and conservative in a negative way.10 
 Nevertheless, the comprehensiveness of the text of the Xunzi eventually makes the 
philosopher Xunzi to be regarded as the Aristotle of China by contemporary scholars.11 This 
extensive philosophical text covered governance, morality, language, perception, literature, and 
psychology. It also kept other major schools and thinkers in perspective. Xunzi’s relations with 
scholars in other schools can thus be unambiguously mapped out. Hence, the text of the Xunzi 
                                                
10 In late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, this negative view of Xunzi was quite often held by literati 
who anticipated and participated in the laboring process of the “new China.” Representative figures include Kang 
Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Hu Shih. 
11 The very first scholarly attempt that associates Xunzi with Aristotle can be seen in Homer Dubs’ work in 1927. 
See Dubs, Hüsntze, 50, 150, 157, 167, 253f. 
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offers us a window to see the intellectual landscape during the Warring States Period. 
Undoubtedly, the philosopher Xunzi represented an all-round scholarly ideal in the dawn of 
imperial China. 
 In short, even though the text of Xunzi seemed to be neglected and marginalized for a 
long time in traditional scholarship, its enduring significance and large-scale influence in 
Chinese intellectual history eventually earned it a reputation comparable to other major 
philosophical works. There is an urgent need to understand its profundity in appropriate ways. I 
would like to proffer a close reading which is not only sensitive to its original philosophical 
context but also related to the contemporary philosophical debates, especially in epistemology, 
which in turn will provide us a better grasp of the characteristics of the Xunzian and, by 
extension, classical Confucian thinking. 
II. 
Philosophical Contexts: Then and Now 
 
 As the warring states competed for political and military supremacy and dominance in 
pre-Qin China, thinkers of different schools were urged to impress the rulers as well as monarchs 
and to distinguish themselves from others. Xunzi’s strategy was to point out the doctrinal defects 
of his opponents, which provided insightful information about the philosophical context of the 
Warring State Period. 
In the chapters “Fei Shier Zi 非十二子 (Against Twelve Thinkers)” and “Jiebi 解蔽 
(Dissolving Partiality),”12 Xunzi attacked more than a dozen popular scholars whose doctrines 
                                                
12 The second character “bi” of the chapter “Jiebi” is usually translated as deception, obscuration, or obscurity. In 
translating this chapter title into “Dissolving Partiality,” I am following Chung-ying Cheng’s interpretation that the 
goal of “Jiebi” is to “see things in their comprehensive totality without being trapped into any one partiality.” See 
Cheng, “Xunzi as a Systematic Philosopher: Toward an Organic Unity of Nature, Mind, and Reason,” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 35 no.1 (2008), 21. 
8 
 
were influential enough to affect governmental decisions. Among them were the Mohists, 
Legalists, Nominalists, Daoists, and even his fellow Confucians such as Mencius and Confucius’ 
grandson, Zisi. From Xunzi’s point of view, their doctrines—though seemingly reasonable—
were misguiding at best and deceiving at worst. There were two foci of Xunzi’s criticisms: first, 
the rhetorical strategies employed by some of these thinkers were full of exaggerations and 
confusion; and second, their doctrines focused on merely certain issues in a biased way without 
reading the entire situation comprehensively (quan 全). The first focus seemed to come very 
close to Plato’s attack against the Sophists. However, Xunzi’s response to focusing on excessive 
rhetorical techniques in persuasion was different from Plato’s. While Plato substantially 
anchored his philosophical enterprise with metaphysical ideals, Xunzi’s constant concern was to 
promote effective governance and social harmony. The second focus suggests that Xunzi was 
confident in outweighing his competitors in terms of both the breadth and the depth of his 
doctrines for running a state. Xunzi was convinced that prescriptions for governing properly 
could not be separated from comprehensive and applicable understanding of received 
conventions, natural tendencies of humans, inter-personal relations, linguistic communication, 
leadership, and social solidarity. Focusing on merely one aspect of human experience would 
certainly lead a state to go astray. 
From another perspective, one of Xunzi’s main goals was to fight against the “naturalistic 
trends” taken on by many thinkers of the Warring States Period.13 In the absence of some 
Creator-God or celestial law-giver, classical Chinese thinkers had no problem in appealing to 
notions such as xing (natural tendencies) and ziran自然 (spontaneity) in explaining how the 
                                                
13 Janghee Lee, Xunzi and Early Chinese Naturalism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 2-3. 
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world-processes came to being and in prescribing how a society should be organized. Two 
prominent thinkers of these naturalistic trends were Mencius and Zhuangzi. Both were criticized 
in Xunzi’s caricatures. Mencius proffered a famous doctrine of xingshan性善: the tendencies of 
humans are towards important moral qualities, that should be as natural as water flows to lower 
places.14 Zhuangzi also provided a naturalized vision of dao道 (proper ways): the path is made in 
the walking.15 However, according to Xunzi, if moral qualities and normativity did come as 
naturally and spontaneously as Mencius and Zhuangzi assert, being moral would have no 
significance at all and could not be regarded as a distinctive kind of human achievement, which 
did not make sense from a Confucian point of view.16 Therefore Xunzi insisted that any human 
achievement should be “wei偽(artificial )” in the sense that huge amount of efforts have to be 
intentionally invested in the process of becoming moral and establishing the norms.17 
 Prioritizing the significance of human efforts in the process of educating people and 
building a strong state, Xunzi has no problem in reinstating the key vocabularies that Confucius 
himself promotes. Li 禮 (ritual propriety), yi 義 (appropriateness), ren 仁 (consummating 
conduct), zhi 智 (processes of knowing as realization and appreciation), yue 樂 (music), he 和 
(harmony), tian 天 (the numinous), dao (holistic guiding discourse or proper ways), and de 德 
(moral efficacy) are constantly emphasized in the text of the Xunzi. It is a strong indication that 
Xunzi is a committed Confucian, making his way to bring the Confucian values back to the 
                                                
14 See the Mengzi, 6A. 
15 道行之而成。《莊子‧齊物論》 
16 Even though Xunzi did not formulate any version of the “is-ought problem” as Hume defined, Xunzi was of no 
doubt very aware of the danger of the slippery slope of justifying the moral through appealing to the natural. 
17 This argument in the form of Reductio ad Absurdum or Modus Tollens is my own reformulation which was never 
stated by Xunzi in this way. However, it is certainly entailed by the reasoning of Xunzi. 
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central stage. Also, it demonstrates Xunzi’s conviction that Confucianism does have an 
important role to play in an age of decay and disintegration of traditional values. 
 Although it appears to be the case that Xunzi’s thinking is concerned exclusively with 
political and moral philosophy, interestingly a new group of notions that Xunzi employs are 
cognitive and epistemic in nature, concerning the whole process of decision-making. For 
example, the first Chinese character of the chapter title “Against Twelve Thinkers” is “fei 非,” 
meaning being averse to something after making a cognitive judgment. In addition, the second 
Chinese character of the chapter title “Dissolving Partiality” is “bi 蔽”, referring to being 
perceptually covered or blocked to some extent so that a sound decision cannot be made. Other 
noticeable notions include lei (analogical grouping), qun 群 (grouping and gathering), li 理 
(patterning), fen 分 (distinguishing), and bian 辨 (discerning). Xunzi’s large-scale applications of 
these cognitive and epistemic notions are unprecedented in the Confucian canons that exist 
before him. Therefore, while it may be too much in asserting that Xunzi’s ethical stances are 
based on a certain epistemic foundation, it is not problematic, however, to say that Xunzi’s 
ethical and epistemic stances are closely interrelated. 
Contextualizing the text of the Xunzi to its historical background does not necessarily 
imply that it should keep silent regarding contemporary epistemological issues. One of the issues 
specifically related to this dissertational project is concerned with knowledge, regarded by Plato 
as the most important element in life (Protagoras 352d). Since the Gettier problem plagued the 
received tripartite definition of knowledge in normative epistemology in the 1960s, long and 
extensive debates between internalism and externalism concerning epistemic justification have 
been going on for decades. According to Laurence BonJour, 
11 
 
[A] theory is internalist if and only if it requires that all of the factors needed for a belief 
to be epistemically justified for a given person to be cognitively accessible to that person, 
internal to his cognitive perspective; and externalist, if it allows that at least some of the 
justifying factors need not be thus accessible, so that they can be external to the believer’s 
cognitive perspective, beyond his ken…18 
Merely following BonJour’s internalism/externalism distinction, there seems to be no doubt that 
Xunzi belongs to the externalist campaign because Xunzi allows some epistemic justifying 
features of knowledge not from the cognitive perspective of an individual.19 Nevertheless, simply 
stating that Xunzi is an externalist does not have much relevance to the soil of classical Chinese 
philosophy. As the focus of epistemic evaluations has shifted from beliefs to faculties, and then 
to agents in communities, Xunzi’s insights tend to resonate this shift of focus to virtue in a 
significant way. 
 One of the most notable features of this shift of focus is that contemporary 
epistemologists are urged to rethink whether epistemic atomism—a pillar of the modern 
epistemology since Descartes—is an adequate starting point for philosophizing. Important 
criticisms are provided by some feminist epistemologists as well as virtue epistemologists, such 
as Lorraine Code, Sandra Harding, Helen Longino, and Linda Zagzebski. Many of them think 
that merely focusing on a specific epistemic item P of an individual S at time T is too narrow, 
that the connection between epistemology and ethics has to be reexamined, and that subjectivity 
as well as the social dimensions of knowledge need to be reinstated. I suggest that Xunzi 
                                                
18 Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, eds., A Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 132. 
19 Xunzi’s notion of the communicability of heart-mind’s “verification of knowing (zhengzhi 徵知)” is a prime 
example of the essential communal aspect of knowledge: whatever cannot be communicated to other members of 
the community is not considered as knowledge. See “Attunement of Names (Zhengming 正名)” chapter in the Xunzi. 
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provides us an effective way of thinking how knowledge comes to existence and function in 
human communities—which is highly coherent with his ethical perspectives—without appealing 
to epistemic atomism. 
 The Xunzian remedy, put in a very simplified way, is to turn to other exemplary members 
in the community for inter-subjective verification and agreement. Before any verification and 
agreement can be made, there is no new piece of knowledge. In other words, for Xunzi the 
communal conditions as a basis for knowledge cannot be ignored. Thus an appropriate starting 
point for philosophizing knowledge is a concrete knowledge-inquiring community rather than an 
abstracted individual knower. If this is the case, a set of questions has to be asked in order to map 
out the epistemic stances that Xunzi holds: How is the Xunzian model different from the 
atomistic model endorsed by conventional S-knows-that-P epistemology? What are human 
persons situated in a community of other fellow members? What are the Xunzian epistemic 
paradigms? How does Xunzi deal with the problem of illusion? What role does language play in 
the communal inquiry? Do the notions conventionally associated with ethics (such as trust, 
authority, responsiveness, and even virtue) have any implication in epistemology? 
 I intend to address these questions one by one as this dissertational project aims to 
provide a coherent account of how Xunzi’s epistemic stances are interwoven together. Even 
though a significant amount of academic works concerning the ethics of Xunzi has been 
fruitfully produced, the epistemic aspect of Xunzi’s doctrines is still largely left off. 
III. 
Literature Review 
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 There are at least three sets of books on the Xunzi available for English readers that are 
also relevant to this project. The first set is translation. In addition to anthologies or sourcebooks 
of Chinese philosophy or intellectual history which come with a few selected passages, Homer 
Dubs (1928), Burton Watson (1963), John Knoblock (1988-1994, in three volumes), and Eric 
Hutton (2001, 2014) have distinguished themselves by offering substantial translational works in 
terms of both quantity and quality. Knoblock’s three-volume-book and Hutton’s Xunzi: The 
Complete Text are by far the only complete translations. 
 An important issue concerning any translation is: since the process of translating from the 
source language to the target language may seem to be “transparent”, translators’ interpretative 
frameworks are usually untold. General readers who do not read different translated versions at 
once are thus exposed to the danger of receiving misinterpretations that results in profound 
confusion. For example, while many scholars presuppose that Xunzi is a realist, their translated 
passages of the Xunzi will consequently impose a realist reading, usually without much 
justification. By the same token, Xunzi is in some other cases regarded as a positivist,20 a 
conventionalist,21 a pragmatist,22 or even a precursor of science.23 The significance of 
interpretative frameworks will become increasingly crucial when it comes to rendering the key 
passages. 
The second set, then, is concerned with providing an appropriate interpretative 
framework to render Xunzi’s philosophical positions. Edward J. Machle’s Nature and Heaven in 
                                                
20 Vincent Yu Chung Shih, “Hsün Tzu’s Positivism,” in Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, New Series 4, no. 2 
(1964): 162-174. 
21 Chad Hansen, Language and Logic in Ancient China, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983). 
22 Hansen, “Xunzi: Pragmatic Confucianism,” in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical 
Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 307-344. 
23 Hu Shih, The Development of Logical Method in Ancient China (Shanghai, 1928). 
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the Xunzi (1993) is one of the earliest works that aims to unpack the Xunzian naturalism via a 
text-based religio-philosophical interpretation of the tractate “Tianlun 天論 (commonly called 
On Nature or Discussion of Heaven)” in the Xunzi. Machle intends to provide a “close reading” 
of the text that questions the unchallenged and unarticulated frameworks employed in the 
received readings of the Xunzi. Machle, arguing against naturalistic interpretations of “tian 天”, 
holds that Tianlun is a key chapter because the interpretation of it “affects the way the whole of 
the Xunzi is understood.”24 Upon careful examinations of the Tianlun chapter, Machle maintains 
that even though tian does have a profound sense of religiousness and it “performs the functions 
of a god, but has no anthropomorphizing stories”, both “God” or “Heaven” on the one hand in 
the sense of Western theology and “Nature” on the other hand in the sense of modern science or 
philosophical naturalism are inapplicable to translate this term.25 By keeping it transliterated and 
untranslated, the distance will prevent us from conforming the Xunzian notions to ill-fitting 
concepts. 
 Janghee Lee’s Xunzi and Early Chinese Naturalism (2005), following Machle’s take on 
the key notion of tian, can be seen as a large-scale project to reexamine Xunzi’s place in the 
philosophical context of naturalism in classical China. As aforementioned, Lee suggests that in 
the absence of the notion of absolute transcendence, it is not surprising for thinkers and 
philosophers in early China to turn to naturalistic ideas as sources of normativity. Xunzi’s 
philosophy is therefore best understood as a critical response to a variety of versions of 
“naturalism” in his time. Lee specifically points out that Xunzi’s notion of xin 心—as the faculty 
of autonomy and self-governance—serves as an important reply to the “naturalistic trends” in the 
                                                
24 Edward J. Machle, Nature and Heaven in the Xunzi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), xi. 
25 Ibid., 176-7. 
15 
 
Warring States Period.26 The autonomy of xin also plays a crucial role “in preventing li [ritual 
propriety] from being a formal, coercive set of normative codes imposed from above.” Thus 
Xunzi distinguishes himself not only from followers of naturalism, but also from the Legalists 
who attempt to diminish the boundary between fa (penalty laws) and li (ritual propriety). 
 Kurtis Hagen’s The Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction (2007) proffers a new 
approach of understanding Xunzi’s philosophical position, challenging a mainstream realist 
interpretation of the Xunzi that “there is a reality independent of our thoughts about it”, that 
“there is a privileged description [prescribed by the sage] of this reality”, that “concepts can and 
should mirror it [i.e., the reality]”, and that “properly chosen moral concepts capture eternal 
truths revealing one true way”.27 With solid textual support, Hagen tries to demonstrate that such 
a loaded metaphysical commitment is not necessary in interpreting the Xunzi. Instead, the 
Hagenean reconstruction shows that Xunzi leans more towards pragmatism rather than realism. 
The models set by the sages are neither eternal nor final: they are historically contingent 
arrangements and constructs assumed to be constantly modified as socio-political and 
environmental conditions change over time. 
 The third set of books is related to specific topics such as moral epistemology and virtue 
epistemology. I shall just name a couple of them that are exclusively related to this project. A. S. 
Cua’s Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu's Moral Epistemology (1985) is the first book 
available for English readers that provides systematic examinations of the epistemic import for 
Xunzi’s ethical claims from the perspective of his communication styles and strategies.28 Cua 
                                                
26 Lee, Xunzi and Early Chinese Naturalism, 3. 
27 Kurtis Hagan, The Philosophy of Xunzi: a Reconstruction (Chicago: Open Court, 2007), 8. 
28 Cua is also recognized as “the first contemporary philosophy scholar to undertake a study of Xunzi’s moral 
philosophy from an analytical point of view.” See Cheng, “Xunzi as a Systematic Philosopher,” 9, 12. 
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points out that for Xunzi there are four standards of argumentative competence: discrimination 
and concordance, evidence, goal articulation, and implementation.29 He also argues that certain 
uses of the term “li (理)” by Xunzi are importantly epistemic and should be rendered as “reason” 
or “reasonableness”.30 Ethical argumentation relying on li is thus a reason-giving activity. Cua 
also suggests that the process of analogical projection (tuilei 推類)—imaginatively applying past 
ethical experiences to a new and concrete circumstance—in ethical reasoning implies that the 
Xunzian ethical reasoning is not rule-based.31 
The process of reasoning (li 理) through analogical projection is embedded in a broader 
ritual context (li 禮). Observance of ritual propriety entails the need to learn and embody certain 
culturally specific practices that may have ethical and epistemic implications. For Xunzi, both of 
the lis are indispensable: while the ritual context (li) provides a person in the community a sense 
of appropriateness, reasoning (li) is a linguistically articulated form of conduct which is 
communicative in nature. 
Cua’s study is of central importance to this dissertational project. I do, however, intend to 
broaden Cua’s project and examine the broader epistemic context in the Xunzi. Cua limits his 
scope of investigation in Xunzi’s “moral epistemology” and such an approach is influential. For 
example, Lee also states: 
In Xunzi’s moral epistemology, the faculty of xin and empirical knowledge occupy 
central positions. While knowledge is produced by our experience, it is neither available 
nor reliable without the faculty of xin… Neither knowledge of things nor moral 
                                                
29 A. S. Cua, Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsun Tzu's Moral Epistemology (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1985), 15. 
30 Ibid., 21. 
31 Ibid., 80, 99. 
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knowledge are just given; they are acquired through direct or indirect experiences that 
call for confirmation by the faculty of xin.32 
I suggest that it is not necessary to speak of Xunzi’s epistemic stances merely in terms of his 
ethics, even though it is valuable in its own right in introducing how moral qualities can be 
known in Xunzi’s philosophy. I also conclude that the attention paid to the epistemic stances of 
Xunzi and their connection to the ethical stances is insufficient, although there is a general 
recognition that Xunzi’s ethical statements are at times intimately associated with epistemic 
statements. It is not until the publication of an important book concerning virtue and 
contemporary epistemology that the gap between the epistemic and the ethical can be effectively 
crossed. 
Linda Zagzebski’s Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the 
Ethical Foundation of Knowledge (1996) provides detailed analyses of the parallelism between 
contemporary epistemology and modern ethics and turns to develop a pure virtue-based 
epistemological theory, which also inspires the current project. Zagzebski points out that 
contemporary epistemology is belief-based, just as modern ethics is act-based. Epistemic 
states are evaluated in terms of properties of beliefs or belief dispositions, just as moral 
evaluations are typically given in terms of properties of acts or act dispositions. Beliefs 
that are evaluated positively are called justified, just as acts evaluated positively are 
called right.33 
It is further articulated that most forms of epistemic internalism are in accord with deontological 
ethics while most forms of epistemic externalism are parallel to consequentialism. Such a 
                                                
32 Lee, Xunzi and Early Chinese Naturalism, 46-7. 
33 Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundation of 
Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19-20. 
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mapping is not a coincidence. If, as Zagzebski suggests, the link between epistemology and 
ethics is much stronger than it appears, it shall be academically valuable and intellectually 
interesting to investigate what this great synthesizer of the pre-Qin schools would think of 
knowledge and conduct in an extraordinary era. 
As the traditional scholarship has already noted, Xunzi faced an era in which socio-
political and ethical values drastically change. On the one hand, Xunzi was a strong defender of 
the core values established by Confucius. On the other hand, Xunzi never tried to hide his 
admiration of the efficient governance of the Qin state that eventually outweighed all other states 
and ended the Warring States Period that lasted almost two hundred years. Therefore, there is no 
doubt that political philosophy and ethics have been two foci of the scholarly attention. 
Nevertheless, it was at the same time that the warring states enjoyed significant breakthroughs in 
traditional medicine and technologies of mechanical as well as civil engineering, highly likely 
co-related with the increasing demands of military propensities that aimed to unify all the 
states.34 Refinement and new developments in metallurgy (among metals such as copper, gold 
and silver, archaeological evidence shows that the smelting of iron also benefited agriculture, 
carpentry, and mining),35 the making of lacquerware, textiles, and glass artifacts, and the 
advances of theories and practices of herbal medicine were just a few of the remarkable 
highlights of this period. As a great synthesizer of the pre-Qin schools, it seems to be more 
inconceivable to believe that Xunzi would ignore all the technological developments and say 
nothing about empirical knowledge than to believe that he would not. 
                                                
34 In the Warring States Period (403 BCE-221 BCE), wars were less frequent yet much more intense than the 
predating Spring and Autumn Period (722 BCE.-481 BCE). 
35 During the Warring States Period, iron utensils have been widely used in China. The making of malleable cast-
iron is further developed. See He Tangkun, “Metallurgy,” in Ancient China’s Technology and Science (Beijing: 
Foreign Languages Press, 2009), 393. 
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 Zagzebski’s other book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and 
Autonomy in Belief (2012), also sheds light on this dissertational project. According to 
Zagzebski, we are rationally required to trust (A) our own faculties, (B) others’ faculties, (C) 
epistemic authorities, and (D) those we and our communities conscientiously trust.36 The project 
of Epistemic Authority aims to spell out how rationality and epistemic trust work in different 
levels of an epistemic community. Such approach has significance resonance with the Confucian 
communal sensibilities.37 Even though trust in a Confucian context is usually related to the 
ethical or socio-political, I think that the dimension of epistemic trust cannot be ignored. Hence 
Zagzebski’s investigations provide a promising way to unpack the entailments of the epistemic 
aspects of authority and trust in the Xunzi. 
The fourth work that fills in the gap and contributes significantly to this current project is 
Jane Geaney’s On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought (2002). Geaney 
provides a precise account of sense discrimination, the role of xin (heart-mind), and how a 
general understanding of the signifier and the signified in linguistic expressions is correlated to 
the comprehension of sense discrimination in the major philosophical texts in pre-Qin China. It 
is stated that 
[w]hile aural/visual parallels occur in all of the Warring States philosophical texts, in the 
Xunzi they play an especially prominent role. For the Xunzi the responses of the eyes and 
ears produce reliable knowledge, both because they correspond to one another, and 
because they respond spontaneously to stimulation. While spontaneity of this sort 
                                                
36 Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 37-8, 69, 107, 152. 
37 For example, Confucius holds that “if the common people do not trust their leaders, community will not endure.” 
See the Analects 12.7. 
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precludes the labor of selecting an appropriate response, it does not preclude evaluating 
responses in relation to their consequence. This indeed reflects the Xunzi’s pragmatic 
approach to knowledge. In the Xunzi, knowledge is oriented toward embodiment and 
action.38 
If Geaney’s observation is warranted, it should be correct to say that Xunzi’s emphasis on the 
socio-political and ethical concerns do not entail that his epistemic stances are completely 
insignificant and uninteresting. Although the claim that Xunzi has developed his version of 
epistemology seems to be an oxymoron according to the received distinction between 
epistemology and ethics, it is much more defensible to state that Xunzi does proffer some 
remarkably coherent epistemic stances that are delicately woven together with the fabric of his 
ethical stances. More importantly, such epistemic stances echo the contemporary criticisms of 
conventional epistemology that has become an irreplaceable pillar of the architecture of the 
modern mind. Now the proper time to reexamine the epistemic stances of Xunzi, with reference 
to some important ethical stances, and provide a coherent synthesized picture has come. 
IV. 
An Overview of the Argument 
 
From the perspective of Joseph Needham, the contribution of Confucianism to science is 
“almost wholly negative” in general. Xunzi, in particular, is a salient example that represents the 
“ambivalent relation of Confucianism to science”: 
[Xunzi] strongly objected to the efforts of the Logicians and the Mohists to work out a 
scientific logic, and insisted on the practical application of technological processes while 
                                                
38 Geaney, On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought, 136. 
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denying the importance of theoretical investigation. In this way he struck a blow at 
science by emphasising its social context too much and too soon.39 
Needham’s assessment of the Confucianism and Xunzian “scientific thinking” is premised on the 
key question he tries to answer through the whole Science and Civilisation in China series in 
which “modern science” is the presupposed standard: Why did post-Renaissance mathematized 
natural science develop only in Europe, but not China?  This dissertational project is not 
designed to refute Needham’s claims concerning classical Confucians. It is of little doubt that 
Xunzi and the Chinese tradition in general do not regard propositional knowledge to be 
exclusively important and fundamental. And yet merely staying with this claim provides neither 
important insights nor profound understanding. Therefore, I do intend to make clear the 
epistemic significance of Xunzi’s taking social context into account in his philosophy. My 
investigation starts with Xunzi’s notion of a person. 
 I shall argue that since the Xunzian philosophical enterprise is based on a relational 
model of a person (person-in-relationships)—in which relationships with people, things and 
events are not add-ons, but build-ins; both the ethical and epistemic paradigm that Xunzi 
attempts to establish is drastically different from, and maybe unintelligible to, the received ones 
in modern Europe. Taking the embodied person-in-relations as primary, exemplary persons 
(junzi) become both the epistemic and ethical paradigm in the communities in which they are 
situated. Being with other epistemic and moral agents, these exemplary persons distinguish 
themselves through efficacious interpersonal relations, reliable practices, and their capacities of 
know-how. While usually being considered as primarily social and communal, efficacious 
interpersonal relations have epistemic implications as well. Xunzi would definitely argue that a 
                                                
39 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, Vol.2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 26. 
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good epistemic model cannot exist alone without those exemplary persons who established, 
developed, refined, and embodied it. Good epistemic practices entail a good knowledge-seeking 
community. 
The primacy of exemplary persons, however, lies on their radical embeddedness in 
communal life. For Xunzi, if epistemic and ethical independency can ever be achieved, the sort 
of independency must begin with epistemic and ethical inter-dependency. The processes of 
knowing, of making sense, and of reasoning—which involve linguistic and physical 
communication, education, reliable practices, and refinement—are irreducibly communal and 
ethical issues. Just as there is no person unless there are two people, there is no knowledge unless 
there are two knowers in a knowledge-seeking community. It is a very different approach from 
modern and contemporary normative epistemology and ethics; and it requires much effort to 
unpack the system in a comprehensive way.  
Thus, Chapter 2 deals with the notion of person in the Xunzi in contrast to its counterpart 
in the Cartesian and Kantian constructions upon which modern epistemology is based. First of all, 
I will closely analyze the connection between the notion of person and its projections in 
epistemological spaces. Even though the term “person” may be an ambiguous word with a 
variety of possible interpretations, philosophical or non-philosophical, the construction of this 
term unarguably becomes the paradigm of philosophizing. Tracing how the modern notion of 
person is constructed will enable us to expose the key assumptions in modern epistemology and 
ethics. 
Secondly, I will reexamine certain key features of the modernist personhood that are 
shared by the Cartesian and the Kantian models. I will demonstrate both the ethical and the 
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epistemological significance of the modernist notion of personhood. Even though this is not to 
say that the notion of person and the epistemology as well as ethics are causally related, their 
associations are too important to be ignored. Then I will bring in the “person-in-relationships” 
model that Xunzi takes for granted: one is a person only among other people (and there is no 
person unless there are at least two people). 
Thirdly, Xunzi’s model of person-in-relationships, which does seem to be conceptually 
foreign from the perspectives of modern philosophers, will be under the spotlight for further 
investigation. Here I present the key argument of this chapter: if the notions of person come with 
epistemic and ethical significance in received philosophical systems, very different versions of 
epistemology and ethics should be expected given that the notion of person is drastically 
unfamiliar. Since a human person is irreducibly communal in the philosophy of Xunzi, close 
attention has to be paid not only to his epistemic and ethical stances as such, but also to the 
alternative models of knowing, acting, and linguistic practices as well. Thus this chapter opens 
doors for the research of the following chapters.  
Chapter 3 will be on Xunzi’s notion of knowledge (zhi知), with its interrelation with 
notions such as heart-mind, competence, and comprehensiveness as the primary focus. I intend to 
demonstrate that zhi is largely not belief-based, that competence is a crucial key to unlock the 
skill-centered understanding of zhi, and that zhi is both communal and ecological. From this 
perspective, zhi is intimately associated with knowing-how. Thus the process of knowing is 
closely related to the process of self-cultivation that aims to increase the awareness and 
transform the heart-mind, from which competence and comprehensiveness are developed. 
Since—in an important sense—developing skills means knowing things for Xunzi, the Xunzian 
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perspective of knowledge emphasizes appropriate responsiveness that having a skill essentially 
entails, rather than an accurate representation. A knower is not a person with justified true beliefs, 
but a cultivated exemplar capable of responding to emerging things and events in a reliable way. 
Chapter 4 aims to elaborate another dimension of knowledge, knowing-who, in relation 
to Xunzi’s doctrine regarding the normativity of language: “attunement of names (zhengming正
名).” Based on an understanding of the interrelations between language and human affairs 
provided in the Yijing, I shall argue against the realist interpretation of the doctrine of zhengming, 
which renders language as a representation of reality and thereby ignores the aspect of 
responsiveness that Xunzi consistently emphasizes. I will present a case that the doctrine of 
zhengming is for optimizing interpersonal communication so that knowing people can be 
effective. Such an approach leads to a discussion of the ideal communicator—that is, the sage—
that Xunzi as well as other Confucians acknowledged. Knowing people through effective 
communication is necessarily embodied, value-laden, socially embedded and saturated, and—
inevitably—not claimed to be infallible. Knowing people is not about having justified true 
beliefs of certain individuals, but about participating in the development of both intimacy and 
integrity in a concrete communal context. 
Chapter 5 serves as a transitional chapter that addresses the treatments that metaphor, 
imagination, and wisdom received in the context of positivist epistemology and classical 
Confucianism, based on the distinction between responsiveness and representation. While 
metaphor, imagination, and wisdom have been marginalized in the context of positivist 
epistemology that prioritizes representational accuracy, they have played significant roles in 
classical Confucianism that emphasizes responsiveness. Being capable of using a metaphor to 
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make a point appropriately is an indication of having the competence to respond to other 
language users’ communication strategies; being able to think imaginatively demonstrates the 
ability to respond to a situation in a non-conventional way after the relations in this given 
situation are depicted; becoming wise is all about developing cultivated responsiveness that 
enables a person’s knowledge and conduct to be unified in coping with, or fighting against, 
emerging situations in a positive and reliable way. Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
understand wisdom impersonally, the discussion of this chapter leads us back to the central 
notion of person-in-relationships, the focus of intellectual virtues.  
Chapter 6, with a virtue epistemological turn, articulates the qualities of good Xunzian 
knowers and how exemplary knowers become sources of normativity. If exemplary persons are 
the foci of both ethical and epistemic evaluations, then knowing will be part of these persons’ 
conduct. In this chapter, I explore key intellectual virtues and a special category of “epistemic 
villains.” Since both virtuous knowers and epistemic villains in the Xunzi possess certain kinds 
of knowledge how and practice their skills in a reliable way as they move from one social 
location to another, I attempt to reexamine the status of skill knowledge in the Xunzi and 
determine that it is not a form of proposition but acquaintance. If my assessment is warranted, 
this characteristic leaves the misidentification of the exemplary a possibility that can never be 
eliminated. I then introduce Zagzebski’s exemplarism to clarify what kind of truth and 
normativity that Xunzi aims to pursue. 
 Chapter 7, the epilogue, serves as the concluding remarks to wrap up the whole discussion.  
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Chapter 2 
Persons in Relationships 
 
 
Chinese culture is often characterized as a culture of 
obligation rather than individual freedom. 
This characterization is not just a stereotype; 
it is rooted in various nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
constructions of Chinese identity,  
as such an identity is compared to that of the “West.” 
-- Erica Fox Bridley 
 
 Both epistemological and ethical theories often, if not always, implicitly presuppose 
certain conceptual projections of the ideal knower or moral agent. Descartes’ cogito —regarded 
as the discovered truth without the need of any criterion—which marks the epistemological turn 
of the landscape of European philosophy, is based on an isolated, independent, and abstract 
“thinking thing” that is not connected with other things, events, and people in any fundamental 
way. The utilitarian enterprise, developed by Jeremy Bentham, is based on the model that an 
individual seeks first and foremost nothing but self-interests; the ethical issue at hand is to pursue 
the enlightened kind of self-interests. For both Descartes (epistemology) and Bentham (ethics), a 
knowing, acting, subject instead of a group of subjects is presupposed.  
 I shall call this position “atomism” in the sense of the classical understanding that an 
atom is an essential element that can not be divided any further. Both “epistemological atomism” 
and “ethical atomism” are based on the assumption that an appropriate epistemological and 
ethical system must start with the existence of the atomic knowing or moral agent. Such a view, 
and its philosophical implications and consequences, will be further examined in detail later in 
this chapter. 
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 Even though this atomic approach is mainstream in both epistemological and ethical 
theories, it has encountered increasingly intensified criticisms within the context of Euro-
American philosophy since the dawn of the twentieth century. Process philosophers such as A. 
N. Whitehead, pragmatists such as John Dewey and George H. Mead, and feminists such as 
Lorraine Code and Sandra Harding have both criticized and proposed different approaches 
outside of the atomic framework. This atomic framework is also foreign to Xunzi and his 
philosophical thinking. 
 Unsurprisingly, the descriptions and prescriptions of knowledge and conduct presented 
through the “non-atomic” approaches are different from those presented through atomism. 
Although it may be an overstatement to claim that epistemological or ethical theories completely 
depend upon how an ideal knower or moral agent is conceived, it should be unproblematic to 
assert that they are closely correlated. 
 This chapter aims to reveal the “uncommon assumptions” that Xunzi adopts in 
establishing his epistemic and ethical stances in contrast with two of the most commonly 
received models that are pillars of modern philosophy: the Cartesian model and the Kantian 
model. I shall first choose a conceptual lens that effectively yields the most optimized results for 
highlighting the Xunzian characteristics. Thus the question at hand is: Which notion(s) 
concerning the conditions of the knower and/or moral agent will provide a satisfactory outcome? 
Candidates conventionally employed in comparative philosophy, such as “self” and “individual,” 
are easy picks. And yet, I shall argue that the notion of “person” will produce an image with 
better conceptual resolution and clarity. 
  I. 
“Person” as a Conceptual Lens 
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 Notions and concepts are deeply rooted in human languages and the practices of these 
languages in communities. A well-established notion or concept in one particular community 
may not be so recognizable in another community. At a deeper level, the cluster of conceptual 
networks that one particular notion is associated with may turn out to be very unfamiliar once the 
communal context is shifted. Therefore, assuming that there is a stable one-to-one 
correspondence between two notions from different communal contexts is very naïve, if not 
completely wrong-headed. In other words, there are always tensions when a scholar attempts to 
build a conceptual bridge between two distinctive intellectual traditions. I regard such uneasy 
tensions as the nature of doing comparative philosophy. It does not imply that notions across 
different intellectual traditions cannot be bridged at all; and yet authors and readers alike do need 
to be aware of the tensions, temporality and limitations once a conceptual bridge is built. 
 To achieve high-quality conceptual resolution and clarity in conducting research in 
comparative philosophy, several criteria have to be met. First of all, there must be significant 
overlaps of semantic meanings. Second, it is important for the clusters of notions, associated 
with the targets for comparison, to share similarity to a certain degree. Third, it will be much 
more desirable for the chosen notions to be unencumbered by established philosophical 
connotations and implications. 
 In the past decades, a common theme in the study of Chinese philosophy and intellectual 
history is to ask: “What is the Chinese notion of self?” or “What does Chinese individualism 
look like?” Even though fruitful results are produced with honest attempts to understand and 
interpret the Chinese mind, I suggest that it is time to move on and skip the use of “self” and 
“individualism” due to their heavily loaded philosophical connotations. 
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 Although both “self” and “individual” seem to satisfy the first two of the aforementioned 
criteria, there are significant problems for employing them as a bridge to Xunzian thinking. 
Etymologically, “self” is closely associated with the notion of strict identity, emphasizing the 
same characteristics of an entity throughout time; “individual” refers to an entity that is not (in-) 
divisible (diciduus), strongly suggesting a kind of atomic existence.40 While both notions and 
other related concepts can easily express themselves in the context of modern philosophy, they 
are not intelligible in Xunzi’s philosophy. 
 Following the Confucian predecessors, Xunzi discriminates ren人 (distinguished ones) 
from min民 (commoners, the masses) in a community. Such a distinction is pervasive in Xunzi’s 
writings, implying that there were processes of becoming distinguished in the historical context 
of increasing social mobility in the Warring States period. Such processual and developmental 
understanding of emerging as ren from the primitive state of min requires neither the notion of 
strict identity nor the notion of atomic existence. Such an understanding, as Yang Rur-Bin 
suggests, also entails the recognition that both notions are profoundly “socialized.”41 At this 
point, what can be established is that the notions deeply embedded in both “self” and 
“individual” are irrelevant to Xunzi’s thinking. As the inquiry of this chapter unfolds, it will 
become even more evident that the gap between the Xunzian model on the one hand and the 
Cartesian and Kantian models on the other hand is too huge to be bridged effectively. 
 In contrast to both “self” and “individual”, the notion of “person” not only avoids the 
pitfalls of irrelevant connotations but also contains irreducible communal dimensions. Moreover, 
                                                
40 C. T. Onions, Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 470, 807-8. 
41 Yang, Rur-Bin楊儒賓, Ru Jia Shen Ti Guan儒家身體觀 (The Confucian Notions of Body), (Taipei: Academia 
Sinica Press, 1996), 8. 
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“person” strongly entails the importance of communal roles that serve as a significant key to 
understanding Confucian ethics. Sociologist Robert Ezra Park states, 
It is probably no mere historical accident that the word person, in its first meaning, is a 
mask. It is rather a recognition of the fact that everyone is always and everywhere, more 
or less consciously, playing a role…It is in these roles that we know each other; it is in 
these roles that we know ourselves.42 
In other words, what is taken as the secondary and the derivative in the model of atomic self—
communal roles in human experience—is considered as the primary in terms of the model of the 
person. Park goes on and explains that “[i]n the end, our conception of our role becomes second 
nature and an integral part of our personality. We come into the world…, achieve character, and 
become persons.”43 
 There is no doubt that for Park “person” is achieved only through active participation in 
communal roles. Such an understanding provides adequate support for taking the process of 
becoming a person as the starting point of philosophizing, because people know each other 
through their personas. This Parkian characterization of “person” comes very close to the 
Xunzian model of becoming ren and therefore demonstrates that employing the notion of 
“person”, instead of “self” or “individual”, as the conceptual lens will promise much more 
meaningful outcomes for comparison. 
 In addition, taking “person” as primary enables us to bypass implications of mind/body 
dualism—not playing any significant role in the Confucian tradition—that becomes the 
mainstream understanding of humans since the dawn of modern philosophy. In his attempt to 
                                                
42 Robert Ezra Park, Race and Culture (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), 249. 
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overcome the “problem of other minds,”44 P. F. Strawson states: “What I am suggesting is that it 
is easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons, if we think first of 
the fact that we act, and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human 
nature.”45 While Descartes introduces a logical gap between the individual knowing self and its 
body, the Strawsonian remedy is that “one begins with the whole person”: the notion of “person” 
must be regarded as logically prior to any individual consciousness in a philosophical 
investigation.46 Thus, starting with the notion of “person” avoids the danger of disorientation. 
 Moreover, choosing “person” over “self” or “individual” will effectively avoid confusing 
statements such as Chad Hansen’s conclusion that “there is no individualism in Chinese 
philosophy.”47 Without understanding Hansen’s overall approach, this statement seems to deny 
the possibility of will, authority, social interaction, and any sense of agency in Chinese 
intellectual history all at once. The problem is not bad scholarship, but inadequate terminology. 
 To find alternative terms instead of readily available ones and to employ them in 
comparative studies of intellectual traditions, however, is not completely uncontroversial. There 
are scholars who would argue otherwise. Erica Fox Brindley, for example, insists that “[t]o cut 
off the use of a perfectly good term and analytic device simply out of allegiance to a presumed 
original context or a single tradition is to deny concepts their potential to change, adapt to new 
contexts, and facilitate the translation of other cultures and the past.”48 Brindley’s remedy is to 
make the bridging terms loose enough so that they can contain two distinctive sets of 
                                                
44 The problem of “other mind” is a philosophical plague resulting from the Cartesian division of a disembodied 
knowing self and the external world. The central question is: how can I be sure that other minds exist? 
45 P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959), 112. 
46 Anita Avramides, Other Minds (New York: Routledge, 2001), 231-2. 
47 Hansen, “Individualism in Chinese Thought” in Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist 
Values, ed. Donald Munro (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985), 54. 
48 Erica Fox Bridley, Individualism in Early China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010), x. 
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implications inter-culturally. Even though terms such as “individual” and “individualism” work 
just fine for Brindley, common readers without much knowledge in the intellectual traditions of 
China have no choice but following their own default thinking patterns. I do not think that this 
approach is effective. 
 If the aforementioned reasons for choosing “person” over “self” or “individual” are 
warranted, I would like to focus on articulating how the notion of “person” is understood in two 
prominent models of modern philosophy—namely, the Cartesian model and the Kantian 
model—with special emphases on their epistemic and ethical implications—before reaching the 
text of the Xunzi to draw a sharp contrast between them. 
  II. 
The Cartesian Model of “Person” 
 
 It seems to be commonsensical that Descartes is so concerned with metaphysics and 
epistemology that ethics and political philosophy play merely minor roles in his philosophical 
enterprise. Such a view is truthful in terms of the final products that Descartes offers in the 
market of the history of philosophy.49 Nevertheless, such a fact does not mean that Descartes has 
no input concerning how a person should be functioning in a society.  
 Prior to any elaboration, I would like to consider three aspects as bases to reconstruct the 
Cartesian model of “person”. First of all, Descartes has a unique and influential perspective of 
how different academic disciplines are related by evoking the image of a tree: 
Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is 
physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may 
                                                
49 For example, Leibniz notes, “[w]e need only inspect the incomparable manual of Epictetus and the Epicurean of 
Laerica to admit that Descartes has not much advanced the practice of morality.” See G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical 
Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 241. 
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be reduced to three principle ones, namely medicine, mechanics, and morals. By 
“morals” I understand the highest and most perfect moral system, which presupposes a 
complete knowledge of other sciences and is the ultimate level of wisdom.50 
Following this scheme, Descartes’ philosophical endeavor focuses on establishing the truth from 
metaphysics (the roots), physics (the trunk), and then morals, mechanics, and medicine (the 
branches). To grasp the significance of morality as a science, one has to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of other sciences rooted in metaphysics. Knowledge of morality, 
therefore, necessarily presupposes knowledge of metaphysics as well as physics. A Cartesian 
sage, as Byron Williston states, thus “must be a capable scientist and metaphysician.”51 
 Second, it is not surprising that as one moves from the roots to the branches of this “tree 
of philosophy,” the degree of certainty decreases. Far from realizing the highest and most perfect 
moral system, Descartes understands that there must be some guiding sources for people not to 
act randomly when the situation is not clear and distinctive. The “provisional moral code (une 
morale par provision)”—consisting of several maxims—can be regarded as the Cartesian 
compass that navigates our daily conduct in responding to doubtful scenarios: 
The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, holding constantly to the 
religion in which by God's grace I had been instructed from my childhood…. The second 
maxim was to be as firm and decisive in my actions as I could, and to follow even the 
most doubtful opinions, once I had adopted them, with no less constancy than if they had 
been quite certain…. My third maxim was to try always to master myself rather than 
fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world…. Finally, to 
                                                
50 Descartes, CSM I 186. 
51 Byron Williston, “The Cartesian Sage and the Problem of Evil,” in Passion and Virtue in Descartes, ed. Byron 
Williston and Andre Gombay (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2003), 308. 
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conclude this moral code… I thought I could do no better than to continue with the 
[occupation] I was engaged in, and to devote my whole life to cultivating my reason and 
advancing as far as I could in the knowledge of the truth, following the method I had 
prescribed for myself.52 
The Cartesian methodology is to follow the rule of évidence53 whenever it is applicable. And yet 
with the understanding that a person is at times pressed to act in the absence of clear and distinct 
knowledge—when reason requires this person to suspend judgment, Descartes turns to his moral 
code for decision making: 
Now, before starting to rebuild your house, it is not enough simply to pull it down, to 
make provision for materials and architects (or else train yourself in architecture), and to 
have carefully drawn up the plans; you must also provide yourself with some other place 
where you can live comfortably while building is in progress. Accordingly, lest I should 
remain indecisive in my actions while reason obliged me to be so in my judgments, and 
in order to live as happily as I could during this time, I formed myself a provisional moral 
code consisting of just three or four maxims.54 
For Descartes, there is a divide between theory and practice. While the goal of theory is to 
pursue truth, our daily practice aims to pursue happiness. While, in theory, the knowledge system 
built through Cartesian methodology—by having empirical data and using deductive 
                                                
52 Descartes, Discourse on the Method (AT VI 22-7/CSM I 122-4). 
53 Descartes wrote, “never to accept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its truth: that is, 
carefully to avoid precipitate conclusions and preconceptions, and to include nothing more in my judgments than 
what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it.” (CSM I 120) 
54 Descartes, Discourse on the Method (AT VI 22/CSM I 122). 
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reasoning55—is solid, our moral practice may be faulty. The best shot for a person to act morally 
is to practice self-mastery and to cultivate his or her own reason. 
 While this “provisional moral code” is personal, it is not private in the sense that it is 
meant to be shared. And it leads to the third aspect that I would like to examine. In terms of the 
sharing of beliefs, Descartes has a clear vision of an “ethics of belief” published some 200 years 
before W. K. Clifford’s famous article.56 Donald Rutherford suggests that even though the 
Meditations seems to be abstracted from practical concerns, it has crucial ethical implications: 
[T]he Meditations pursues, in a theoretical context, an inquiry that is closely related to 
ethics: the proper disposition of the will. Descartes takes the operation of the will to be 
integral to both action and judgment… Descartes assigns the will a pivotal role in the 
pursuit of knowledge... [He] draws a close parallel between the will’s relation to the true 
and the good. Just as the will is compelled to assent to what is clearly and distinctly 
perceived to be true, so it is compelled to choose what is clearly and distinctly perceived 
to be good... And analogously, we might suppose, just as the recipe for avoiding error is 
to withhold assent from that whose truth is not perceived clearly and distinctly, so the 
recipe for avoiding moral error, or sin, is to refuse to choose that whose goodness is not 
perceived clearly and distinctly.57 
                                                
55 Descartes wrote, “There are two ways by which we arrive at a knowledge of things, viz. either by experience or by 
deduction…While our experience of things is often fallacious…deduction, i.e. the pure illation of one thing from 
another, though it may, through failure to take advantage of it, be omitted, can never be wrongly performed by an 
understanding that is in the least degree rational (Regulae II).” 
56 The term “ethics of belief” is due to the nineteenth-century English philosopher W. K. Clifford. The principle is: 
“It is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” See W. K. 
Clifford, The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays (London: Watts, 1947), 77. 
57 Donald Rutherford, Descartes’ Ethics (2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ethics/> 
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John Marshall, in his book Descartes’s Moral Theory, also makes a similar point concerning the 
ethical implications of the cogito: 
The Cartesian cogito is at once central to Cartesian ethics and to any theoretical 
understanding of morality: our own agency and autonomy…. Descartes believed that 
what was disclosed in the cogito could be interpreted as a substantial self—a soul—with 
the property of free will and potential for immortality.58 
If Rutherford and Marshall are right, Cartesian ethics is rooted in an epistemic structure. 
 With this simple, and hopefully not over-simplified, sketch of Descartes’ blueprint for 
building a philosophical system (tree of philosophy), for personal conduct (provisional moral 
code), and for inter-personal communication (ethics of belief), I wish to suggest the key 
characteristics of the Cartesian model of person. 
 Since the notion of person necessarily involves practicality, a Cartesian person is 
constantly situated between the known and unknown, the theoretical and the practical. Even 
though the Cartesian theory draws a sharp dichotomy between mind and body, throughout his 
life, Descartes approaches his local communities pragmatically: under the pressure of political, 
religious, and academic authorities, most—if not all—of his projects are carried out carefully 
with the anticipation that the metaphysical and physical principles might be recognized as truth. 
Descartes as a historical figure is by no means a person who disregards his bodily needs, social 
status, and scholarly career in any excessive way. Therefore, it seems to be the case that an ideal 
Cartesian person is more complicated than merely being dualistic. 
 However, Descartes’ unrelenting insistence that it is essential to find the unconditional 
truth as the basis of building a solid knowledge system deems that knowledge is purely 
                                                
58 John Marshall, Descartes’s Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 4. 
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intellectual. It has to start with a subjective reflection, a first-person perspective with the logical 
divide that cuts this thinking “I” from the non-thinking body and other members of the 
community. Descartes’ best hope, therefore, is that his readers as individual and intellectual 
beings will come to the realization of the Cartesian truth, one transformed mind at a time. By 
setting the central stage for this “I”, Descartes also presents the community where this thinking 
thing is situated as a contingent gathering of atomic figures. A person, as far as the Cartesian 
theory is concerned, is an indivisible atomic existence without any inherent, intrinsic, and 
necessary relationship with other atoms. 
 The cogito as the first established truth and the paradigm of knowledge is propositional—
refraining from any bodily practice and inter-personal communication—and the whole project is 
based on the model of mathematics. As Descartes lays out at the opening of the Regulae, the 
discipline of mathematics (and hence deduction and the certainty of derived knowledge 
guaranteed by the deductive method) is based on intellectual intuition exclusively. To franchise 
deduction is thus to privilege intellectual intuition over anything else. These entailments have a 
twofold implication. On the one hand, privileging deduction over experience, conception over 
perception, and the intellectual over the physical, marks a distinctive standpoint of Cartesian 
epistemology: nothing can be known prior to intelligence. From this comes the backbone of the 
Cartesian system: “the Cogito is the first known truth, the mind is easier to know than the body, 
for the mind knows itself without the body, but the body cannot know itself without the mind.”59 
On the other hand, constructing a knowledge system based on a mathematical model 
demonstrates an ambitious and rigorous project of developing universal science in which each 
element is connected with the chain of truths. Therefore, the “order” of Descartes’ writing is of 
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significant importance: the propositions laid down first must be known without the aid of any 
following inference; the further inferences should be proved as truths solely from the preceding 
premises.60 
 In order to achieve the goal of developing universal science, the “mask” that a Cartesian 
person is designed to wear functions just as a “universal quantifier”: by wearing the mask, the 
social roles, the family background, the facial expressions, the body movement, and the 
relationship with others of this person are effectively erased. The ‘I’ functions as a place holder. 
The subjective reflection in the beginning leads to the removal of subjectivity in the end.  
 Based on the understanding that a person is an atomic existence and that knowledge is 
propositional, there are epistemological and ethical implications that must follow. 
Epistemologically, the Cartesian system informs us that knowledge acquirement presupposes 
identity over time. This identity, in theory, is so solipsist that a very crucial philosophical 
problem—the problem of “other minds”—is generated from the system. Ethically, there are 
several important notions that come with the cogito: reason as the guiding faculty, free will and, 
as we shall see in Kantian philosophy, autonomy: 
What we discover in the cogito is our own freedom, the freedom of our own reason, 
which sets us apart from everything else in nature. We are rational, and insofar as we act 
under the guidance of our own reason, we seek the good.   
It is rarely within our cognitive power, however, to achieve certainty concerning what, 
specifically, is the best thing to do in particular circumstance; and even when we act 
within reasonable confidence, the good we seek often turns out to have been beyond our 
power. We are, in short, free to reason and to choose but also limited in our capacity to 
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know and to control. In one respect, then, the good we aspire to achieve is elusive. In 
another respect, however, it is not…61 
Even though Descartes himself still believed in the classical, virtue-based ethics, his system 
paved the way for the transition to action-based ethics. “Personal conduct”—the central idea for 
ethical evaluation—thus shifts its meaning from the general character of a person to the 
particular actions of a person. Since interpersonal relationship is an addition to the essence of a 
person, it also dissipates in the new ethics that the Cartesian system anticipates to come.  
 III. 
The Kantian Model of “Person” 
 
 In addition to noting that the Cartesian model of person is founded on the assumption of 
atomism62 and the assumption of taking propositional knowledge as the paradigm of knowing, 
this brief examination also demonstrates how a philosophical system can reinforce the existing 
etymological meanings of terms such as “self” and “individual.” Kant modifies63 and further 
develops several Cartesian themes and integrates them into his own philosophical enterprise. I 
would like to start with Kant’s notion of person, before identifying two continuous threads that 
both Descartes and Kant agree on as far as the inquiry of this chapter is concerned.  
                                                
61 Gueroult, The Soul and God, 7. 
62 Another prominent modern thinker, John Locke, also endorses a version of atomism. According to his principium 
individuationis (principle of individualization), consciousness is the determining factor for personal identity: 
“[C]onsciousness always accompanies thinking, and ’tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self” (Essay 
II.xxvii.9). Locke entertained the possibility of the continuity of the same consciousness in different human bodies; 
but consciousness by itself is atomic because it is not further divisible. 
63 Even though the main purpose of this section is to identify the continuity and similarities between Descartes and 
Kant, I am aware that Kant’s notion of personhood is far more complicated and with subtle layers. First of all, there 
is a noumenal aspect of a person that can never be known (even though its capacities can be mapped out). The 
phenomenal aspects of a person consist of several parts. Kant sometimes discusses a person as body, other times as 
mind. While there is no doubt that a person is a rational being, the empirical components of this being cannot be 
separated from it. Due to the complexities of these layers, Kant cannot be regarded as a direct representationist. 
40 
 
 Following the framework of distinguishing the theoretical—concerning knowledge and 
the limits of it—from the practical, one of the most significant Kantian moves in epistemology is 
to denounce Descartes’ cogito as illusionary. This is the paralogism of personality, which 
formulates as follows: That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different 
times is in this regard a person. 
 The cogito is an illusion because it misrepresents—in Alenka Zupancic’s words, “if I want 
to observe the mere ‘I’ in the flux of representations, I can refer to no other correlatum except, 
once again, myself.”64 Restated, it is a view from nowhere. Such self-reference is problematic 
because knowledge and the objects of knowledge cannot be the same. Even if a second person’s 
standpoint is introduced, the gap is unbridgeable to solve the problem according to Kant: 
But if I view myself from the standpoint of another person (as object of his outer intuition), 
it is this outer observer who first represents me in time, for in the apperception time is 
represented, strictly speaking, only in me. Although he admits, therefore, the ‘I’, which 
accompanies, and indeed with complete identity, all representations at all times in my 
consciousness, he will draw no inference from this to the objective permanence of myself. 
For just as the time in which the observer sets me is not the time of my own but of his 
sensibility, so the identity which is necessarily bound up with my consciousness is not 
therefore bound up with his, that us, with the consciousness which contain the outer 
intuition of my subject.65 
Kant’s point is that the cogito is not the epistemological certain foundation in the strict sense for 
philosophizing. Even though the Cartesian thinking “I” represents itself as if it is in the realm of 
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ontological existence, it is beyond the limit of reason and cannot be part of our knowledge. What 
can be said about the cogito is that it is a spontaneous ideology of the thinking subject. 
 One of the most notable statements that Kant makes in the Critique of Pure Reason is the 
opening passage of §16, “On the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception,” of the 
Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concept of Understanding in the second edition: 
The I think must be capable of accompanying all my presentations; for otherwise 
something would be presented in me that could not be thought at all—which is equivalent 
to saying that the presentation either would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to 
me. (B131-2)66 
The “I think” in Kant’s text here refers to the proposition (or the thought) “I think” and “all my 
presentations”—all possible items of thought that can be claimed as mine (the propositions that 
accompany “I think”)—according to Béatrice Longuenesse—should be “taken up in one and the 
same act of combining and comparing them, an act that is determined according to some 
universal concepts of the understanding….”67 In Pierre Keller’s words, “[t]he kind of self-
consciousness expressed by the statement ‘I think p,’ where p is any proposition, is, for Kant, the 
basis for all use of concepts, judgment, and inferences that is not just true for our own individual 
point of view, but is also true for any arbitrary point of view.”68 Similar to Descartes, Kant 
recognizes the existential import of the proposition “I think”. However, what distinguishes Kant 
from Descartes is Kant’s assertion that “this inner perception [i.e., the perception of one’s inner 
experience, including the very act of perceiving that I am thinking] is nothing more than the 
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67 Béatrice Longuenesse, “Kant’s ‘I Think’ versus Descartes’ ‘I Am a Thing That Thinks,’” in Kant and the Early 
Moderners, ed. Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 16. 
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mere apperception I think that makes even all transcendental concepts possible” (A343/B401). 
Longuenesse explains: 
There is nothing more to be known of ‘I’… In referring his thoughts to ‘I’, the thinker 
(perceiver, imaginer) is doing nothing more than committing himself to the unity and 
consistency of his thoughts, and committing himself to obtaining a unified standpoint that 
could be shared by all: an objective standpoint, also called by Kant “objective unity of 
apperception”… [T]he function of ‘I’ in this [Kantian] context is quite different from what 
it was in Descartes’ cogito argument. As we saw, [in Descartes’ works] the use of ‘I’ 
served to express the identity between the subject of which “think” is asserted in the 
proposition “I think” and the subject currently thinking the proposition in which the 
predicate “think” is attributed to a subject. In Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, “I” serves 
to express the identity of the subject that thinks a variety of thoughts about objects of 
perceptual experience and commits himself to the consistency of his thoughts about those 
objects.69 
Doing justice to the discussion of Kant’s theory of perception and conception is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. However, it is clear that for Kant (transcendental) apperception functions 
to shape the unity and identity of consciousness of the mind and the mind’s consciousness of 
itself as the subject of all its representations (A106-108). However, it is important to point out 
that Kant does not present to us how this apperception as a form-imposing subject relates to 
individual human beings. 
 Given that the cogito is not an adequate foundation for a knowledge system that requires 
certainty, it seems to be the case that Kant could completely operate outside of the Cartesian box. 
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However, being fully aware of Descartes’ tree of knowledge and endorsing it to a significant 
degree, Kant’s purpose is to replace the cogito with reason—being mindful of its principal 
boundaries—as the foundation of epistemic certainty. Hence, a crucially important focus—if not 
the only focus—in Kant’s practical philosophy is about the conformity to reason. 
 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant proffers an assessment concerning 
the value of members of a moral community, a “realm of ends” (4:428): 
Now I say that the human beings and in general every rational being exists as an end in 
itself, not merely as means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in 
all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be 
regarded at the same time as an end. … [R]ational beings are called persons because their 
nature already marks them out as an end in itself, that is, as something that may not be used 
merely as a means, and hence so far limits all choice (and is an object of respect). These, 
therefore, are not merely subjective ends, the existence of which as an effect of our action 
has a worth for us, but rather objective ends, that is, beings the existence of which is in 
itself an end, and indeed one such that no other end, to which they would serve merely as 
means, can be put in its place, since without it nothing of absolute worth would be found 
anywhere.70 
For Kant, being a person entitles dignity,71 which is an absolute value rather than a price tag 
indicating limited worth, and being a person is defined by being rational and having free will.72 
Therefore, reason—where morality itself is solely grounded—and (free) will—the precondition 
                                                
70 Kant, GMM, (4:428), my emphasis. 
71 In the Metaphysics of Morals, “dignity” is defined as “a worth that has no price, no equivalent for which the 
object evaluated could be exchanged” (6:462). 
72 Given that whether or not our real self, the noumenal self, can choose is outside of the range of our knowledge, 
Kant argues that we have no choice but to believe that we choose freely when we make a choice. 
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for persons to act with purposes and with moral significance—play central roles in our 
entitlement to dignity. 
 Reason is formal in terms of its intimate association with “the form of the understanding 
and reason itself and the universal rules of thinking in general, without distinction among 
objects” (4:387). Will, or volition, is more complicated, consisting of the formal part and the 
material part. According to Kant, 
[i]t is clear from the preceding that the aims we may have in actions, and their effects, as 
ends and incentives of the will, can impart the actions to unconditional and moral worth. In 
what, then, can this worth lie, if it is not supposed to exist in the will, in the relation of the 
actions to the effect hoped for? It can lie nowhere else than in the principle of the will, 
without regard to the ends that can be effected through such action; for the will is at a 
crossroads, at it were, between its principle a priori, which is formal, and its incentive a 
posteriori, which is material, and since it must somehow be determined by something, it 
must be determined through the formal principle in general of the volition if it does an 
action from duty, since every material principle has been withdrawn from it. (4:400) 
Both reason and will are not directly related to the discernment of right and wrong in any 
particular situation. Therefore, the Kantian project is not focused on making sense of people’s 
moral intuition, but in doing the right things consistently in a self-disciplined way regardless of 
the concrete time and place in which an ethical scenario takes place. Kant’s prescription is to 
find one single, universalizable, rational principle (maxim) that all morality can be reduced to, 
45 
 
the categorical imperative.73 Kant identifies three possible expressions of the categorical 
imperative: 
1) Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law of nature. 
2) Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in 
the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
end. 
3) All maxims which spring from your own making laws ought to accord with a 
possible kingdom of ends as of kingdom of nature. 
What the categorical imperative represents is an ethical system that is both action-based and rule 
(or maxim)-governing. Good will is the kind of volition that self-willingly submits under the 
governance of reason as its disposition. As far as Kant’s characterizations of the notion of 
“person” are concerned, a person is a rational being with free will who demands the dignity of 
being treated as an “end” instead of a “means”. A person is also an irreducible member of the 
Kantian ethical community, the “kingdom of ends”. 
 Even though Kant’s notion of “person” seems to be very different from Descartes’, there 
are continuous traits that categorize them together in contrast to Xunzi’s position. I intend to 
make two points that I hope will be beneficial in comparing the Kantian model and the Cartesian 
model to the Xunzian model.   
 The first concerns atomism. Some scholars, such as Jennifer Moore and Stijin Van Impe, 
think that the atomistic reading of Kant is too narrow, if not a complete mistake. Both of them 
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rely on articulating the Kantian “kingdom of ends” and hope to demonstrate the inadequacy of 
understanding Kant as an atomist. Moore is convinced that for Kant “to be a moral agent implies 
membership in a social order”, that “to act morally is to be a citizen of this order”, and that “the 
highest good is always a social good,”74 while Impe argues that the absolute value is gained only 
by “being a member in the realm of ends”, not by being in a condition of “atomistic isolation”; 
such a fact thereby “adds an important communal dimension to Kant’s view of morality.”75 I 
think their defense of reading Kant against the atomist approaches misses a key point: being 
atomistic is not identical with being solipsistic.  
 In spite of the fact that Kant’s notion of the “kingdom of ends” entails important social 
dimensions that cannot be ignored, this merely falsifies the assertion that Kant is solipsistic. An 
important strategy, as Charles Taylor identifies, that both Descartes and Kant take is 
internalization (in the sense of looking inside) through disengagement, which requires the first-
person stance: 
As we saw with Descartes and Locke, the developing power of disengaged, self-
responsible reason has tended to accredit a view of the subject as an unsituated, even 
punctual self. This is from one perspective quite understandable: it involves reading the 
stance of disengagement, whereby we objectify facets of our own being, into the ontology 
of the subject, as though we were by nature an agency separable from everything merely 
given to us—a disembodied soul (Descartes), or a punctual power of self-remaking 
(Locke), or a pure rational being (Kant). The stance is thereby given the strongest 
                                                
74 Jennifer Moore, “Kant’s Ethical Community,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 26 (1992): 55, 62. 
75 Stijin Van Impe, “Kant’s Realm of Ends: A Communal Moral Practice as Locus for the Unity of Moral 
Personhood” in Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy: Kant and Asian Philosophy, ed. Stephen 
Palmquist (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 428. 
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ontological warrant, as it were.76 
This crucial approach—based on, in Taylor’s words, “radical reflexivity”—triggers the 
development of the substantialization of self. As a consequence, the notion that “the individual is 
a ready-made self conceptually and ontologically prior to social relations” is introduced and 
eventually becomes a pillar in various socio-political practices in liberalism after 
Enlightenment.77 As long as social relations are considered external to rational and autonomous 
individuals, to whom moral personhood is ascribed, the Kantian person is still atomistic. 
 My second remark is concerned with propositional knowledge as the epistemological 
paradigm. Both the Kantian project and the Cartesian project belong to Kenneth Barber’s “strong 
model” with regard to the relation between epistemology and ontology: 
[E]pistemological considerations serve as criteria for the adequacy of an ontological 
system: putative candidates for inclusion in the catalogue of existents must first pass a test 
for knowability and, once included, their classification in terms of categorical features must 
again meet the same rigorous standard. Failure to pass these tests is, or ought to be, 
sufficient reason for discarding all or parts of the ontology in question, no matter how 
firmly entrenched the latter may have been in a philosophical tradition 78 
Kant, in the beginning of the Preface of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, starts 
with lamenting the fall of metaphysics and yet his way of rebuilding it is purely epistemological. 
Descartes, focusing on his quest for certainty, is ready to doubt everything unless what is 
                                                
76 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1989), 514. 
77 Sor-hoon Tan, Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2003), 17. 
78 Kenneth Barber, Introduction to Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, ed. 
Kenneth Barber and Jorge Gracia (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 4. My italics. 
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presented is so clear and distinctive that there is no room for disbelief. The knowledge system 
that they envision is based neither on bodily skills nor on acquaintance with other people, but on 
propositions that claim the truth of what has been represented or, in Richard Rorty’s term, 
“mirrored.”79 
 Descartes, in numerous occasions, refers to his first known truth “(ego) cogito, ergo sum” 
as a proposition. Such a treatment is intentional and deliberate. It sets the stage for a set of 
related notions—including truth and objectivity—that is impersonal and impartial. In discussing 
the role of judgments in Kant’s epistemology, Keller suggests: 
Judgments make an implicit claim to objectivity by making a truth claim. In forming a 
judgment, we commit ourselves to the truth of the proposition that is asserted by the 
judgment... Kant accepts the nominal definition of truth as correspondence with an object 
even though there is no way to determine whether a judgment corresponds to an object 
independently of whether that judgment coheres with other judgments.   
The claim to truth made by judgment, and with it the presumption that the proposition 
asserted by the judgment corresponds with an object, is the ground for the normativity 
claim made by a judgment. This normative ground of judgment ultimately has its source in 
the possibility of representing the content asserted by a judgment in an impersonal way. 
The possibility of representing the content of judgment impersonally, in turn, is based on 
the fact that consciousness of one’s particular point of view as representer is parasitic on 
the possibility of representing oneself in an impersonal manner.80 
                                                
79 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 12. 
80 Keller, Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness, 65-6. 
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A general trait of the proposition-based knowledge systems in the Enlightenment era is that truth 
corresponds to a series of representations. Claims such as “S knows that p” and “I think that p” 
aim to mirror the impartial and impersonal objective truth. As a consequence, both the subjective 
information about ‘S’ and ‘I’ become insignificant and even irrelevant in this particular 
understanding of knowledge and objectivity. The epistemological and ethical atoms become 
nameless.  
  IV. 
The Xunzian Model of “Person” 
 
 In modern Chinese, the literal translation of objectivity is keguan客觀 (perspectives from 
the guests) while subjectivity is zhuguan主觀 (perspectives from the hosts). This host-guest 
relation entails different viewpoints in a social setting that cannot be further reduced: there can 
be no host without any guest, and vice versa. Such an understanding can be traced to pre-Qin 
China, in which Xunzi is an important contributor. 
 In addition to the distinction between ren (distinguished persons) and min (the masses), 
another group of terms that Xunzi uses frequently is jun君 (exemplars) and qun群 (herds, 
without the negative connotation that Nietzsche employs to refer to the masses). In Xunzi’s own 
words, “persons who distinguish themselves as jun are the ones who are good at associating 
people (K 9.16a).”81 Similar to the host-guest relation, both ren-min, and jun-qun co-define each 
other in a non-dualistic conceptual framework. There is a profound sense of inter-dependency. 
 Xunzi is keen to identify the exemplars in terms of the socio-political roles that they play in 
relation to fa, established models (K 2.10): 
Those whose conduct is based on their deep appreciation of the established models are 
                                                
81 君者，善群也。《荀子‧王制》 
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called “shi (scholars)”. Those who set their mind and embody the established models are 
called “junzi (exemplary persons)”. Those who shine as bright as the established models 
are called “shengren (sages).”82 
Fa is co-defined by li (ritual proprieties); working together, the ideal situation is to set up an 
environment not only for regulated socio-political order and effective governance, but also for 
cultivating intimacy extended from family experience (K 11.9a):83 
Ideal superiors never fail to love their subordinates, who are governed according to the 
participation in and observance of li (ritual proprieties). The relation of the superiors to the 
subordinates is analogous to that of “parents’ tending and caring for a newborn.” 
Governmental ordinates, edits, regulations, and standards that are not in accord with 
recognizable patterns by so much as the tip of a hair should not be applied to the Hundred 
Clans, much less to the utterly helpless—orphans, childless old people, widows, and 
widowers. Hence, the closeness between subordinates and their superiors will result in 
rejoicing “as though he were their parent.” Although threatened with death, they could not 
be forced to disobedience. Lord and minister, superior and inferior, noble and base, old and 
young, down to commoners—all should exalt this as the standard of rectitude. Only in this 
way will all examine themselves to ensure that they devote their attention to their assigned 
tasks of their social groups. This can be generalized from the experience of the Hundred 
Kings, and it is established as the pivot and axis of li (ritual proprieties) and fa (established 
                                                
82 好法而行，士也；篤志而體，君子也；齊明而不竭，聖人也。《荀子‧修身》 
83 In contrast to the polis/oikos (public/private) distinction in Aristotle’s Politics, “family” serves as a “pervasive 
metaphor for social, political, and even religious relations” in classical China, especially in classical Confucianism. 
See Roger T. Ames and David Hall, Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the 
Zhongyong (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 38. 
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models).84 
Since “fa cannot be established alone, nor can its lei (categories for analogical extension) apply 
themselves in particular instances,” the exemplars must become shi師 (teachers) who educate 
their community members of appropriate ways to participate in ritual proprieties and to apply or 
follow established models. Therefore, the process of learning from exemplars is of central 
importance in a community (K 2.11): 
It is through li (observing ritual proprieties) that persons are set right. It is by means of the 
appropriate practice of shi (teachers) that the observance of ritual proprieties is set right. If 
there were no ritual propriety, how could persons be set right? If there were no teacher, 
how could you know which ritual is correct? ... Hence to oppose observing ritual 
proprieties is the same as lacking fa (established models). To oppose your teachers is the 
same as being without any teacher. Not to hold correct your shi (teachers) and fa (the 
established models), but to prefer instead to rely on your own understandings and practice 
is to employ a blind person to differentiate colors or a deaf person to distinguish sounds—
you have nothing with which to reject confusion and error. Therefore, persons in the 
progress of learning are those who learn various aspects of li (observing ritual proprieties) 
and fa (established models). Teachers are exemplars who make their own persons an erect 
gnomon indicating the proper standard of deportment and who value what are at peace with 
                                                
84 上莫不致愛其下，而制之以禮。上之於下，如保赤子，政令制度，所以接下之人百姓，有不理者如豪末
，則雖孤獨鰥寡必不加焉。故下之親上，歡如父母，可殺而不可使不順。君臣上下，貴賤長幼，至於庶人
，莫不以是為隆正；然後皆內自省，以謹於分。是百王之所〔以〕同也，而禮法之樞要也。《荀子‧王霸
》 
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them.85 
 It should be noted that, unlike the Cartesian and Kantian theories, the Xunzian learning 
involves a variety of bodily practices. The notion of zhengshen正身 (set a person right) literally 
means “correcting the body.” Therefore, learning is not merely an intellectual exercise; it 
involves all aspects of the whole person. Since it is not possible for anyone to practice the 
Xunzian learning alone, the involvement of the whole community—especially the exemplars—is 
of central importance (K 8.11): 
Thus if persons who are intelligent lack shi (teachers) and fa (established models), they will 
certainly become robbers. If they are brave, they will surely become murderers… 
Intelligent persons who have both teachers and established models will quickly become 
comprehensively skilled. If brave, they will quickly become awe-inspiring… Accordingly, 
having teachers and established models is people’s greatest treasure, and lacking teachers 
and established models their greatest calamity.86 
This passage may not mirror the truthful images of a community—there are plenty of counter-
examples to be found. And yet Xunzi emphasizes the normativity coming from the exemplars 
and the processes of developing and establishing models. 
 I would also like to suggest the significance of practice and participation in the Xunzian 
philosophy, which is dramatically different from the philosophical practices of both Descartes 
and Kant. As aforementioned, Taylor identifies internalization and radical reflexivity as two key 
                                                
85 禮者、所以正身也，師者、所以正禮也。無禮何以正身？無師吾安知禮之為是也？…故非禮，是無法也
；非師，是無師也。不是師法，而好自用，譬之是猶以盲辨色，以聾辨聲也，舍亂妄無為也。故學也者，
禮法也。夫師、以身為正儀，而貴自安者也。《荀子‧修身》 
86 故人無師無法，而知則必為盜，勇則必為賊…；人有師有法，而知則速通，勇則速畏…。故有師法者，
人之大寶也；無師法者，人之大殃也。《荀子‧儒效》 
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factors that facilitate the development of the Cartesian thinking thing and the Kantian rational 
being. The formation of the modern sense of self is the same process as radical 
individualization—or atomization—of members in a community, at least conceptually. This 
process is not observable in the Xunzi, which renders social and communal relations as the 
intrinsic fabric of constituting persons in a community. 
 If the key to understanding the Enlightenment philosophers is learning to be disengaged, an 
appropriate understanding of Xunzi cannot be achieved without learning to live out both li and fa 
through constantly engaging and participating in the making of a community, which is the same 
process for persons to become distinguished in that community (K 8.11): 
Not having heard something is not as good as having heard it; having heard it is not as 
good as having seen it; having seen it is not as good as understanding it; understanding it is 
not as good as putting it into practice. The process of learning reaches its utmost when it is 
fully put into practice. Persons who put it into practice will achieve acuity. Those who 
achieve acuity will become sages. Sages… do not miss the mark by even so much as hair. 
The only way to account for this is to put the knowledge into practice.87 
This passage is concerned with knowledge acquirement. It is very clear that Xunzi does not 
assume an unchanging identity. Keeping in mind that exemplars like sages cannot stand alone 
without members in their communities, there are many people in a variety of social roles who 
participate in the process of knowledge-making in a communal setting. Knowing is a kind of 
doing; knowledge and conduct cannot be separated.   
                                                
87 不聞不若聞之，聞之不若見之，見之不若知之，知之不若行之。學至於行之而止矣。行之，明也；明之
為聖人。聖人也者…不失豪釐，無他道焉，已乎行之矣。《荀子‧儒效》 
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 There are some general features that distinguish Xunzi from both Descartes and Kant. 
First of all, Xunzi never attempts to develop a universal system. Everything that a person can 
work with must start here and now, in a particular time and place. Therefore, if both Descartes 
and Kant intend to build a top-down philosophical system in which universalizable propositions 
serve as the backbone of the system, then Xunzi’s project is definitely from the bottom-up, 
starting from the local community and extending to established models whenever and wherever 
they become applicable. Second, Xunzi does not show much interest in finding the ontological 
and/or metaphysical status and description of personhood. All the chapters in the Xunzi are 
designed to address specific and practical concerns, with implications related to real persons 
whose social locations cannot be rendered meaningless or insignificant. Third, Xunzi never states 
that his teaching is infallible. The Xunzian project is not a quest for certainty but to cultivate a 
flourishing community. For many, such an approach defeats the very purpose of epistemology. 
However, the Xunzian way may be effective enough for leading us to think outside of the box. 
 The Xunzian notion of “person” is also very different from the Cartesian and the Kantian 
one. Unlike the Cartesian and Kantian idea that already-made selfhood comes before social and 
communal relations, the relations between distinguished persons and the masses, and between 
the exemplars and the common people, are inter-dependent, co-defined, and in continuum. 
Readers may object that distinguished persons and exemplars are communal roles and not what 
is meant to be a person; but in the Xunzian tradition, and I quote from Park again, “this mask is 
our truer self.” These roles are normative and they are also what we are inspired to become. In 
other words, the Xunzian notion of “person” is irreducibly relational: relationships are built-ins, 
not add-ons. 
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 Moreover, given the fact that accurate representations through propositions are not 
paradigmatic in the Xunzi, the epistemic paradigm should come from somewhere outside of 
propositions. According to the aforementioned passages from the Xunzi, there should be little 
doubt that exemplars—including scholars, exemplary persons, and sages—take the position of 
being paradigmatic, not only in the ethical sense, but also in the epistemic sense. The only way to 
become a sage is to put empirical knowledge into practice in a communal setting. It entails that 
knowing is a social event; knowledge acquirement cannot be reduced to individual efforts in the 
strictest sense. 
 
 In this chapter, I have very briefly sketched the close relationship between the notion of 
“person” and its epistemological and ethical implications in both the Cartesian and Kantian 
tradition. I have also discussed some key passages from the Xunzi that suggest a very different 
kind of understanding. I intend to map out the epistemic and ethical landscape based on the 
implications of the Xunzian person in the following chapters that cover important topics such as 
perception, language, and the roles of both imagination and trust in the Xunzian epistemic and 
ethical stances. 
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Chapter 3 
Skill Cultivation as Knowing 
 
The weakness of the epistemology of the eighteenth and  
nineteenth centuries was that it based itself purely upon 
 a narrow formulation of sense-perception. 
 Also among the various modes of sensation, visual experience 
 was picked out as the typical example.  
The result was to exclude all the really fundamental factors  
constituting our experience. 
--A. N. Whitehead 
 
 If what I argued in the previous chapter—that Xunzi’s notion of person as epistemic and 
ethical focus is irreducibly inter-subjective—is warranted, then neither “personhood” nor 
“selfhood” established before the formation of communal relations serves as the Xunzian starting 
point for philosophizing. Rather, the Xunzian assumption is that we become persons through the 
process of becoming recognized in our communities. The Xunzian sense of knowing, an activity 
in which concrete persons in their community engage, is a key part of becoming communally 
recognized through cultivation and competent demonstration of skills and expertise with 
competence. Following Xunzi’s understanding, knowing is relationally embedded because it is 
first and foremost a communal project. Commenting on the relational constitution of the 
Confucian notion of humans, Herbert Fingarette states that “[f]or Confucius, unless there are at 
least two human beings, there can be no human beings.”88 Such irreducible relationality of 
human beings is also shared by Xunzi who would extend Fingarette’s statement one step further: 
there must be at least two communicating knowers, or there is no knower at all. From Xunzi’s 
perspective, if a person is relationally constituted, the creation of human knowledge must be 
irreducibly communal. 
                                                
88 Herbert Fingarette, “The Music of Humanity in the Conversations of Confucius,” in Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 10 (1983): 217.  
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 This chapter and the next target two kinds of knowing crucial to understanding Xunzi’s 
notion of knowledge: skill and interpersonal knowledge. Both skill knowledge (knowing how) 
and interpersonal knowledge (knowing who) have been by and large ignored by contemporary 
epistemological discussions—which up until recent decades has emphasized almost exclusively 
belief-based knowledge. Nevertheless, the claim that I would like to make is not that belief-based 
knowledge has no place in Xunzi’s thinking, but that focusing solely on merely belief-based 
knowledge in studying the Xunzian notion of knowing is missing his point. I will discuss the 
significance of skill knowledge and expertise in the Xunzi in this chapter, leaving the 
investigations of interpersonal knowledge until Chapter Four. 
 The focus of this chapter is an investigation of zhi知—a term that appears in the text of 
the Xunzi more than 450 times and is usually translated as “knowledge” or “wisdom”—in terms 
of its interrelation with three notions: heart-mind (xin心), competence (neng能), and 
comprehensiveness (quan全). As far as knowledge is concerned, I will demonstrate that zhi is 
for the most part not belief-based, that competence is a crucial key to unlock the skill-centered 
understanding of zhi, and that zhi is both social and ecological. The Xunzian perspective of 
knowledge emphasizes an appropriate responsiveness that having a skill essentially entails, 
rather than an accurate representation. This view will be demonstrated by Xunzi’s intentional 
choice of the water image as the metaphor of knowing rather than the mirror. 
I. 
Xin心 and Zhi知 
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In a prominent passage, Xunzi identifies the relation between zhi and xin (K21.5d-e): 
“How do humans know (zhi)? I say that it is because of heart-mind (xin).”89 There is no doubt 
that Xunzi regards zhi as the faculty of xin. Knowing well requires xin to be cultivated in 
particular ways. Thus, comprehending both xin and zhi properly is the key to understanding 
Xunzi’s epistemic stances. 
According to Lee, the notion of xin underwent an evolutional process in classical China. 
Originally, the term referred to the physical organ (the character was derived from a picture of 
the aorta), but then, prior to the sixth century BCE, it came to be associated with emotions, 
feelings and sentiments, as well as—though less frequently—the source of intellect, 
understanding, and moral exertion. It was not until the texts of Mozi and Guanzi that xin was 
recognized as the thinking organ and the organ of intelligence (as in the Mozi), as well as the 
governor of the sense organs.90 The early development of xin as a notion demonstrates the 
intellectual orientation that avoids sharp distinctions between the body and the mind. 
In order to refrain from any reference to radical dualism, a position that Xunzi definitely 
rejects,91 xin is therefore best rendered as “heart-mind” rather than merely the “mind” and is not 
to be associated with any mind/body dichotomy. This way of translation was established among 
scholars who take differences in philosophical contexts seriously, as Roger T. Ames and Henry 
Rosemont Jr. state: 
In the classical Chinese worldview, in which process and change have priority over form 
and stasis, it is frequently observed that, with respect to the human body, physiology has 
                                                
89 人何以知道？曰：心。《荀子‧解蔽》 
90 Lee, Xunzi and Early Chinese Naturalism, 33-4. 
91 Xunzi was in accord with other Confucians who did not conceive “[xin] and nature, the subjective and the 
objective… as separate, static substances…”. See Chung-ying Cheng, New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-
Confucian Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 248. 
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priority over anatomy, and function takes precedence over site. This being the case, it 
might be argued that xin means “thoughts and feeling,” and then derivatively and 
metaphorically, the organ with which these experiences are to be associated.92 
Xunzi’s notion of xin follows the same pattern of combining both “thoughts and feelings.” In 
Xunzi’s own words (K22.1), 
The natural tendencies (xing性) expressed in liking and disliking, in delighting or 
angering, and in sorrowing and enjoying are called “feeling-emotions (qing情).” The 
feeling-emotions being so paired, xin’s choosing between them is called “deliberation (lü
慮).” Xin’s being capable of (neng能) acting on what is deliberated is called “[inchoate] 
human conduct (wei偽).” When deliberations are accumulated and a person’s 
competence (neng) has been cultivated by learning, such accomplishment is called 
“[refined] human conduct.”93 
In the framework of a belief-based epistemology, knowledge is usually associated with mental 
events. However, this passage suggests that Xunzi’s notion of xin (heart-mind) is closely related 
to epistemic competence (neng)—which will be discussed in the following section—and 
deliberation (lü), feelings and emotions (qing), as well as human conduct. Knowledge for Xunzi, 
then, is not concerned with accurate mental representation, but with refined conduct resulting 
from the proper application of epistemic competence. In other words, knowing is a conduct, and 
such a conduct requires a learning process in developing epistemic competence, as well as the 
                                                
92 Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemond Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (Ballantine 
Books: New York), 56. 
93 性之好、惡、喜、怒、哀、樂謂之情。情然而心為之擇謂之慮。心慮而能為之動謂之偽；慮積焉，能習
焉，而後成謂之偽。《荀子‧正名》 
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appropriate expressions of feelings and emotions. This process is called the “cultivation of xin 
(yangxin養心),”94 and it is achievable only through communal efforts (K2.4): 
In summary, of all methods of ordering qi and cultivating xin, none is more direct than 
proceeding with achieving propriety in one’s roles and relations (li), none more essential 
than obtaining good teachers, and none more numinous than making virtues efficacious.95 
Instead of rational principles, Xunzi associates the cultivation of xin with essential fabrics of 
living in a community such as achieving propriety in one’s roles and relations (li), education 
expressed through teacher-student relationships, and religious qualities that transform the lives of 
community members. Therefore, for Xunzi xin cannot be interpreted as a property belonging to a 
discrete individual. 
 Achieving propriety in one’s roles and relations (li) has many dimensions: formal, 
normative, performative, transformative, regulative, aesthetic, religious, somatic, and personal.96 
Usually li can be regarded as wholly related to social force and disciplines without any personal 
import, especially when this term is translated as rites or rituals. Nevertheless, based on the 
Xunzian understanding that one becomes a person through interacting with other community 
members, the personal and public dimensions of li are continuous and impossible to separate in 
both theory and practice: 
                                                
94 Even though many scholars tend to interpret the “sheep” component of the character yang 養 as a symbol 
indicating its pronunciation, the early form of this character seems to suggest that yang is intimately associated with 
“shepherding.” Later semantic development of this character expands its meaning to be associated with “nurturing” 
and “cultivating.” 
95 凡治氣養心之術，莫徑由禮，莫要得師，莫神一好。《荀子‧修身》 
96 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (University of Hawai’i Press: Honolulu, 2011), 171-4. As we will 
see, most—if not all—of the aspects are expected by Xunzi when it comes to his prescriptions and descriptions of 
knowledge. 
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Li is a process of personal articulation—the cultivation and expression of an elegant 
disposition, an attitude, a posture, a signature style, an identity. Li is a resolutely personal 
performance revealing one’s worth to both oneself and to one’s community…. [L]i 
requires the utmost and unrelenting attention in every detail of what one does at every 
moment that one is doing it, from the drama of the high court to the posture one assumes 
in going to sleep, from the reception of honored guests to the proper way to comport 
oneself when one is alone, from how one behaves in formal dining situations to 
appropriate extemporaneous gestures.97 
If the cultivation of xin has to proceed according to li, as Xunzi suggests, then xin has to be both 
communal and personal. For Xunzi, being personal is not antithetical to being communal. 
 Cultivating xin is of central importance for communal exemplars, and what comes with 
this cultivation process is the competence of responsiveness and transformation (K3.8): 
The ultimate kind of dynamics for exemplars (junzi) who devote themselves to the 
cultivation of xin is achieving co-creativity (cheng誠). If co-creativity is achieved, there 
will be no other concerns…. If these exemplars act in accord with the consummate 
conduct (ren仁) with the xin of co-creativity, they become established models. Having 
become established models, they extend themselves to the realm of spirituality. Having 
extended to the realm of spirituality, they become transformative (hua化). If these 
exemplars act in accord with appropriateness (yi義) and with the xin of co-creativity, 
they become established patterns. Having become established patterns, they achieve 
acuity (ming明). Having achieved acuity, they are capable of being responsive (bian變). 
                                                
97 Ibid., 174.  
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"The dynamic relationship between responsiveness and transformation is called the 
“efficacy of spirituality (tiande天德)”.98 
Given that Xunzi defies religious superstitions and his notion of religiousness is human-centered, 
the term for “spirituality (shen神)” is co-defined with “human extension (shen伸),” and the 
term for “the numinous (tian天)” is co-defined with “distinguished human-person (ren人).” In 
other words, spirituality—just like sagehood—is intimately related to the best kind of effort that 
a community has to offer. In addition, key terms in this passage—such as “co-creativity 
(cheng),” “consummate conduct (ren),” and “appropriateness (yi)” can only be meaningful in 
communal life. Therefore, there are two notable interpretative points that can be inferred from 
these passages. First, at least a very significant aspect of xin is understood through the notion of 
neng (competence or skillfulness). Second, even though the meaning of xin originates from the 
depiction of a corporal organ, the Xunzian understanding of this term is irreducibly interpersonal 
and communal. 
If both interpretative points are warranted, then we are in a good position to interpret 
what “zhi (knowing)” could mean for Xunzi. Since the notion of zhi and the notion of xin are 
intimately associated, there is no reason to assume that knowing is merely individualistic and 
intellectualistic for Xunzi. In the following two sections, I discuss the Xunzian concept of 
knowledge. Based on the Xunzian understanding that we come to know (zhi) through cultivated 
xin, knowledge must be linked to the epistemic competence of xin. Such an inference is 
consistent with Christoph Harbsmeier’s observation: one of the mainstream ways for early 
                                                
98 君子養心莫善於誠，致誠則無它事矣。…誠心守仁則形，形則神，神則能化矣。誠心行義則理，理則明
，明則能變矣。變化代興，謂之天德。《荀子‧不苟》 
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Chinese writers to understand knowledge was in terms of competence.99 In the following section, 
the competence-centered idea of knowledge in the Xunzi is examined. And in the third section, I 
would like to explore how this competence-centered notion of knowledge, together with the 
socio-communal dimension of xin, provides a distinctively different understanding of what is 
meant by comprehensiveness. 
II. 
Neng能 and Zhi知 
 
 If the interconnection between competence (neng) and heart-mind (xin) is taken seriously, 
then the expectation is that as people’s xin is gradually cultivated, their epistemic competence 
grows. And if this cultivation process of xin aims at the competence to respond to things and 
events well, the same should be expected as the outcome of gaining knowledge. From this 
perspective, to know is to know how: knowledge is associated with certain performative 
capabilities that demonstrate the possession of knowledge. Therefore, Xunzi does not shy away 
from drawing a direct link between knowledge and competence (K22.1): 
The means to comprehend which is within humans is called “[inchoate] knowing (zhi 
知).” Such knowing successfully responding to the worldly phenomena is called 
“knowledge (or wisdom, zhi智).” Being capable of performing intellectually is called 
“[inchoate] competence (neng能).” If such competence successfully responds to the 
conditions of a situation, it is called “[refined] competence (neng).”100 
                                                
99 Christoph Harbsmeier, “Conceptions of Knowledge in Ancient China,” in Epistemological Issues in Classical 
Chinese Philosophy, ed. Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 15. 
100 知之在人者謂之知；知有所合謂之智。〔智〕所以能之在人者謂之能；能有所合謂之能。《荀子‧正名
》 
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In this prominent passage, key terms such as “zhi (knowing, knowledge, or wisdom)” and “neng 
(competence)” are employed twice, but with qualitative differences—first as inchoate and second 
as refined. Xunzi suggests that a developmental process is involved in terms of becoming a 
competent knower. Accordingly, a constant theme in the Xunzi is the tension between the refined 
responsiveness based on a comprehensive grasping of the situation and the incompetence of 
doing so as a consequence of underdeveloped judgment, which results in being biased (K21.1): 
“It is the common flaw of people to be blinded by insisting on their biases and to obscure the 
comprehensive patterns (dali大理).”101 It follows that an ideal knower for Xunzi is a person who 
is experienced, sophisticated, and capable enough to observe situations in a comprehensive way 
(which necessarily entails, as I will discuss in the next section, taking relationality into account 
and including the perspectives of other community members whenever it is possible), and who is 
skillful and capable enough to judge situations and respond to them effectively.102  
 Such a competence-centered view makes Xunzi focus on the growth and development of 
a person. In Confucian tradition, the ideal path leading towards achieving sagacity is one based 
on this process of growth and development. Even though it is commonly perceived that sages 
have superior moral qualities, I would like to draw the readers’ attention to the fact that sages 
also possess excellent epistemic competence to respond to any given situation. As Jean François 
Billeter observes, “[t]he sagehood that [Chinese] philosophers pursue is a kind of competence, 
                                                
101 凡人之患，蔽於一曲，而闇於大理。《荀子‧解蔽》 
102 Therefore, judging situations and responding to them effectively have significant ethical implications. However, 
Xunzi does not rule out the possibility that the members of a community share the same biases. Being a falliblist, 
Xunzi holds that the best way to avoid mistakes is to include as many perspectives as possible. 
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enabling a person to act and react spontaneously and accurately.”103 If Billeter is right, then a 
person’s growth in the community from scholar (shi) to exemplar (junzi) and sage (shengren) 
must correlate with the development of competence to assess environing conditions and act upon 
them. In other words, in order to be a sage, one must have the capacity to skillfully assess 
situations and respond to them in a comprehensive and efficacious manner. Living a moral life 
well entails knowing well.  
 In the Xunzi, an epistemic-ethical state of non-obscurity and responsiveness—including 
both perception and communication—called “da qingming大清明 (great acuity)” can be 
achieved in the process of cultivation of a person in the context of communal relationships. Even 
though the term “sage (sheng)” is not used, this passage evokes every association of a sagely 
figure (K21.5d-e): 
How do humans know? I say that it is because of xin (the heart-mind). How does xin 
know? I say by its being open, continuous and focused, and sustaining equilibrium 
(jing)… Being open, continuous, and harmoniously tranquil is called “da qingming (great 
acuity)”. In achieving this state a person is able to observe, communicate, and assign the 
myriad things and events to their proper positions… The acuity and brightness of this 
person is comparable to the sun and moon; the greatness of this person fills the eight 
                                                
103 Jean François Billeter, “Zhuangzi Jiu Zha莊子九札 (Nine Notes on Zhuangzi and Philosophy),” Zhongguo 
Wenzhe Yanjiu Tongxun 中國文哲研究通訊 (Newsletter of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy) 22, 
no. 3 (2012): 23. My translation. 
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poles. Such a person is truly what is meant by “daren (Great Person).” How indeed could 
this person be obscured?!104 
The state of xin of being open, continuous and focused, and harmoniously tranquil presents an 
image of active dynamic balance rather than a completely passive stillness. Therefore, from 
Xunzi’s point of view knowing is actively engaging instead of passively receiving. The focus of 
this passage is a chain of appropriate responses (observing, communicating, and positioning) to 
ever-changing environments, not a chain of accurate representations of reality. More importantly, 
the greatness and significance of this sagely person is based on the competence and skill of being 
responsive. 
 There are two questions that have to be asked at this point. First, does competence in the 
Xunzian sense imply skills and habits? And, second, how does this Xunzian understanding of 
knowledge differ from belief-based conventional epistemology? 
 Competence, skill, and habit seem to be closely related; but they are not the same. Simply 
having the competence to do something does not guarantee reliable performance that qualifies as 
a skill, nor does it necessitate such a capacity be habitual. Being skillful necessarily involves a 
certain degree of habitualization; but it is never blind, as habits sometimes are. However, none of 
them are purely intellectual exercises of the mind. Xunzi’s notion of knowledge as knowing how 
comes very close to what Gilbert Ryle terms “intellectual practices” and what Julia Annas terms 
“practical expertise”. Ryle states: 
The ability to apply rules is the product of [intellectual] practice. It is therefore tempting 
to argue that competences and skills are just habits. They are certainly second natures or 
                                                
104 人何以知道？曰：心。心何以知？曰：虛壹而靜。…虛壹而靜，謂之大清明。萬物莫形而不見，莫見而
不論，莫論而失位。…明參日月，大滿八極，夫是之謂大人。夫惡有蔽矣哉！《荀子‧解蔽》This passage 
will be further examined in my discussion of the intellectual virtues in the Xunzi in Chapter Six. 
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acquired dispositions, but it does not follow from this that they are merely habits. Habits 
are one sort, but not the only sort, of second nature, and it will be argued later that the 
common assumption that all second natures are merely habits obliterates distinctions 
which are of cardinal importance for the inquiries in which we are engaged.105 
Ryle uses an example of doing mathematical calculation to highlight the fact that intellectual 
practice requires exercising care, vigilance, or criticism. In other words, such practice is never 
non-intentional. There is a conscious focus when it comes to skillful performance and 
responsiveness. Both competence and habit are necessary conditions of skill; but neither of them 
is sufficient. “Intellectual practices” require awareness and mindfulness that one’s performance 
is being modified by its predecessors. 
 Similarly, Annas distinguishes “practical expertise” from routine—which “once 
developed to the point of adequacy, stays where it is.”106 Nevertheless, even though habituation 
is also involved, practical expertise leads to “reactions that differentiate among, and are 
appropriate to, different situations.”107 There is an important sense that the Xunzian skill 
knowledge belongs to the group of Rylean intellectual practices and Annasian practical expertise 
in two aspects: first, skill knowledge needs to be learned; second, there is a drive to aspire. 
 In Ryle’s example of the same passage quoted above, a mountaineer walking over ice-
covered rock demonstrates a skillful person in responding to the environing conditions. Such an 
example will be much closer to the Xunzian sense if a group of mountaineers are at the focus 
instead of a single person. When we say that a group of people are competent mountaineers, we 
                                                
105 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1949), 42.  
106 Julia Annas, “Practical Expertise” in Know How, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 102. 
107 Ibid. 
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mean that these people are not only able to climb mountains and to develop a set of special habits 
in doing so, but are also capable of intentional performance, including mutual learning and 
communication, that makes them reliable to one another. Thus, there should be no ambiguity that 
the Xunzian understanding of knowledge ultimately leads to refined skills and expertise, not just 
simply inchoate and yet unsophisticated abilities or blind habits. 
 Regarding the second question, that is, how does this Xunzian understanding of 
knowledge differ from belief-based conventional epistemology, one key difference between 
skill-based and belief-based understanding of knowledge lies in their treatment of the body. 
While belief-based understanding of knowledge minimizes—if not completely eliminates—the 
role that the body plays, skillful performance and responsiveness necessarily entails the direct 
involvement of the body. In contrast to Xunzi, many devoted followers of the Cartesian 
epistemology would eventually become what Nietzsche calls “the despisers of the body”. Even 
though the tensions between mind and body (and by extension between conception and 
perception) as well as that between rationality and emotionality have seemed to be constant since 
Plato, it was not until the birth of modern philosophy that the relations between these pairs 
became radicalized. According to the analyses of Val Plumwood, two distinctive characteristics 
shared by several mainstream versions of radicalized dualism are dependency and denial: the 
pole of power depends on the subordinated other yet denies this dependence.108 That is, the mind 
depends on the body, and yet such dependence is completely denied and unrecognized. By such 
a denial, the mind is thought to be completely independent. The image of rationality is thus 
purely intellectual without any bodily influence. True knowledge is disembodied. 
                                                
108 Val Plumwood, “The Politics of Reason: Towards a Feminist Logic,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 no.4 
(1993): 443. 
69 
 
 Nevertheless, as Whitehead points out, a narrow formation of visual experience was 
singled out as the operational model of modern epistemology.109 The analogy between 
perceiving and knowing generates a series of models, images and vocabularies—including the 
“Inner Eye” employed by both Descartes and Locke—that enables philosophers to articulate 
what the human mind is and how it functions. Even though in a radical dualistic system, the 
independence of the eye of the mind is of pivotal importance while the naked eyes in the flesh 
are marginalized and/or despised, it is interesting to note that the body (at least as the source of 
sensory information), as well as the metaphors, still remains in this system of thought, refusing to 
go away. The myth of the given is ultimately the “myth of the body.” 
 On the contrary, it is unthinkable to Xunzi that knowledge is achievable without the full 
participation of the body in the process of learning (K1.9): 
The learning of exemplary persons (junzi) enters through the ears, becomes rooted in the 
heart-mind (xin), and then spreads through the four limbs, making its presence in both 
activities and repose. No matter these learned persons stand still and give a speech or 
move in a relaxed way, all the deeds can be regarded as models… The learning of 
exemplary persons aims at aestheticizing the body (mei qi shen美其身).110 
 One interpretation of aestheticizing the body is to present the body in an artistic, 
ritualized, and even idealized manner, as if the body is non-aesthetic and ritually indifferent to 
begin with. This interpretation misses the point. Xunzi never discusses the body without any 
                                                
109 A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thoughts (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), 223. 
110 君子之學也，入乎耳，著乎心，布乎四體，形乎動靜。端而言，蝡而動，一可以為法則。…君子之學也
，以美其身…。《荀子‧勸學》 
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communal context or social relations: “a pre-socialized body… is not a human body.”111 A 
human body is born with aesthetic qualities and capacities; exemplars in a community are those 
who are able to refine and present those qualities and capacities in a productive way. Another 
passage that focuses on the inseparability of body, knowledge, and aesthetic qualities states 
(K21.9): 
Through concentrating on participation and verification, the myriad of things and events 
are able to be known effectively. If a person is able to exhaust the patterns of myriad 
things and events with his or her own body, this person is aesthetically refined.112 
Such an understanding forms a continuous thread from the birth of Chinese philosophy to the 
performance of grand sacrifices in the Qing Dynasty. Angela Zito’s in-depth investigation of 
both the visual presentations of the imperial body in eighteenth-century China and thinking 
patterns provides a rare perspective of this evolving and yet continuous thread that runs for 
thousands of years.113 
 Another interrelated difference between skill-based and belief-based understanding of 
knowledge concerns subjectivity. A consequence of formulating knowledge as “S knows that p” 
is that subject S becomes merely a place holder. Since what is of exclusive significance is the 
content of the belief, subjectivity is effectively dismissed, if not completely eliminated. 
Nevertheless, if knowledge is comprehended as skill, the quality of the skillful person is usually, 
if not always, a focal point. Therefore, people who participate in authoring dao (the proper paths) 
                                                
111 Yang, The Confucian Notions of Body, 17-8. 
112 以贊稽之，萬物可兼知也。身盡其故則美。《荀子‧解蔽》 
113 Angela Zito, Of Body And Brush: Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance in Eighteenth-Century China (University 
of Chicago Press, 1997), 96-113. 
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are exemplars not only capable of, but skillful at, organizing and communicating to people with 
particular skills (K21.10): 
The farmer concentrates on his fields, yet it would be inadmissible to consider this person 
for the position of director of the fields. The merchant concentrates on the marketplace, 
but it would be inadmissible to consider this person for director of the marketplace. The 
artisan concentrates on his wars, but it would be inadmissible to consider this person as 
director of wars. There are people incapable of these three skills who could be 
commissioned to put in order any of these three offices. I say that they are people who 
concentrate on dao and [not] merely on things. One who concentrates on things will treat 
each thing as a particular thing. One who concentrates on dao will treat things in their 
comprehensive combinations as things. Thus junzi concentrate on dao so that they may 
participate in the verification of things and events.114 
A possible criticism states that Xunzi always hastens to “socialize” every important aspect of 
human experience. However, I think that Xunzi does have his point. Skills cannot be meaningful 
if uprooted from all social and communal contexts. Skill knowledge entails the significance of 
subjectivity; and subjectivity cannot be meaningful unless there are other subjects to interact 
with. 
III. 
Quan全 and Zhi知 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the starting point for Xunzi’s philosophizing is a 
group of people-subjects situated in concrete roles and relationships. This approach is different 
                                                
114農精於田，而不可以為田師；賈精於市，而不可以為〔賈〕市師；工精於器，而不可以為器師。有人也
，不能此三技，而可使治三官。曰：精於道者也。精於物者也。精於物者以物物，精於道者兼物物。故君
子壹於道，而以贊稽物。《荀子‧解蔽》 
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from the common path that conventional epistemologists use: starting from an isolated individual 
and regarding roles and relationships as external, if not irrelevant. For Xunzi, it is impossible to 
discuss knowledge without paying attention to other subjects, their perspectives, verifiability, 
accountability, and epistemic trust. All of these aspects aim for a comprehensive and socio-
ecological understanding of knowledge that is inter-subjective in nature. Xunzi employs the 
notion of “quan全” to capture the idea of comprehensiveness. 
 Etymologically, the original meaning of quan was associated with the jades, with the 
highest quality stones being interred with the bodies of ancient kings. Later, its meaning 
expanded to describe anything without impurities, as well as something that is comprehensive 
and consummate.115 What is important to note here is that there is a process of participatory 
refinement to achieve a state of purity, comprehensiveness, or consummation. Jade has to be 
mined, crafted, and polished before being used in a royal burial; comprehensiveness is never a 
given, and the process of consummation invites participation, and is therefore profoundly 
relational. By the same token, Xunzi discusses learning and the knowledge that comes with it as 
a process of refinement that requires the best and most comprehensive that a community has to 
offer, which necessarily includes other communal exemplars (K1.15): 
Knowing well that aesthetic refinement (mei) is not achievable without the kind of 
learning that is both comprehensive (quan) and pure, exemplary persons (junzi) recite the 
texts and enumerate their studies in order to penetrate them, ponder over them, and search 
into them in order to find a path, apply them to their conduct in order to dwell with them, 
and eliminate what is harmful in order to cultivate themselves…. Therefore, the 
                                                
115 Throughout history, quan is often associated with wan完, originally referring to the house for the newly-weds. 
Even today, wan still strongly suggests a consummate state.  
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exigencies of time and place, as well as considerations of personal profit cannot influence 
them; cliques and coteries cannot sway them; and the whole world cannot deter them…. 
Then they can then be called “virtuous resolutes.” Being resolute in an efficacious way 
leads to being firm of purposes; being firm of purposes leads to being responsive. Those 
who are both firm and responsive are called “fully-developed persons (chengren成 
人)”…. Therefore exemplary persons value comprehensiveness (quan).116 
What is implicitly presupposed in this passage is that this learning process is not possible without 
other communal exemplars who assume the role of teachers. In other words, what Xunzi means 
by learning necessarily involves other subjects in the community. One’s own subjectivity comes 
from an awareness of, and interactions with, others’ subjectivities. 
 Not only is it the case that quan is closely related to the best kind of communal learning 
that aims at comprehensiveness and consummation, but Xunzi also explicitly associates this kind 
of learning with refined skills and expertise cultivated through bodily participations and 
communal practices (K1.14): 
People who miss a single shot out of a hundred do not deserve to be called expert archers. 
People who travel a journey of a thousand miles, but do not take the last half-step do not 
deserve to be called expert carriage drivers. People who do not fully grasp the connection 
between various roles, relationships and categories of humans and things and people do 
not see the continuity of becoming consummate persons and appropriate conduct do not 
                                                
116 君子知夫不全不粹之不足以為美也，故誦數以貫之，思索以通之，為其人以處之，除其害者以持養之。
…是故權利不能傾也，群眾不能移也，天下不能蕩也。…夫是之謂德操。德操然後能定，能定然後能應。
能定能應，夫是之謂成人。…君子貴其全也。《荀子‧勸學》 
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deserve to be called experts in learning…. Be comprehensive (quan) and exhaustive, and 
then a person will be truly learned.117 
Both archery and carriage-driving require bodily participation. Even grasping roles, 
relationships, and categories is not a purely intellectual activity: it requires it to be done in 
communal rituals and teacher-student interactions, as well as in social gatherings. Learning in the 
Xunzian sense, and the knowledge coming out of the process of learning, cannot be separated 
from reinstating the significance of subjectivity and body. 
 A consequence of reinstating the significance of both subjectivity and body is an 
ecological understanding of knowledge. It has been commonly unchallenged, as demonstrated in 
the Cartesian Meditator’s observing the wax, that the point of observation is shared by all 
observers. In reading the Meditation, any reader can assume this observational perspective and 
see the unchanging truth underlying this transforming event. Therefore, who the Cartesian 
Meditator is and what the life story of this person is, are not important. It is but an empty place 
holder to be filled in by another observer. However, such a view is over-simplified. According to 
James J. Gibson, 
[w]hen a point of observation is occupied, there is also optical information to specify the 
observer himself, and this information cannot be shared by other observers. For the body 
of the animal who is observing temporarily conceals some portion of the environment in 
a way that is unique to that animal. I call this information propriospecific as distinguished 
from exterospecific, meaning that it specifies the self as distinguished from the 
environment… What is concealed is occluded not by a surface…but by a unique entity… 
                                                
117 君子知夫不全不粹之不足以為美也，故誦數以貫之，思索以通之，為其人以處之，除其害者以持養之。
…是故權利不能傾也，群眾不能移也，天下不能蕩也。…夫是之謂德操。德操然後能定，能定然後能應。
能定能應，夫是之謂成人。…君子貴其全也。《荀子‧勸學》 
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The purpose of vision…is to be aware of the surroundings, the ambient environment, not 
merely of the field in front of the eyes.118 
In concrete, as opposed to abstract, cases of perceiving, the perceivers are always interacting 
with the environment, and hence, perceptions have to be ecological in the sense that the final 
products are the results of different levels of relational negotiation. Moreover, there must be 
some qualitative differences of perceptual experiences with regard to different observers. In 
other words, the information of the environment is inseparable from the information of the 
observer: “one perceives the environment and coperceives oneself.”119 In Taylor’s words, “[o]ur 
grasp of things is not something which is in us, over against the world; it lies in the way we are 
in contact with the world, in our being-in-the-world (Heidegger), or being-to-the-world 
(Merleau-Ponty).”120  
 From the Heideggerian-Merleau-Pontian-Gibsonian point of view, the Cartesian visual 
experience is not what vision is generally about, but a specific kind of gazing121 that not only 
separates the (Cartesian) persons from their bodies, communities, and environment, but also 
eliminates any trace of socio-ecological location. Nevertheless, what Descartes attempts to 
eliminate are what Xunzi wants to preserve. In addition to identifying different social locations 
and roles such as scholars (shi), exemplary persons (junzi), and sages (shengren), Xunzi is keen 
to point out where the human persons are placed in the world (K9.19): 
                                                
118 James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979), 
111-3. 
119 Ibid., 126. 
120 Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Foundationalism?: Knowledge, Agency, and World,” in Heidegger, 
Coping, and Cognitive Science, ed. Mark A. Wrathall, Jeff Malpas (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2000), 119-120. 
121 The employment of the term “gaze” is intended to be associated with Michel Foucault’s analyses of knowledge 
and power. 
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Water and fire possess vital energy but have no life. Plants and trees possess life, but lack 
awareness. Birds and beasts have awareness, but lack a sense of moral appropriateness. 
Humans possess vital energy, life, and awareness, and add to them a sense of moral 
appropriateness. It is for this reason that they are the noblest in the world. In physical 
power they are not as strong as an ox, in swiftness they do not equal the horse; yet the ox 
and horse can be put to their use. Why is that? I say it is because humans alone can form 
societies and animals cannot.122 
From a certain perspective, Xunzi’s philosophy is all about location: human persons are on the 
top of the ecological system and sages are on the top of human communities. However, just as 
sages do not live without other members in their communities, human persons do not live 
without other things and events in the world. This sensitivity to location suggests that ecological 
and social awareness is necessary for the Xunzian notion of knowledge, which cannot be simply 
reduced to true beliefs that are deductively structured. From Xunzi’s perspective, there are 
epistemic qualities that cannot be captured by the aggregation of true beliefs, and losing these 
qualities is losing knowledge. Being knowledgeable entails being aware of the unique socio-
ecological location(s) in which a person is situated, as well as being capable of response to the 
changes in the surroundings. Knowledge is embodied, encultured, and ecologically situated. 
Comprehensiveness is based on an awareness of locality. 
 How does the Xunzian understanding of knowledge as skill and expertise fit into this 
broader ecological context? Being skillful can be seen as incorporating a general sense of 
ourselves and the dynamic environment. If, as Tim Ingold suggests, the investigation starts with 
                                                
122 水火有氣而無生，草木有生而無知，禽獸有知而無義； 人有氣、有生、有知、亦且有義，故最為天下貴
也。力不若牛，走不若馬，而牛馬為用，何也？曰：人能群，彼不能群也。《荀子‧王制》 
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developing organisms-in-their-environment, as opposed to the “self-contained individual 
confronting a world ‘out there,’”123 then skills, and consequently, knowledge, cannot be made 
sense of without appealing to the fields of relationship within a particular environment. In other 
words, Knowledge, with its history and locality, is a context-sensitive communal response to the 
environing conditions. And Xunzi’s notion of zhi—not the achievement of a mind in a body, but 
of the human community as a whole in its environment with its own exploratory movements 
through the world—precisely embodies this understanding. Complete accuracy of representation 
is not a requirement for a skillful person; a careful employment of xin (heart-mind) that leads to 
appropriate responses in context, which by no means entail being error-free, is. 
IV. 
A Case Study of Perceptual Illusions in the Xunzi 
 
 One example that sheds light on how the Xunzian approach distinguishes itself from 
conventional epistemology is concerned with the treatment of perceptual illusion. 
 Since the dawn of modern philosophy, reflecting on sense perception has been a window 
through which thinkers “look” into how the human mind works. In scrutinizing a melting piece 
of wax, Descartes’ Meditator concludes that “[s]omething which I thought I was seeing with my 
eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgment which is in my mind” (AT VII:32). For 
Descartes and his followers, perceptions alone do not entail the grasping of knowledge; 
knowledge is gained merely through the intellect. Kant, in stating that “[c]onception without 
perception is empty; perception without conception is blind” (CPR A51/B75), also implies that 
perceptions alone do not automatically lead to knowledge. Even though there seems to be little 
doubt that sensory information is an important source of beliefs and knowledge, could senses be 
                                                
123 Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (London: Routledge, 
2011), 4. 
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misleading and misguiding? In the Cartesian tradition, the answer is definitely positive. 
Perception itself does not enable us to see. 
 In the First Meditation, the inquiry set for finding an epistemic foundation that is 
completely certain and indubitable begins with doubting how reliable the senses are in relation to 
epistemic certainty. Descartes’ Meditator states: 
Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses 
or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that senses deceive, and it is 
prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.  
Yet although the senses occasionally deceive us with respect to objects which are very 
small or in the distance, there are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite 
impossible, even though they are derived from the senses… [H]ow could it be denied that 
these hands or this whole body are mine? Unless perhaps I were to liken myself to 
madmen…. But such people are insane, and I would be thought equally mad if I took 
anything from them as a model for myself (AT VII:18-9). 
These are the first two of five cases that the Meditator considers in regard to whether our senses 
are to be trusted. Similar cases are considered by Xunzi as well. In the “Jiebi (Dissolving 
Partiality)” Chapter, Xunzi illustrates seven instances of seeming obscurity caused by the senses 
(K 21.8): 
Someone walking along a road in the dark may see a fallen stone and think it a tiger 
crouching in ambush, or he may see an upright tree and think it a standing man. The 
darkness has obscured the clarity of his vision. A drunk may jump across a ditch a 
hundred paces wide, thinking it a drain half a pace wide, or may stoop down to go out the 
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city gate, thinking it a small doorway. The drink has disordered his judgment. Pressing 
against the eye while looking at an object will make it appear double; covering the ears 
when listening will make silence seem like a clamor. The force applied to the sense 
organs has disordered them. Hence, looking down at oxen from the top of a mount will 
make them appear the size of a sheep, but someone looking for sheep will not go down to 
lead them away. The distance has obscured their sizes. If from the foot of a mountain you 
look up at trees, trees ten cubits high look like chopsticks, but someone looking for 
chopsticks would not climb up to break them off. The height has obscured their length. 
When water is moving and reflections waver, people do not use it to determine their 
beauty or ugliness. The circumstances of water make for deception. A blind man [tilting 
his head back] and looking up will not see the stars; so people do not have him determine 
whether there are stars or not. The essential vigor of his eyes is impaired.124 
 Even though the passage quoted so far merely shows that both Xunzi and Descartes take 
illusion as a problem while not suggesting much about their different treatments, Xunzi does go 
on to state (K 21.8): 
If there were anyone who would use occasions such as these [e.g., misidentifying a fallen 
stone as a crouching tiger when it is dark] to determine things and events, then this 
person would be the biggest fool in the world. Such a fool’s determination of things uses 
                                                
124 冥冥而行者，見寢石以為伏虎也，見植林以為後人也：冥冥蔽其明也。醉者越百步之溝，以為蹞步之澮
也；俯而出城門，以為小之閨也：酒亂其神也。厭目而視者，視一為兩；掩耳而聽者，聽漠漠而以為哅哅
：埶亂其官也。故從山上望牛者若羊，而求羊者不下牽也：遠蔽其大也。從山下望木者，十仞之木若箸，
而求箸者不上折也：高蔽其長也。水動而景搖，人不以定美惡：水埶玄也。瞽者仰視而不見星，人不以定
有無：用精惑也。《荀子‧解蔽》Unlike Descartes, who speaks through a solitary Mediator without any 
reference to any social relations, Xunzi never gives up a communal perspective even if only a single person is 
considered in each of the seven cases: while there are indeed personal judgments, the presence of communal 
judgments cannot be ignored. 
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what is doubtful to judge doubtful points. The judgment would of necessity be 
inappropriate. And if indeed his judging is inappropriate, how can he not err?125  
What Xunzi attempts to establish here is that there must be a baseline to determine whether a 
person’s responses to the environing conditions are appropriate or not. Such a baseline should, 
first and foremost, be intimately associated with the normal functioning of our sense organs in 
normal situations where practical judgment can be cultivated. Then, depending on how well 
trained a person is, the judgment of this person may compensate for the perceived distortions. 
However, there is no guarantee that a person will never be in extreme situations, so the best 
approach for this person is still trained judgment since some mistakes are expected. 
 Commenting on this passage, Chris Fraser also points out that “[t]he point of these 
examples is not that perception is deceptive or that appearances may fail to represent reality 
accurately. It is that we need to employ [xin (heart-mind)] carefully.”126 Given the fact that 
Xunzi is a fallibilist, the Xunzian project is not to completely eliminate errors but to maximize 
pragmatic truth. In short, on top of affirming the general reliability of the senses, Xunzi also 
advocates for “trained judgment” associated with qualified perceivers who learn together and 
with teacher-student relationships in the context of education, and self-cultivation in the context 
of communal life. 
 Thus, according to Xunzi, those seven cases of cognitive error exactly demonstrate that 
our sense perception is generally reliable, even though it may not be of much use without 
appropriate judgment. Hence, instead of the reliability of senses (a philosophical problem that 
Descartes wants to address), the key issue here is the refinement of practical judgment, which is 
                                                
125 有人焉以此時定物，則世之愚者也。彼愚者之定物，以疑決疑，決必不當。夫苟不當，安能無過乎？《
荀子‧解蔽》 
126 Chris Fraser, “Knowledge and Error in Early Chinese Thought” Dao 10 (2011):143. 
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a set of polished skills that takes time and practice to cultivate and develop in interacting with the 
environment as well as with other people. Insisting on determining things with untrained 
judgment is what makes people unwise and allows them to engage in naïve practices. 
 If a person is misled by illusions, or situated in a potentially confusing circumstance that 
results in wrong judgments, then it says nothing more than that this person is an incompetent 
knower who responds to things and events based on merely observing part of the situation.127 
The incompetence is a consequence of a lack of comprehensive grasp of the socio-ecological 
surroundings, as well as the absence of a process of refinement in learning. Irresponsiveness is 
the ultimate sign of a person who knows little. 
V. 
Water Instead of Mirror: Metaphor of Responsiveness 
 
 The reason why there are two distinctive metaphors for the epistemic stances of the 
Cartesian-Kantian enterprise and the Xunzian philosophy should become clear. Emphasizing the 
accuracy of different levels of representations, the “mirror” is inevitably the governing metaphor 
of the Cartesian-Kantian epistemology. Rorty states: 
The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great 
mirror, containing various representations—some accurate, some not—and capable of 
being studied by pure, nonempirical methods. Without the notion of the mind as a mirror, 
the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation would not have suggested itself. 
Without this latter notion, the strategy common to Descartes and Kant—getting more 
                                                
127 Fraiser, “Knowledge and Error in Early Chinese Thought,” 128-9. 
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accurate representations by inspecting, repairing, and polishing the mirror, so to speak—
would not have made sense.128 
Thus, the Cartesian-Kantian epistemic project can be considered as an ambitious task of 
mirroring, which is intended to accurately represent the whole world, tangible to rationality 
through the senses, ideally in an isomorphic manner. Anything other than accurate representation 
is regarded as distortion or illusion, inadequate to be considered as knowledge. 
 Once this representational knowledge is achieved, there is no reason to not act upon it. 
For Descartes, morally correct decisions are derived from knowledge that accurately mirrors the 
metaphysical and the physical. Such knowledge guarantees certainty; acting upon it yields 
maximum approximation of certainty and a minimum of mistakes. The core of philosophy is 
“theory of knowledge,” distinct from other branches of sciences (including moral science) 
because it is their foundation.129  
 Following the same line of reasoning, Kant reasserts the “fundamental” significance of 
philosophy, concerning the most universal and the least material. In Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant painstakingly sets out his metaphysics with the guidance of his epistemology as the 
cornerstone of further projects such as practical reason and aesthetic judgment. Morally right 
decisions are derived from a categorical imperative—a universal, unconditional axiom that 
represents certainty. Just as moral science is derived from metaphysics and physics, moral 
conducts involving bodily movements are derivative in the sense that the mind must grasp the 
reality with epistemic representations in the first place. Mind should be active; body should be 
passive. 
                                                
128 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 12. 
129 Ibid., 132. 
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Water as Responsiveness 
 Without much sensitivity to the classical Chinese worldview, in general, and the Xunzian 
treatment of knowledge as skill-centered, in particular, the following passage may not say much 
more than what Descartes and Kant want to state (K21.11): 
Hence, the human heart-mind (xin) may be compared to a pan of water. If you place the 
pan upright and do not stir the water up, the mud will sink to the bottom, and the water on 
top will be clear and pure enough to see your beard and eyebrows and to examine the 
patterns on your face. But if a slight wind passes over its surface, the submerged mud will 
be stirred up from the bottom, and the clarity and purity of the water at the top will be 
disturbed so that it is impossible to obtain the correct impression of even the general 
outline of the face. Now the heart-mind is just the same. Thus, if you lead it with the 
patterns of things and events, nurture it with purity, and not allow mere things to “tilt” it, 
then it will be adequate to determine right and wrong and to resolve any doubtful 
points.130 
For scholars who tend to interpret the main point of this passage as representation, there does not 
seem to be much to explain: the pan of water has to sit in order to offer the best quality of the 
representational images; and the human mind does exactly this. The assumption underlying such 
an interpretation is that water is a workable, but lesser, version of the mirror. In Plato’s Allegory 
of the Cave, as the fog lifts, the first things that come into view for the escaping prisoner are 
reflections of objects in water, and then the objects themselves, before the adjustment can be 
made to identify the source of the light. Seeing the reflections in the water is not much better 
                                                
130 故人心譬如槃水，正錯而勿動，則湛濁在下，而清明在上，則足以見鬒眉而察理矣。微風過之，湛濁動
乎下，清明亂於上，則不可以得大形之正也。心亦如是矣。故導之以理，養之以清，物莫之傾，則足以定
是非決嫌疑矣。《荀子‧解蔽》 
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than seeing the shadows in the cave. Following such Platonic reasoning, seeing the reflections in 
the water in the Xunzi leads to an acceptable but incomplete account of reality in the epistemic 
sense. 
 Nevertheless, while this passage may carry some similarities to the Cartesian-Kantian 
enterprise, Xunzi’s choice to use water rather than the mirror is not a mistake. Water is a better 
choice than the mirror for Xunzi because of the following reasons. First, water has been 
associated with wisdom and knowledge as early as Confucius.131 Water is dynamic and responds 
to even the slightest changes of the environing conditions. Achieving sagehood, for Xunzi, is 
very similar in the sense that a person needs to be responsive to things and events that are 
constantly changing. Second, the image of a pan of water mimics many aspects of self-
cultivation. Just as the mud in the water is stirred up and the clarity of the water is affected, so 
the Xunzian sages are not completely immune from being disturbed. However, they are very 
capable of maintaining equilibrium so that their judgment can be reliable.132 Third, maintaining 
the clarity of the water is a skill. It takes time and practice in order to achieve this kind of 
equilibrium, which entails the necessity of the learning processes. 
 The resolution of the reflective image in a pan of water is not very sharp or clear and the 
reflection may not be completely accurate. Therefore, the point of using the water metaphor does 
not aim at representation. What Xunzi attempts to emphasize here is a kind of cultivated 
                                                
131 In the Analects 6.23, Confucius says that “the wise (zhi) enjoy water; those consummate in their conduct (ren) 
enjoy mountains. The wise are active; the consummate still. The wise find enjoyment; the consummate are long-
enduring.” That wisdom as an inseparable aspect of zhi (so far identified merely as knowledge) will be discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
132 A similar notion can also be found in the Analects 17.3, where Confucius says “only the most wise (zhi) and the 
most stupid do not move.” 
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responsiveness. As long as a person is competent in responding to eventful situations in a reliable 
way, there does not seem to be much need to merely focus on accurate representations. 
 It is important to note that the significance of responsiveness seems to be shared by many 
Chinese philosophers in the pre-Qin era. Even for those who employ the “mirror” as the key 
analogy or metaphor, the point is still responsiveness, not representation. A passage in the 
Zhuangzi states: 
The utmost persons use the heart-mind like a mirror; they do not escort things as they go 
or welcome them as they come, they respond (ying應) and do not store. Therefore they 
are able to conquer other things without suffering a wound.133 
Just like the Xunzian analogy of the heart-mind and a pan of water, the Zhuangzian analogy 
stresses the quality of the heart-mind of concrete persons after a process of self-cultivation. The 
worth of the cultivated heart-mind does not reside in its reflecting the world as it is, but in being 
inclusive and responsive. Representational accuracy is not the point that both Xunzi and 
Zhuangzi would like to make. 
Certainty, Fallibility, and Reliability 
 If what I propose—that Xunzi’s understanding of knowledge is skill-centered, 
communally based, context-sensitive, non-foundational, and non-representational—is warranted, 
then distinctive differences should also be expected when it comes to deeper issues such as the 
norms of knowledge. 
 One of the focal points that the mirror-type conception of knowledge and the water-type 
conception of knowledge are at odds with is the issue of certainty. In an important understanding 
                                                
133 至人之用心若鏡，不將不迎，應而不藏，故能勝物而不傷。《莊子‧應帝王》 
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of knowledge that can be traced to ancient Greece, the key qualitative difference between the 
statement that “S believes that p” and that “S knows that p” is the degree of certainty. People are 
capable of believing whatever they want (doxa), but only a small set of these beliefs can be 
crowned as knowledge (episteme). Adopting Aristotle’s definition of episteme,134 Thomas 
Aquinas identifies the following principle concerning the nature of science, that “from things 
already known conclusions about other matters follow necessarily.”135 That is to say that all 
scientific knowledge has to be deductively derived from some established truths, which, by 
definition, are infallible. Articulating such truths thus becomes a common project for thinkers—
theologians and philosophers alike—who pursue episteme. Some of them turn to the notion of 
God, and thus the existence of God becomes more urgent than ever to be dealt with. For others 
who intend to find some alternatives, Descartes’ groundbreaking formulation of cogito is almost 
irresistible. Nevertheless, the shared vision between the theologians and philosophers is the quest 
for certainty. 
 Certainty implies reliability, not the other way around; thus if certainty is achievable, 
there is no need to discuss reliability. Skillfulness, on the contrary, does not entail being free of 
error; hence the degree of being skillful depends on the degree of being reliable. It follows that a 
thinker who wants to build a system on certainty does not have to pay attention to skills. Given 
that certainty has been intimately associated with the pure intellect that grasps reality and 
generates knowledge since Plato, it is usually held that the more uncertain a thing, event, or 
                                                
134 In Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, Aristotle distinguishes the part of the human soul that has reason from the part 
without reason. He further divides the former part into the reasoning (logistikos) part, which is lower, and the higher 
"knowing" (epistēmonikos) part which contemplates general principles (archai). There are four kinds of capacities 
of soul: technical know how (technē), logically deduced knowledge (epistēmē, sometimes translated as "scientific 
knowledge"), practical wisdom (phronēsis), and lastly theoretical wisdom (sophia). The distinction between the 
theoretical and the practical seems to suggest that certainty is an important issue that Aristotle has in mind. 
135 Thomas Aquinas, Faith, Reason, and Theology, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1987), 41. 
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affair is, the less intellect and knowledge (as opposed to wisdom) are involved. As a 
consequence of focusing on both certainty and the intellect, change, practical affairs, and 
communal practices are left out. As John Dewey observes, 
[the] exaltation of pure intellect and its activity above practical affairs is fundamentally 
connected with the quest for a certainty which shall be absolute and unshakable. The 
distinctive characteristic of practical activity, one which is so inherent that it cannot be 
eliminated, is the uncertainty which attends it… Practical activity deals with 
individualized and unique situations which are never exactly duplicable and about which, 
accordingly, no complete assurance is possible. All activity, moreover, involves change. 
The intellect, however, according to the traditional doctrine, may grasp universal Being, 
and Being which is universal is fixed and immutable.136 
According to this understanding, epistemology, considered the normative study of beliefs, should 
be thus concerned with reason, certainty, and infallibility rather than skills, chances, and 
reliability. 
 Infallibility is a necessary condition for certainty; therefore, if a person holds that we can 
be certain of anything in the strict sense (that is, not “doxastic certainty” that usually involves 
nothing more than feeling certain), this person is an infallibilist. On the contrary, a fallibilist is a 
person who denies this position. As Roberts G. Meyers points out, Descartes is a careful 
infallibilist who accepts only a short list of what is certain, including “(1) some (but not all) 
logical and necessary truths, (2) our own existence, and (3) propositions describing our 
sensations, ideas or sense data.”137 Even though there are debates concerning whether those 
                                                
136 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), 6. 
137 Roberts G. Meyers, The Likelihood of Knowledge (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 19. 
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items on the list are truly indisputable, they are indeed infallible from Descartes’ point of view. 
This Cartesian perspective is never shared by Xunzi. 
 One of the permanent themes in the chapter “Dispelling Partiality” is the refinement of 
specific skills (jing精), which leads to concentration (yi一) that is highly regarded by Xunzi (K 
21.11): 
Thus, those who have been fond of writing have been many, yet that Cang Jie alone has 
been remembered is due to his concentration [of energy]. Those who have been fond of 
husbandry have been many, yet that Houji alone has been remembered is due to his 
concentration [of energy]. Those who have been fond of music have been many, yet that 
Kui alone has been remembered is due to his concentration [of energy]. Those who have 
been fond of appropriateness have been many, yet that Shun alone has been remembered 
is due to his concentration [of energy]. Chui invented the bow and Fuyou made the 
arrow, but it was Yi who refined the art of archery. Xizhong invented the chariot and 
Chengdu discovered how to harness horses to it, yet it was Zaofu who refined the art of 
charioteering. From antiquity until the present day there has never been anyone that was 
of two minds who was able to achieve refinement...138 
Refinement and concentration, however, do not logically guarantee perfection in the sense of 
being free of error. However, through concentrating on practice and cultivation, reliable 
performance can be expected. Adhering to the strict sense of certainty, it follows that the 
Xunzian notion of knowledge as skill leads to reliability rather than infallibility. In other words, 
                                                
138 故好書者眾矣，而倉頡獨傳者，壹也；好稼者眾矣，而后稷獨傳者，壹也。好樂者眾矣，而夔獨傳者，
壹也；好義者眾矣，而舜獨傳者，壹也。倕作弓，浮游作矢，而羿精於射；奚仲作車，乘杜作乘馬，而造
父精於御：自古及今，未嘗有兩而能精者也。《荀子‧解蔽》 
89 
 
Xunzi must be an epistemic fallibilist. Xunzian sages, by the same token, also certainly make 
mistakes even though they are generally very reliable. 
Truthfulness and the Normative Paths 
 Thus, so far we have a sharp distinction between Descartes and Xunzi in terms of their 
epistemic stances: 
 
Descartes Xunzi 
the theoretical 
mirror 
infallibilist 
certainty 
intellect-reason 
the practical 
water 
fallibilist 
reliability 
body-skills 
 
For a Cartesian follower, giving up certainty—and consequently foundationalism and 
representationism that support and sustain the system—will be a disaster. Nevertheless, Xunzi is 
at ease without the absolute certainty that Descartes requires for a knowledge system. Xunzi’s 
focus is on optimizing intelligent practice rather than building a solid theoretical system. 
 One may argue, of course, that optimizing intelligent practice and building a solid 
theoretical system are not mutually exclusive. However, when theories are constructed to the 
extent that there is neither room nor value for practical activity, practice is technically excluded. 
Dewey identifies the common assumption that different theories of knowledge share as “the 
operation of inquiry excludes any element of practical activity that enters into the construction of 
the object known.”139 If the mind makes sense of the known object in a way that is not 
                                                
139 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 22. 
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practically observable and the process of knowing is all about the mind and its cognitive 
characteristics, the importance of practice is diminished. 
 According to Dewey, practice suffers “double discrediting” due to two ideas associated 
with certainty that shape how knowledge is conceived in modern philosophy: 
[T]he cause of modern philosophy’s contributing so little to bring about an integration 
between what we know about the world and the intelligent direction of what we do 
resides in unwillingness to surrender two ideas formulated in conditions which both 
intellectually and practically were very different from those in which we now live. Those 
two ideas…are that knowledge is concerned with disclosure of the characteristics of 
antecedent existences and essences, and that the properties of value found therein provide 
the authoritative standards for the conduct of life.  
Both of these traits are due to quest for certainty by cognitive means which 
exclude practical activity—namely, one which effects actual and concrete modifications 
in existence. Practical activity suffers from a double discrediting because of the 
perpetuation of these two features of tradition. It is a mere external follower upon 
knowledge, having no part in its determination. Instead of evolving its own standards and 
ends in its own developing process, it is supposed to conform to what is fixed in the 
antecedent structure of things 140 
Practice is neither considered as antecedent existences and essences nor regarded as the value 
inherent within them. A philosophy focusing on practical activities such as cultivating skills is 
therefore thought to be irrelevant to knowledge. 
                                                
140 Ibid., 71-2. 
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 While absolute certainty and truth, infallibility, foundation(s) of knowledge, intellect, and 
the mind that is logically separated from the body are never in the Xunzian picture, another set of 
vocabulary is relied upon: refinement, truthfulness, contingency, consistency, intelligent practice, 
and the heart-mind. In the absence of an absolute coordinate system, one of the best ways to 
make exploratory movements together is building a community. Absolute truth never becomes a 
philosophical issue in the Chinese intellectual tradition; that does not mean, however, that there 
is no sense of being truthful. Community exemplars who have the competence and skill to lead, 
sages and scholars included, are truthful trail blazers, leaving normative marks in the 
development of the community. Their legacies and paths can be seen as one and as many: one in 
terms of their common efforts to move the community forward; many in terms of the different 
ways they respond to the communal affairs as well as the environing conditions. The term for 
knowing and understanding in Chinese (“zhidao”) thus conveys a vivid image of persons who 
develop a path without appealing to any absolute coordinate system. A person who knows or 
understands can neither be surgically separated from his or her own communal relations and 
locations nor be simply capable of representing things and events as they are without the 
cultivated skill to respond. 
 
 So far I have presented that, in an important dimension, the Xunzian understanding of 
knowledge as cultivated skills is distinctively different from Descartes’ conception. The Xunzian 
understanding of knowledge, based on competence and reliable performance, is neither belief-
based nor representative. It relies upon collective efforts of a community, together with the 
values that used to be categorized as ethical, rather than absolute certainty in pure rational 
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analysis. It necessarily involves concrete communal practices rather than conducting intellectual 
exercises in the arm-chair. It appeals to the image of water instead of the mirror. In the next 
chapter, I would like to reinforce this understanding by investigating Xunzi’s understanding of 
interpersonal knowledge through linguistic normativity. The philosophical consequences will be 
further examined in latter chapters. 
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Chapter 4  
Knowing as Acquainting People Through Communication 
 
As soon as one treats language as an autonomous object,   
accepting the radical separation which Saussure made   
between internal and external linguistics,   
between the science of language and the science of the social uses of language,   
one is condemned to looking within words for the power of words,   
that is, looking for it where it is not to be found. 
--Pierre Bourdieu 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to articulate and elaborate the second paradigm of knowing 
in the Xunzi (specifically, interpersonal knowing) through a detailed reexamination of the 
doctrine of zhengming正名. Historically, the primary concerns of this doctrine were 
unmistakably socio-political, but I will use it to articulate the epistemic significance of Xunzi’s 
philosophy. The doctrine of zhengming is intimately associated with how ming名 (names) and 
shi實 (a more controversial term that I will translate as “communal experience”) are related to 
each other. The term zhengming has been inadequately—and yet stubbornly—translated as 
“rectification of names” because of a realist interpretation that has become the mainstream 
interpretation in recent decades. I will argue against this realist interpretation in this chapter on 
the basis of rejecting representationalism. Therefore, an important task of this chapter is to tackle 
the interrelationship between knowledge and language in the Xunzi. The standard arrangement of 
Enlightenment philosophy attempts to integrate both knowledge and language into a 
representational system, but this is not the only possible way through which knowledge comes to 
being. I will present a case, according to Xunzi’s understanding of the sociality of language, that 
will demonstrate that a non-representational treatment of language can effectively lead to 
reinstating subjectivity rather than marginalizing it, an important precursor to the recognition of 
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the significance of interpersonal knowledge, which is of central importance in the Confucian 
tradition. The first half of this chapter argues against a realist interpretation of knowledge and 
language in interpreting the Xunzi, through reexamining the doctrine of zhengming in a nuanced 
way that is sensitive to its philosophical context. Such a “realist interpretation” is based on 
conceptualizing language as a mirror demonstrated in the expression of “S knows that p,” which 
is a very specific way of thinking of knowledge that is not found in the Xunzi. The second half of 
the chapter promotes a more comprehensive and justifiable “hermeneutic interpretation” of the 
doctrine of zhengming and elaborates on the intimate relationship between language and 
interpersonal knowledge in the Confucian tradition that Xunzi inherits. As Confucius states, “[a] 
person who does not understand language has no way of knowing people.”141 
 I shall begin with a brief discussion of the familiar formulation of knowledge as “S 
knows that p” in relation to language. Three important language-related assumptions derived 
from this formulation will be identified for the purpose of demonstrating the kinship between the 
realist interpretation of Xunzi’s doctrine of zhengming and the “S knows that p” understanding of 
knowledge and language. These three assumptions face critical challenges from within and from 
the cosmological understanding in ancient China, and are therefore problematic. A discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s later position will represent the internal critique, and an examination of the 
cosmology recorded in the early commentaries of the Yijing易經 (Book of Changes), in which a 
proper understanding of zhengming must be situated, will serve as an external critique. These 
critiques demonstrate that the realist interpretation is not only a less-favored position in its own 
philosophical context, but also inconsistent with the philosophical context where classical 
                                                
141 See the Analects 20.3. 不知言，無以知人也。 
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Confucianism is cultivated. Imposing the realist interpretation, already under siege in its own 
tradition, to read the Xunzi and in so doing ignoring the Xunzi’s cosmological and philosophical 
contexts is, therefore, questionable. This leads to a hermeneutical reading of the doctrine of 
zhengming in which exemplars and their subjectivities, communal roles as well as social 
locations, are all significant in shaping the normativity of linguistic practices. Finally, based on 
my hermeneutical interpretation and the sage’s role in the doctrine of zhengming according to 
Xunzi, I will focus on articulating the notion of the sage as a virtuous communicator, elaborating 
the importance of interpersonal knowledge as a pivotal epistemic paradigm in the Xunzi. 
I. 
Key Assumptions of the Realist Interpretation of Meaning 
 
The standard “S knows that p” formulation of knowledge—in which p, knowledge in the 
form of propositions, becomes a dominant concern while S, the reasoning knower, is effectively 
marginalized, if not completely erased—is based on a presumption that language works as a 
mirror. The focus of endeavoring to find universally necessary and sufficient conditions of 
knowledge is on analyzing propositions, not the subjects who claim to know. A fact, as many 
prominent epistemologists agree, is a true proposition. To know a fact is to know the proposition 
established as truth. Knowledge as justified true beliefs, according to the definition of the 
epistemologies of the mainstream, is an articulation of the properties of the propositions rather 
than the knowers. A knower is a passive bearer of knowledge, not the knowledge itself. Thus 
conceived, a conceptual division similar to Saussure’s distinguishing external linguistics from 
internal linguistics appears: there is a radical separation between the sociology of knowledge 
(focusing on the interactions of these knowledge bearers) and the theories of knowledge 
(focusing on the knowledge itself). 
96 
 
A proposition, no matter how one wants to define it academically, is undeniably a 
sentence expressed in human languages, natural or artificial; in order for a proposition to be true, 
this sentence must represent or reflect a piece of the world in an accurate way. Therefore, it is 
necessary for language to function as a mirror. This is the first assumption on which the realist 
interpretation of the doctrine of zhengming operates. 
“Realism” is the term that Robert Eno employs to describe Xunzi’s theory of language in 
which correspondence is simply assumed rather than proven: 
…when viewed as a whole, the Hsun Tzu’s [Xunzi’s] theory of language is realist. 
Although individual words are initially chosen arbitrarily, their consistent use and 
syntactic relations in language create a perfect correspondence between the element and 
structure of language and the objects of the world and their relations.142 
Realists assert that the linguistic structure and the structure of the world should perfectly 
correspond. In other words, realism implies that the role of language in the doctrine of 
zhengming is as that of a mirror. Its main function is to represent, or reflect, the real world out 
there: “…the structure of the world is reflected in the configuration of speech and of ideas 
expressed as doctrines.”143 For Eno, the mirror-like reference relationship between language as 
the representing medium and the objects or structure of the world represented through language 
is the core of understanding Xunzi’s doctrine of zhengming. 
In the “S knows that p” formulation, knowledge is not about a few isolated facts with no 
connections to each other. Rather, it is precisely about how these true propositions are integrated 
in an epistemologically justifiable way. The second assumption implicitly held by scholars who 
                                                
142 Robert Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990), 272 n65. 
143 Ibid., 146. 
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endorse the realist interpretation of zhengming is that there is an advantageous way of using 
language: the sages’ way; it is advantageous because it reflects reality more clearly and, 
ultimately, gives us more knowledge. 
Since it is uncontroversial that in the Xunzi sages play a pivotal role in the making of 
linguistic normativity, the inference that sages see reality better should be unproblematic—
according to the realist view. For instance, Benjamin Schwartz states: 
Both [the Mohists and Xunzi] are convinced that a truly correct language which provides 
a clear and unambiguous picture of both the natural and human world is a product of 
conscious human activity…. [I]t remains [Xunzi’s] fundamental conviction that the 
establishment of a clear and unambiguous language had been primarily the work of sage-
kings and that his own doctrine based on his own definitions provides the authentic 
interpretation of that language…. Hsün-tzu [Xunzi] believes not only that the sages had 
clearly established the fundamental logical categories and classes but that they had also 
solved the problem of applying them to reality so that what they had bequeathed was a 
complete map of social reality.144 
By evoking the metaphor of a complete map, Schwartz also conceives language as a system of 
representational correspondence. His other expressions (such as “a truly correct language” and “a 
clear and unambiguous picture”) imply the involvement of strict linguistic and epistemic 
representational systems in the Xunzi, which, as I will demonstrate in the following sections, is 
hardly the case. However, following the realist line of reasoning the doctrine of zhengming is all 
about linguistic corrections applied according to a golden standard configured by the sages. In 
                                                
144 Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 
312-3. 
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other words, zhengming for Xunzi is to rectify, making the linguistic practice straight according 
to the external standard of the “truly correct language” that the sages established. It is in this 
particular context that rendering zhengming as “rectification of names” makes sense. After all, 
the term “rectification” is etymologically derived from the Latin word rectus—meaning 
“straight”—and the root of facere—meaning “to make.” In other words, zhengming rendered as 
“rectification of names” is to make linguistic references straight by a golden standard that the 
sages established to reflect reality. The realists’ reckoning of the whole project is thus merely 
retrospective, focusing only on restoring the orders of the old ages without much consideration 
of the present and the future.145 
 Readers are reminded that so far, the realist interpretation that both Eno and Schwartz 
promote is merely implicitly assumed. Other possible forms of philosophical positions regarding 
language, such as idealism and pragmatism, are neither mentioned nor considered. As a 
consequence, it is not a surprising move to regard Xunzi’s doctrine of zhengming as merely a 
less developed, if not completely naïve, version of what some prominent philosophers in the 
Enlightenment era and their predecessors have to say.146 Even though the realist rendering of 
zhengming as “rectification of names” seems to resonate with the correspondence theory, it has a 
sense of déjà vu because studying Xunzi’s thoughts leads us back to Descartes (and his 
predecessors, such as Plato and Saint Augustine), along with many others. 
                                                
145 This is a popular, and yet problematic, view among Chinese scholars’ interpretation of the doctrine of zhengming 
as fagu法古: a conservative retrieval of historical meaning. The fagu interpretation is not very defensible when 
taking a closer look. See Sarah A. Mattice, “On ‘Rectifying’ Rectification: Reconsidering Zhengming in Light of 
Confucian Role Ethics,” Asian Philosophy 20 no.3 (2010): 247-60. 
146 For example, Descartes claims that general laws of reason can be not only found and laid out, but also assumed 
into a method through which we represent reality in language. See John D. Lyons and Stephen G. Nichols, Jr. (Eds.) 
Mimesis: From Mirror to Method, Augustine to Descartes (Aurora, Davies Group Publishers, 2004), 16. 
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 Aligning itself with the exclusive emphasis on propositions in the “S knows that p” 
formulation, the third assumption of the realist interpretation of the doctrine of zhengming is that, 
through treating language as a mirroring and labeling system in mediation, the physical and the 
mental are radically and distinctively separated, and a dualistic system is effectively suggested. 
Consider Paul Goldin’s rendering of a key passage in the Xunzi (K22.8): 
Names are that by which different objects are designated. Propositions connect the names 
of different objects in order to sort ideas into one. Disputations and explications do not 
differentiate [between] reality and name in order to illustrate the Way of movement and 
quietude [this statement is inherently ambiguous in the Chinese original as well]. 
Designating and naming are the application of disputations and explications. Disputations 
and explications are the mind’s image of the Way.147 
Goldin’s translation is faithful to the realist interpretation: three levels (the external objects, the 
language, and the mind) are distinguished, and language’s function as a representational system 
is identified. By regarding Xunzi as a realist, a familiar framework of mind, language, reality, 
and their mutually referential connections is established, leading readers to think that the 
dichotomy between the mental and the physical, between the knowing-self and the world to be 
known, and between the internal and the external is taken for granted by Xunzi. However, having 
all the elements that a realist reading requires, Goldin himself admits that nailing down this 
passage in a sensible way while avoiding disintegrations is not easy. 
                                                
147 名也者，所以期累實也。辭也者，兼異實之名以論一意也。辨說也者，不異實名以喻動靜之道也。期命
也者，辨說之用也。辨說也者，心之象道也。《荀子‧正名》See Paul Rakita Goldin, Rituals of the Way: The 
Philosophy of Xunzi (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 98. The bracketed statement is Goldin’s own words in the 
translation. 
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 My own translation of this passage, without implicitly starting with any of those three 
assumptions, is as follows: 
Names are used in order to accumulate shared human experience. Phrases combine 
names that point to different experiences in such a way that their meanings are 
comprehensible to others in the community. Disputations and explanations, by not 
allowing the established pairing of names and experiences to be broken down, are 
employed in explicating proper judgments, such as the movement or tranquility of the 
path-making process (dao). The purpose of disputations and explanations is to make the 
linguistic practices comprehensible to the community. The processes of disputing and 
explaining are like the path-making (dao) of the heart-mind. 
The context of this passage indicates that Xunzi attempts to differentiate a variety of levels of 
linguistic communication practiced in concrete communal settings. The constant foci here are not 
the accuracy of representation in propositions and mental images, but the shared experience of, 
and the communicability among, community members. Neither of these requires strict 
representational accuracy, but both are intimately associated with communicative relationships. 
Goldin’s difficulty in translating this passage is due to the ineffectiveness of the realist position 
as an overarching framework in interpreting Xunzi’s thoughts, and not so much related to the 
ambiguity of classical Chinese language. The realist reading will encounter more and more 
obstacles when further challenged to interpret the Xunzi. If the realist reading is right, those 
difficulties and obstacles should be less, not more. 
 In addition, the realist interpretation has a profound impact on how the notion of shi實 is 
understood. There is no dispute among scholars that ming and shi are usually paired in the Xunzi, 
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and that the relation between ming and shi is the key to unpack how Xunzi understands language 
(K22.2): 
… the way [sage-]kings institute names is as follows. Because settling a way by which 
ming are appropriately used leads to proper distinction of shi and because when their 
ways are practiced their intentions are understood, by doing these they painstakingly lead 
the people and unite them.148 
While translating ming as “names,” “phrases,” or even “language” is not problematic, how the 
notion of shi is understood in relation to the doctrine of zhengming is controversial. Realists find 
no difficulties in translating “shi” as “reality” based on the understanding that linguistic terms 
refer to the objects in the external world in a representationally accurate way.149 Conceiving the 
ming-shi relationship as a language-reality correspondence perfectly fits the realist sensibility. 
 Nevertheless, such an interpretation is at odds with the etymological understanding of the 
character shi. According to the Shuowen Lexicon, the character shi, consisting of a roof (宀) and 
shell used as currency (貫) in ancient China, means family wealth and, by extension, the tangible 
result—the fruit—of a creative process. Shi is usually in contrast to xu虛, an open or deserted 
place. Shi is not the reality out there regardless of whether humans exist or not. On the contrary, 
creative participation is fundamental in this fruit-bearing process. Within the context of Xunzi’s 
constantly focusing on human affairs, I suggest understanding shi as communal experience 
because it is the fruition of meaningful human interactions. 
                                                
148 …王者之制名，名定而實辨，道行而志通，則慎率民而一焉。《荀子‧正名》 
149 As a consequence, some realists have no problem of conceiving dao—a pivotal notion in Chinese philosophy—
as “eternal and unchanging.” See Goldin, Rituals of the Way, 103-4. 
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 Restated, the position of realism claims that the meaning of a word ultimately is built on 
something that exists in the external world, which is independent of language and the individual 
using that language. Therefore, representational accuracy is necessary for the system to work. 
 In summary, when it comes to interpreting the Xunzi, there are three assumptions upon 
which this position revolves: first, it is necessary for language to function as a mirror; second, the 
sages’ way of using language is advantageous because it reflects reality more clearly and, 
ultimately, gives us more knowledge; and third, the physical and the mental are radically and 
distinctively separated. I shall reject the realist interpretation by criticizing all three assumptions, 
with Wittgenstein as an internal critique, and with the cosmology inherited by Xunzi— that is 
also embodied in the commentary of the Yijing—as an external critique. 
II. 
Internal and External Critiques of Realism 
 
 The realist interpretation is not the only possible reading and cannot be taken for granted 
considering criticisms of it as well as other interpretations. I will start with a reexamination of 
later Wittgensteinian remarks regarding the modern construction of language and the knowing 
self. These remarks, serving collectively as an internal critique, demonstrate that the 
representational model is neither the only option nor the only way to understand the connection 
between language, knowledge, and the world. 
Internal Critique: Later Wittgenstein 
 Since the dawn of modern philosophy, philosophers have been concerned with how 
language is conceived. Later, Wittgenstein rejects several distinguished philosophical 
characteristics of language conceptualization. First, he rejects the idea that the function of 
language is to represent non-linguistic objects, which goes against the realist assumption that 
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language functions as a mirror. This view of language can be traced back to ancient Greece and 
medieval times, exemplified by Plato’s repelling the poets and sophists and Saint Augustine’s 
developing the theory of ostensive definition. However, the Enlightenment philosophers are the 
first ones to systematically popularize this conceptualization. Thus philosophy sets itself apart 
from rhetoric and poetic expressions by mapping out a network of accurate representations 
between thoughts, language, and the world. Finding meaning is to understand the operations of 
multiple layers of representational references.  
 Nevertheless, comparing language with monetary currency, Wittgenstein points out that 
language is meaningful only in a concrete pragmatic context, just as money is meaningful only 
when it is used (BT, 367). Without any concrete pragmatic context, terms such as “I,” “here,” 
and “now” are referent-less, and no represented and corresponding objects are to be found. 
Therefore, there is a constant danger in abstracting and universalizing: without any concrete 
context, the objects to be represented may be simply assumed but not verified. 
 Second, as far as knowledge is concerned, Wittgenstein rejects that the idea that there is 
one advantageous way of using language, one that aims for true propositions, which goes against 
the realist assumption that representational accuracy is advantageous in (sages’) employing 
language. If one has to, on the one hand, follow the intuition that what distinguishes knowledge 
from wild beliefs is the degree of certainty, and, on the other hand, to keep the belief that the 
function of language is to represent non-linguistic objects, this person must then regard 
propositional knowledge as something functioning like a mirror. According to the conventional 
tripartite conception of knowledge, knowledge is a systematic aggregation of true propositions 
that must be epistemically justifiable. Certainty is guaranteed by representational accuracy 
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between the knower and the known, mediated by true belief in the form of propositions. This 
view confines language to a labeling system; and a good system distinguishes itself from bad 
ones in terms of its degree of accuracy (how well the labeling system reflects reality). Therefore, 
pursuing certainty in knowledge is accompanied by pursuing accuracy in language. Ordinary 
language (i.e., physical language) is not professional enough for philosophers. 
 Before working on the Philosophical Investigation, Wittgenstein intended to develop a 
logical system concerning atomic propositions and phenomenological descriptions of immediate 
experience. His intention was to understand the logical multiplicity for inference through 
accurately examining the phenomena to be described (RLF, 29-31). Wittgenstein later 
determined that such a project was fruitless and ultimately abandoned it because such a quest for 
accuracy can only result in infinite regress. It led Wittgenstein to conclude that there is no 
advantageous and direct way to describe the world as we experience it. Any pursuit of linguistic 
accuracy in hopes of representing the referents better will eventually be futile. 
 Third, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that knowing resides in the internal domain, the 
individualized mind. If language—a non-thinking labeling system—serves as a mirror that 
accurately represents the external world (which does not think either), then the “thinking thing” 
must exist somewhere internally. Therefore, making sense of the meaning and tracing the 
thinking process have everything to do with introspection. Thus, the key to knowledge is always 
looking inside, whether it is the known that exists in the external world or it is an internal process 
such as immediate experience. This internalizing and introspecting move in philosophy also 
gives rise to the theory of privileged access (e.g., nobody can understand my happiness), the 
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exclusive fundamental epistemic status of sense data (e.g., I feel the heat of this boiling pot), and 
the possibility of private language.  
 For Wittgenstein, the fallacy of this internalizing movement is associated with misusing 
ordinary language, originally meant to describe the physical world, being used to describe a 
totally a different realm such as consciousness and emotional states. Supporters of philosophical 
introspection did not find new mental objects that could be the epistemic and metaphysical 
foundation of the world; instead, what they found was a new way of talking about things while 
still being restrained and, in this case, misguided by the syntax rules of ordinary language (PI 
400). The Wittgensteinian deconstruction of the internalizing approach of modern philosophy 
effectively breaks the connection between the conscious knowing self and privately-owned sense 
data by this modern construction of self. As Judith Genova states: 
Ultimately, instead of focusing on the truth status of propositions or the mental state of 
knowers, Wittgenstein turns to acts and their circumstances. Knowing something is not a 
simple relation between a mind and a fact, but a complex one involving many 
variables.150 
If knowledge cannot be reduced to the linear connection between the knowing and the known, 
conventional epistemology may have to seriously consider opening up to some unconventional 
suggestions such as relational knowing with, in Michael Polanyi’s terms, “post-critical” and 
“committal” orientations.151 
 So far, in addition to pointing out the Wittgensteinian rejections of the three identified 
realist assumptions, I have also demonstrated some problems with the realist interpretation, such 
                                                
150 Judith Genova, Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing (New York: Routledge, 1995), 175. 
151 I will discuss some of Polanyi’s key suggestions in Chapter Six. 
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as leading the readers to Descartes and his predecessors’ understanding of linguistic meaning 
that had little relevance to the Xunzian approach, as well as failing to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of certain key passages and ideas without disintegration or violations of the 
sensitivity of participation that is deeply rooted in classical Chinese philosophy. Under such 
circumstances, the inadequacy of the realist interpretation of Xunzi’s doctrine of zhengming 
becomes clear: to impose a problematic realism on the Xunzi is to understand it as advocating a 
fallacious way of thinking. Now I shall substantiate my claims and reject the realist assumptions 
by reexamining the cosmology recorded in the early commentaries of the Yijing, from which 
classical Confucianism was cultivated and developed. I will then provide a hermeneutical 
interpretation of the ming-shi relation within the context of the Xunzian notion of language as an 
expression of social embeddedness.  
External Critique: Cosmological and Philosophical Context of the Yijing 
 A major flaw of the realist interpretation, other than being rejected within its own 
philosophical soil, is ignoring the philosophical context of the doctrine of zhengming. The realist 
interpretation of the doctrine of zhengming has to face challenges from classical Confucian 
cosmology embodied in the Yijing, from which most of the core notions of Xunzi’s thinking can 
be traced. An appropriate understanding of the ming-shi relation and the relationship between 
zheng and ming in the Xunzi cannot be achieved without an investigation of the worldview that 
classical Confucians commonly shared. In order to reject the realist assumptions identified in the 
previous section, I shall focus on the key aspects of how language was conceived in relation to 
the sages. 
107 
 
 Unlike the familiar triad (the representing subject, the medium of representation, and the 
represented objects) that the realist view presupposes, an overarching framework in the early 
commentaries of the Yijing is an emphasis on human participation in the cosmic creative 
processes. Humans, tian (the heavens), and di (the earth) are recognized as “sancai三才”—the 
three most significant creative forces in cosmic formations and transformations: 
As a book, the Yijing is broad and great, detailed and carefully written. There are the 
ways of tian in it, the proper ways of human in it, and the ways of di in it. It brings these 
three creative forces (sancai) together and doubles them in their presentations in 
hexagrams. This is the reason for there being six lines in a hexagram. What these six 
embody are nothing other than the ways of the three creative forces. Since the proper 
ways consist of transformations and changes, we refer to them as “moving lines (yao 
爻)”. Since these moving lines consist of different classes, we refer to them as “things 
and events.” Since these things and events mix together, we refer to these as “patterns 
(wen文).”152 
In the absence of both the subject/object as well as human/nature dichotomies and the Judeo-
Christian notion of Heaven, there is a profound sense of interdependency and mutual 
participation in the classical Confucian worldview. Tian, neither conceptually separable from 
human affairs nor independent of this world, is both anthropomorphic and euhemeristic, and, 
more importantly, takes a participatory role in a discourse shared by the human community.153 
                                                
152 易之為書也，廣大悉備。有天道焉、有人道焉、有地道焉，兼三材而兩之。故六六者，非它也，三材之
道也。道有變動，故曰爻；爻有等，故曰物；物相雜，故曰文…。《易傳‧繫辭下》English translation, 
with minor interpretative revisions, is cited from Richard John Lynn, trans. The Classic of Changes: A New 
Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 92-3. 
153 Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, 46-8. 
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 This notion of creative processes that stresses interdependence and mutual participation, 
conceived as the matrix from which things and events emerge, leads to a pivotal emphasis on the 
sensibility of “ganying感應 (resonance and responsiveness).” Unsurprisingly, this term is used 
in both the nonhuman as well as the human realms: 
Two kinds of vital energy (qi) respond to each other and achieve resonance (gan) in a 
mutually participatory and responsive (ying) way…. As tian and di achieve resonance 
(gan), myriad things and events are generated in a transformative way. As sages achieve 
resonance (gan) with the hearts-minds of the people, those under their governance will be 
living harmoniously and peacefully. By focusing on the resonance, the genuine 
dispositions of tian, di, and myriad things and events will present themselves.154 
If humans are part of the generative fabric that keeps unfolding, the significance of appropriately 
responding to the creative processes and achieving harmonious resonance with them can never 
be overlooked. Consider the self-understanding of the origin of the trigrams of the Yijing: 
When in ancient times Lord Bao Xi ruled the world as sovereign, upward he looked at 
images presenting in tian and downward looked at the models that di provided. He looked 
the patterns on birds and beasts and what things are suitable to the land. Nearby, adopting 
them from his own person, and afar, adopting them from other things and events, he 
thereupon made the eight trigrams in order to become thoroughly conversant with the 
                                                
154 二氣感應以相與…。天地感，而萬物化生；聖人感人心，而天下和平。觀其所感，而天地萬物之情可見
矣。《易傳‧咸》See also Lynn, The Classic of Changes, 55. 
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efficacies inherent in the numinous and the bright and to classify the myriad things and 
events in terms of their ways in the world.155 
Trigrams, on which more complicated hexagrams are based, are understood as an outcome of the 
effective triangulation of sancai, the three interdependent creative forces that form and transform 
the world as we know it. They do not come from disengaged observation by a distancing, non-
participating, and emotionless observer. The aim is to achieve productive communication—that 
is, resonance—between human experience and its surroundings by certain kinds of intentional, in 
situ responses. Trigrams and hexagrams are celebrated by Confucians, not because they represent 
the reality in an extremely accurate way, but because they are the presentations of the 
intertextuality of tian, di, and humans. 
 In contextualizing human activities in the notion of sancai, languages are expressions of 
the creative processes that keep transforming and are being transformed. In the early 
commentaries of the Yijing, there was already a profound appreciation of the complexities of 
human language. However, textual evidences show that language is not conceived as mirror-like: 
The Master said: “Writing does not exhaust words, and words do not exhaust meanings 
(yi). If this is so, does this mean that the meanings of the sages cannot be discerned?” The 
Master said: “The sages established images (xiang) in order to express their meanings to 
their optimum. They established hexagrams in order to treat the tendencies of things and 
events and their countertendencies to their optimum. They attached phrases to the 
hexagrams in order to optimize what they have to say. They let the changes occur and 
                                                
155 古者包犧氏之王天下也，仰則觀象於天，俯則觀法於地；觀鳥獸之文，與地之宜，近取諸身，遠取諸物
，於是始作八卦，以通神明之德，以類萬物之情。《易傳‧繫辭下》See also Lynn, The Classic of Changes, 
77. 
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achieve free flow in order to optimize the potential of the benefit involved. They made a 
drum of it, made a dance of it, and optimized the potential of its numinous power.156 
At least three levels of symbolism can be identified here: first, meanings; second, images and 
hexagrams; and third, written and spoken language. If the sages are concerned with 
representational accuracy, as the realist interpretation asserts, then images should be the first 
items to be eliminated. After all, images are at times too vague and open to interpretation; they 
also have a tendency to destabilize the established correspondence. However, as mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, images established by the sages, including trigrams and hexagrams, are 
celebrated in the Confucian tradition;157 commentary after commentary on the Yijing also 
demonstrate significant endeavors to keep this tradition alive. These evidences indicate that, 
contradictory to the first assumption of the realist interpretation that the main function of 
language is to reflect or represent the designated objects in the external world, language is not 
associated with representing objects. In other words, conceiving the ming-shi relation as merely a 
linguistic referential correspondence between names and reality does not stand. 
 As discussed in the previous section, the etymology of the character shi indicates a 
certain kind of fruition that requires participatory efforts. Combined with the understanding of 
the sensibility of the Yijing articulated above, ming is what humans are able to achieve 
linguistically in response to shi; and shi, in turn, becomes the fruition of ming in resonance. Shi is 
thus the fruition of communication that is shared by the members of a community. The quality of 
                                                
156 子曰：「書不盡言，言不盡意。然則聖人之意，其不可見乎？」子曰：「聖人立象以盡意，設卦以盡情
偽，繫辭以盡其言，變而通之以盡利，鼓之舞之以盡神。」《易傳‧繫辭上》See also Lynn, The Classic of 
Changes, 67. 
157 The notion of xiang象 (image or figure) is closely associated with human imagination, through which we 
“figure” things out and “configure” a world. Detailed discussions can be found in Chapter Five, in which 
imagination and metaphors are brought in focus. 
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being publicly shared is of central importance in appropriately conceiving both ming and shi, as 
well as other levels of symbolic presentations. It implies that the ming-shi relation—as well as 
other levels of symbolism involved in it—is a hermeneutic process. Being a hermeneutic process 
entails an invitation to more conversations as well as revisions, which is incompatible with the 
second assumption of the realist position (i.e., sages’ way of using language is advantaged 
because it reflects reality more clearly and leads to more knowledge). There can be no sage 
unless there is a communicating community. And the significance of being a sage, as I will 
discuss further in later parts of this chapter, lies in the capability of facilitating more 
conversations, not in providing an advantageous social map. 
 The quality of being publicly shared also implies that the ming-shi relation, as well as 
knowledge associated with it, is not primarily a solipsist achievement of any discrete mind, 
which goes against the third assumption of the realism, that is, that language is intimately 
associated with mind/body dualism. Ming, which realists associated with the mental, is not a part 
of any private language or internal solo; and shi, which realists associated with the physical, is 
not simply the aggregations of external objects and their structural relations. Since all three key 
assumptions of the realist interpretation of zhengming are highly inconsistent with the cosmology 
in the Yijing, generally shared by classical Confucians including Xunzi, I suggest that the 
realists’ rendering of zhengming as “rectification of names” needs to be replaced. 
 In short, “rectification” is a term that has little resonance with the cosmology in which the 
idea of zhengming is situated. Confucianism, as part of the classical worldview presented in the 
Yijing, presupposes that “the only constant is change itself,”158 and therefore, appreciates the 
developmental processes in human responsiveness. In accepting this understanding as primary, it 
                                                
158 Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, 23. 
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is contradictory to think of the ming-shi relationship as fixed and unchanging. There can be no 
rectification of a relationship because the relationship never stands still. By taking changes 
seriously, new experiences make our being-in-the-world a transformative process, and old names 
may or may not be applicable. In this worldview, the ming-shi relation has to be in constant 
adjustment and negotiation. The main function of language is to enhance the human experience 
that produces resonance with our surroundings, tian and di. 
 Zheng, in the Yijing, has everything to do with a certain kind of proper positioning 
leading to efficacious resonance: 
The way the symbol Qian presents is ceaseless functioning with bright patterns. As it is 
positioned properly (zheng), it will be responsive in an efficacious way. Therefore, 
exemplary persons position themselves properly. Only by becoming an exemplary person 
will one be capable of communicating the orders in the political community 
effectively.159 
In this passage, as well as many others, “being proper” is co-defined with “achieving productive 
resonance” rather than “following established standards.” Unlike “rectification,” a term 
associated with either a visual or purely intellectual experience, “resonance” is much more in 
line with the audio experience. Therefore, following the interpretation of Kurtis Hagen, 
zhengming is better understood as the “attunement of names.” If the language is properly attuned, 
it will bring about the most fruitful outcomes of human experience. This is the foundation of my 
interpretation of zhengming based on the cosmological context of this term. 
III. 
A Hermeneutical Interpretation of the Doctrine of Zhengming 
                                                
159 乾行也，文明以健，中正而應，君子正也。唯君子為能通天下之志。《易傳‧同人》See also Lynn, The 
Classic of Changes, 34. 
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 My interpretation of the doctrine of zhengming, which is based on the cosmology of the 
Yijing as well as Xunzi’s uncompromising relational ideas of person and knowledge, is 
concerned with the social responsiveness (associated with the water metaphor) rather than the 
accuracy of linguistic and mental representations (associated with the mirror metaphor) of an 
individual person. 
 Historically, zhengming has a tradition of use prior to its use by Xunzi. The first notable 
use of this term is recorded in the Analects: 
“Were the Lord of Wei to turn the administration to his state over to you, what would be 
your first priority?” asked Zilu.  
“Without question it would be to insure zhengming,” replied the Master.  
“Would you be as impractical as that?” responded Zilu. “What is it for names to 
be attuned anyway?”  
 “How can you be so dense!” replied Confucius. “An exemplary (junzi) defers on 
matters he does not understand. When names are not attuned, language will not be used 
effectively; when language is not used effectively, matters will not be taken care of; when 
matters are not taken care of, the observance of ritual propriety (li) and the playing of 
music (yue) will not flourish; when the observance of ritual propriety and the playing of 
music do not flourish, the application of laws and punishments will not be on the mark; 
when application of laws and punishments are not on the mark, the people will not know 
what to do with themselves. Thus, when exemplary person puts a name to something, it 
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can certainly be spoken, and when spoken it can certainly be acted upon. There is nothing 
careless in the attitude of the exemplary person toward what is said.”160 
It is clear that, for Confucius, zhengming is intimately associated with effective governance, 
which is ultimately a specific type of resonance between the leaders and the people. The 
emphasis is on the crucial and practical role that language and communication play in a 
community. From the perspective of Confucius, the failure to achieve zhengming will eventually 
lead to the disintegration of a community because people will not know what to do with 
themselves. As far as this passage is concerned, there is no textual evidence that endorses either a 
perfect correspondence (as asserted by Eno) or the sages’ advantageous way of using language 
(as suggested by Schwartz). Zhengming is a direct response to the improper and deviant uses of 
names that cause confusion and miscommunication. 
 Nevertheless, simply describing zhengming as one way to facilitate effective governance 
is definitely an understatement of what Confucius meant. This passage records one of a few 
occasions in the Analects in which Confucius uses harsh words followed by a structured 
argument to refute one of his favorite disciples.161 Confucius is profoundly serious when it 
comes to zhengming: the “attunement of names” is what keeps the human world in motion! It is 
the infrastructure of our living together in the world that is ever changing. This is the reason why 
the ming-shi relation has to be constantly attuned. In other words, it is inconceivable to interpret 
zhengming as merely a passive, reactive, and retrospective means, made possible by an 
established golden standard such as perfect correspondence. If we take change seriously, 
language users have no choice but to be responsive. Thus, zhengming has to be both 
                                                
160 See the Analects 13.3. 
161 Zilu, the disciple criticized by Confucius, is a military man near Confucius in age. Even though Confucius has 
great affection for Zilu, the latter is often impetuous without giving sufficient thought to the situation. 
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retrospective and prospective; “rectification” merely captures the retrospective aspect of 
zhengming, not the prospective, programmatic function of it. 
 The Analects records a case in which the shape and function of one kind of ritual drinking 
vessel changes so much over hundreds of years that one can hardly call the new vessel by the old 
name: 
The Master said, “A gu ritual drinking vessel that is not a gu ritual drinking vessel—a gu 
indeed! A gu indeed!162 
It is possible to interpret this passage according to the following logical structure, where ‘X’ can 
be any arbitrary proposition: from a contradiction one can derive anything ([G & ~G] → X). 
Nevertheless, such an interpretation misses Confucius’s point. In its own time and place during 
the Shang dynasty, the ritual vessel gu was iconic and culturally alive, reflecting the political, 
religious, and cultural status of its owner; but centuries later, by Confucius’s time, it has become 
an artifact, an object of mere beauty. The first half of the sentence comes with a sense of history, 
as well as the continuum (a kind of ritual vessel carrying the same name), and the break of the 
historical sensibility (the shape and function of this particular type of vessel changing over time) 
creates a tension. Likely with a profound sense of sarcasm, the second half of the sentence 
delivers an innovative judgment. In reaffirming the ming-shi relation and continuing to call this 
particular kind of vessel “gu,” Confucius effectively co-creates, along with history and shared 
experience, new qualities to an established ming-shi relation. Confucius is demonstrating the 
zhengming project. 
                                                
162 See the Analects 6.25. 
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 Just as with language, this kind of innovative judgment is not created ex nihilo, but in situ. 
In other words, the act of naming or its attunement cannot be described as being creative without 
a proper understanding of both the historical conditions and the current situation. It is the reason 
why Confucius not only expresses this sensitivity with words, but also instills it in the education 
of the younger generation(s) of his family: 
Chen Gang asked the son of Confucius, Boyu: “Have you been given any kind of special 
instruction?”  
 “Not yet,” he replied. “Once when my father was standing alone and I hastened 
quickly and deferentially across the courtyard, he asked me, ‘Have you studied the 
Songs?’ I replied, ‘Not yet,’ to which he remarked, ‘If you do not study the Songs, you 
will be at a loss as to what to say.’ I deferentially took my leave and studied the Songs.” 
“On another day when he was again standing alone, I hastened quickly and 
deferentially across the courtyard. He asked me, ‘Have you studied the Rites?’ I replied, 
‘Not yet,’ to which he remarked, ‘If you do not study the Rites, you will be at a loss as to 
where to stand.’ I deferentially took my leave and studied the Rites. What I have learned 
from him, then, are these two things.”163 
From Confucius’s point of view, studying the classics—which is importantly retrospective—is 
necessary for effective communication in a person’s own communal relationships with other 
listeners and speakers—which is prospective. The knowledge gained through studying classics is 
much more than merely propositional; it also includes a sense of history, cultural inheritance, and 
sensitivity to the social embeddedness expressed through language, as well as a continual process 
                                                
163 See the Analects 16.13. 
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of making all these aspects one’s own via cultivation. As a consequence, not studying the 
classics leads to a lack of communicative capability. 
 The quality of communication, effective governance, and a sense of togetherness, as well 
as an in situ kind of innovation are all inherent concerns of zhengming in the text of the Xunzi.164 
But unlike Confucius, who does not seem to be concerned with the competition of other thinkers, 
zhengming is a major way that Xunzi responds to the doctrines and rhetorical strategies of the 
competing thinkers of other schools, such as Daoism, Mohism, and Dialectism. These rhetorical 
strategies and doctrines are considered to be destabilizing to the norms of established socio-
linguistic practices in the sense that, retrospectively, they disrespect tradition, and, prospectively, 
they achieve little resonance. More than once, Xunzi describes his historical context as an era 
when the sage-kings have died, and the relation between ming and shi has become chaotic and 
unregulated, while illicit and pernicious doctrines have arisen (K22.3, 8). Xunzi is convinced that 
this trend, if not stopped, will lead to the disintegration of society (K22.4): 
Objects of different shapes are experienced by the hearts-and-minds of the people and yet 
their linguistic expressions are at odds and fail to identify those objects. The names 
(ming) pointing to concrete experience (shi) of different events are entangled and become 
chaotic. There is no clear distinction between the noble and humble. What are similar and 
what are different can no longer be discriminated. If the situation is like this, then 
                                                
164 Even though Confucius describes himself as a person who “follows (shu述) the proper way” and “not forge new 
paths (zuo作)” in the Analects 7.1, it cannot be denied that more than a dozen long-lasting and important ideas 
received their new lives through Confucius. Xunzi states that a king should certainly retain some old names and, at 
the same time, forge (zuo) new names (K22.3). 
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conveying intentions will definitely be frustrated by miscommunication, and carrying out 
communal decisions will suffer from being hampered and obstructed for sure.165 
This scenario is the antithesis of Xunzi’s ideal picture of effective communication. It is possible 
that Xunzi does not hold zhengming and its social effects as the logical antecedent and 
consequent in a deductive framework; however, there should be no doubt that Xunzi is 
convinced that they are highly correlated. 
 Xunzi specifically identifies three major types of practices by the literati of other schools 
that diminish the ways of making distinctions through the established ming-shi relations. All 
three incorrect uses of language result in confusion and, as a consequence, the obstruction of 
effective communication. 
 The first incorrect practice is to “obstruct the established uses of names with other 
incompatible names (yi ming luan ming以名亂名).” Statements such as “being insulted is not 
being humiliated,” “sages—while loving other people—do not love themselves,” and “killing 
robbers is not killing people” are listed as prime examples. From Xunzi’s standpoint, these 
deceptive statements are concerned with destabilizing established ways of “conceptual grouping” 
without sufficient reason. Generally speaking, since the feeling of humiliation is part of the 
experience of being insulted, it is highly unlikely that one can happen without the other; since 
sages are also the members of the community whom they love, it is implausible that they are not 
included in the range of their love; and since robbers are also people, killing robbers is killing 
people. Breaking the established patterns of conceptual grouping without specifications leads to 
ineffective communication and the loss of clarity. 
                                                
165 異形離心交喻，異物名實玄紐，貴賤不明，同異不別；如是，則志必有不喻之患，而事必有困廢之禍。
《荀子‧正名》 
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 The second incorrect practice is to “obstruct the established uses of names with special 
cases of experience (yi shi luan ming以實亂名).” Statements such as “mountains and deep pools 
are of the same level,” “the natural tendencies of humans desire less rather than more,” and 
“eating meat does not increase the satisfaction of taste; and playing huge bells as musical 
instruments does not increase the enjoyment of listening to music” are highlighted by Xunzi. 
Granted, under some special circumstances in which mountains and deep pools may appear to be 
on the same level (e.g., a person’s visual experience can be extremely different under the 
influence of certain drugs); sometimes a person may desire less rather than more (e.g., after a 
huge feast, one may choose a green salad over another large meal); and, once in a while, a person 
may feel that eating meat does not increase the satisfaction of taste (e.g., when a person is 
extremely anxious, everything, including meat, becomes tasteless, an example that Xunzi uses). 
However, these statements cannot be regarded as general descriptions or prescriptions of human 
experience. 
 The third incorrect practice is to “obstruct the established categorizations of experiences 
with names (yi ming luan shi以名亂實).” Statements such as “an ‘ox-horse’ is not a horse” are 
targeted. This statement is fundamentally different from the sentence “a butterfly is not a fly”: 
while “butterfly” is an established term that points to a certain kind of insect, “ox-horse” is not. 
While the term “ox-horse” seems to point to something in our experience because both the term 
“ox” and “horse” do, it is meaningless. 
 It should be noted that these three types of language misuse that Xunzi carefully 
identifies and analyzes are concerned with neither the breakdown of correspondence nor the loss 
of the language that sages set up. All the examples that Xunzi picks to illustrate this 
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inappropriateness are possible and only make sense when a constant linguistic practice is 
relatively alive and well. However, they do not pass the “Xunzian test” for two reasons: on the 
one hand, they are based on biased ways of stating human experience and eventually obscure the 
comprehensive patterns, which are also normative for Xunzi (K21.1);166 on the other hand, they 
obstruct the effective communication of the community. 
 Given that these targeted statements of other schools have their own philosophical points 
to make, we have to allow the possibility that Xunzi’s caricatures of them may not be fair. 
Nevertheless, what is philosophically interesting is to reveal the underlying presuppositions 
necessary for the “Xunzian test” to be sustained. 
 The first and foremost presupposition is that language is a social institution. Xunzi makes 
it clear that language is instituted by the (sage-)kings, leaders who play significant social roles 
(K22.2). In accord with his notion of personhood, there is a profound understanding in Xunzi’s 
worldview that language is fundamentally and irreducibly communal. Language—along with 
ritual propriety, music, and all sorts of education—is a form of structured communication. 
However, communication is not possible without the pre-existence of a plurality of people who 
understand each other. Therefore, instead of the singular “I,” the Xunzian reasoning, and 
Confucian, in general, always starts with “we.” Rather than looking into the individual mind in 
searching for the first principle, the Xunzian sensibility is to examine the like-mindedness of a 
community.167 The Cartesian question (“Who am I?”) as the starting point of philosophizing is 
misleading and fallacious from the perspective of Xunzi. The question that should be asked in 
the first place is: “Who are we?” Zhengming, by the same token, is not a quest of a solipsistic 
                                                
166 It is a significant flaw for Xunzi. See Chapter Three for more discussion of this issue. 
167 In the Xunzi, there is indeed a term “yixin一心” to express the notion of “like-mindedness.” This term is 
specifically used to describe the result of effective governance, and is intimately associated with the military order. 
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individual to think of a way to make the referential representations right, but a much more 
complex process that involves social norms, communicational efficacy, interpersonal skills, 
social locations, and change. Zhengming is the trigger for the community members to become 
more like-minded and collectively responsive via effective communication through changes over 
time. 
 Second, since language is publicly shared, it is a communal resource that has to be used 
in economically streamlined and wise ways. Xunzi uses the character “jian姦” (composed of 
three characters standing for woman) to describe those doctrines to be refuted and rejected 
(K22.2, 8, 10). Jian is conveniently translated as “evil”; yet its original meaning is associated 
with “excessiveness” or “wantonness.” When necessary things become excessive, what may 
originally have been beneficial will turn harmful. For instance, sugar is necessary to maintain the 
proper functioning of human bodies, but consuming too much sugar may cause diabetes. 
Similarly, using linguistic resources in excessive and squandering ways will eventually hurt the 
community. Taking Xunzi’s historical context into account, the abuse of linguistic and 
communicational resources would have been a pressing issue. While the conflict between the 
warring states became more and more fierce, the majority of the society could be wiped out in a 
single battle.168 In other words, no society in the warring state period could afford the 
consequences of long-term miscommunication. Since excessively squandering linguistic 
resources will eventually undermine the effectiveness of communication, it is certainly unwise, 
                                                
168 According to the historical record, some 450,000 military personnel of the state of Zhao趙 lost their lives in the 
single battle of Changping長平; this number does not include the casualties of Zhao’s opponent, the Qin state. This 
battle was concluded in 260 BCE, when Xunzi was still alive. 
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at least from Xunzi’s view point, to accept the doctrines of other schools that tend to abuse the 
linguistic resources. 
 Third, based on the previous two assumptions, those who are linguistically competent 
should not use communal resources for projects that will undermine the community. The 
doctrine of zhegming is Xunzi’s normative claim concerning those who “know” the language in 
the sense that early Chinese thinkers usually understand knowledge in terms of competence or 
ability.169 In other words, zhengming is a salient example of how knowledge and conduct are 
fused together in Xunzi’s philosophy. In the Xunzian sense, the knowledge of language is not so 
much related to the linguistics but to a continuity of knowing how to use linguistic competence. 
This idea is not limited to Xunzi. French philosopher Pierre Bourdieu emphasizes the 
inseparability between the capacity of the techniques and the capacity level of social status when 
it comes to language: 
Linguistic competence is not a simple technical capacity but a statutory capacity with 
which the technical capacity is generally paired, if only because it imposes the acquisition 
of the latter through the effect of statutory attribution (noblesse oblige), as opposed to the 
commonly held belief that regards technical capacity as the basis for statutory capacity. 
Legitimate competence is the statutorily recognized capacity of an authorized person—an 
authority—to use, on formal occasions, the legitimate (i.e., formal) language, the 
authorized, authoritative language, speech that is accredited, worthy of being believed, or, 
in a word, performative, claiming (with the greatest chances of success) to be effective.170 
                                                
169 See Chapter Three for more discussion. 
170 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 69-70. 
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Compared with Eno, Schwartz, and Goldin, Bourdieu’s analysis is much closer to what Xunzi 
attempts to convey. Language is not independent of its being spoken or written in the social 
context where it comes into existence, just as smile, an example employed by Wittgenstein, is 
not independent of a human face (PI 583). The power of language is not separable from its 
pragmatic use in concrete situations in which its users communicate with each other. The same 
claim can be made concerning Xunzi’s concept of knowledge: the power of knowledge is 
inseparable from the communicating knowers who set knowledge into motion in concrete 
circumstances. In short, both language and knowledge are socially situated. This is why for 
Xunzi the doctrine of zhengming cannot be uprooted from the discussions of social norm, 
authority, credibility, performance, and trust. The legitimate use of linguistic competence is an 
issue intimately associated not only with knowledge, but also with conduct. 
 Fourth, ultimately, the doctrine of zhengming is concerned with social responsiveness 
(ying). From Xunzi’s perspective, communication should lead to the ability to be responsive and 
to respond well with skill; and those who dedicate themselves to the cultivation process of 
becoming a sage can be distinguished by their responsiveness to emerging events and changes. 
There is a type of scholar (shi) who are identified as good communicators (tongshi通士); Xunzi 
describes them as ones who “honor their lords and love the people, respond (ying) to things and 
events whenever they arise and manage the situations as they emerge (K3.11).”171 Such ability to 
respond with respect to the established social orders is, in one important aspect, related to the 
competence of making discriminations through linguistic communications (K5.18): 
                                                
171 上則能尊君，下則能愛民，物至而應，事起而辨，若是則可謂通士矣。《荀子‧不苟》 
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There are discriminations [through linguistic communications] of petty persons (xiaoren), 
those of scholars (shi) and exemplary persona (junzi), and those of sages (shengren). The 
discriminations of the sages involve no prior consideration and no planning beforehand, 
yet whatever they express are appropriate, fitting into the patterns and categories [of the 
society]. In raising up issues or in setting them aside, in removing them or shifting them, 
they respond (ying) to the changes in inexhaustible ways. The discriminations of the 
scholars and exemplary persons involve considering the problems in advance and 
planning for them early, so that when they speak even on the spur of the moment, their 
advices deserve a hearing. Their well-composed words (wen) convey human experience 
(shi); they are broad in learning and committed to what is upright. Now if one listens to 
the discussions of the petty people, though they appear to offer organized discriminations, 
one will find that those discussions lack comprehensiveness that connects everything 
together. If one employs their doctrines, one will find that they are deceptive and lead to 
no accomplishment. On the one hand, they are incapable of following and clarifying the 
king’s instructions; on the other hand, they are incapable of harmonizing and uniting the 
people. Further, through their clever and glib tongues, whether with garrulity or with but 
a simple yes, they may seem to be hugely convincing, and yet they ought to be regarded 
as braggarts, arrogant attendants, and others of their ilk. Such persons may be described 
as the most dominant of villainous (jian) people.172 
                                                
172 有小人之辯者，有士君子之辯者，有聖人之辯者：不先慮，不早謀，發之而當，成文而類，居錯遷徙，
應變不窮，是聖人之辯者也。先慮之，早謀之，斯須之言而足聽，文而致實，博而黨正，是士君子之辯者
也。聽其言則辭辯而無統，用其身則多詐而無功，上不足以順明王，下不足以和齊百姓，然而口舌之均，
噡唯則節，足以為奇偉偃卻之屬，夫是之謂姦人之雄。《荀子‧非相》 
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While scholars, exemplars, and sages respond to change in appropriate ways leading to 
successful resolution, those who abuse communal linguistic resources respond to nothing and 
achieve nothing but their fake communal images. Xunzi’s blame is not that they are linguistically 
incompetent. The blame is precisely that they are competent, yet either mislead or obscure the 
clarity of communication with the excessive use of linguistic resources.173 
 If my analysis of these four presuppositions underlying the doctrine of zhengming are 
warranted, then Xunzi’s central concern here is about communal responsiveness, not 
representational accuracy as assumed by the realist reading. The doctrine of zhengming was itself 
a response to the changes during the time of Xunzi, when the social order was much shakier and 
the competition with other schools of thinking was much more intense than during Confucius’s 
era. Nevertheless, a continuing thread remains: zhengming in the Analects and in the Xunzi 
conveys a sensibility focusing on “we” as members of a (linguistic) community in a 
transformative process. My interpretation is consistent with Xunzi’s choosing water over the 
mirror as the root metaphor of his concept of the heart-mind (xin), which is also communally 
situated and embedded. 
 The previous discussion of the doctrine of zhengming provides an important vocabulary 
for bridging to and exploring the second important type of knowledge in the Xunzi. This 
vocabulary includes social embeddedness, effective communication, responsiveness, linguistic 
competence, and norms. At this point, I would like to refocus on the Xunzian notion of the sage 
as a virtuous communicator. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Xunzi’s paradigm of knowledge is 
person-centered rather than proposition-centered. Studying what an ideal Xunzian person is will 
                                                
173 In the Xunzi, it is mentioned that there is a particular type of people who are ashamed to be inferior to others; 
with the frame of mind of a scoundrel, they seek the reputation of an exemplar or of a sage. See K.7.8. 
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give us a unique perspective on what Xunzian knowledge could entail. While the goal of Chapter 
2 was to cover skill knowledge embodied in the Xunzian sage, here I aim to articulate the other 
significant type of knowledge in the Xunzi: interpersonal knowledge.   
IV. 
Knowing People in Communal Communication 
 
 Interpersonal knowledge is at times categorized as knowledge by acquaintance, a kind of 
knowledge distinctively different from knowledge by description, according to the original 
characterization by Bertrand Russell: 
I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that 
object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive 
relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort 
which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I 
call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which 
constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the 
same thing as to say that O is presented to S.174 
For Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is a form of direct awareness that is both non-
conceptual and non-judgmental. Since concepts and judgments are representational in nature, 
knowledge by acquaintance is not representational, but presentational. In addition, knowledge by 
acquaintance is unattainable without the existence of the relata, an item or a person, and an 
awareness or recognition of its existence. Both characteristics are in agreement with the 
Confucian sensitivity, even though Russell’s insisting on starting with an idealized individual 
knower would not be accepted by Confucians. 
                                                
174 Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 11 (1910-11): 108-128. Reprinted in his Mysticism and Logic (London: Unwin, 1986), 200-21. 
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 When it comes to knowing people, there is no doubt that, for Confucians, communication 
is of unparalleled importance. In the Confucian sense, the process of becoming a sage from an 
exemplar has everything to do with communication. The first character of the term “junzi 
(exemplary person)” is composed of a truncheon-holding hand that governs and a mouth that 
commands. The first character of the term “shengren (sage)” is composed of an ear that listens 
and a mouth that speaks. The etymology of the characters jun and sheng entails the notion of 
effective communication.175 
 Taking communication as the primary quality, there should be no surprise that Xunzi 
regards the aforementioned tongshi (scholars who are good at communicating) as one of the 
highest ranks of the shi category. Even though the differences between shi, junzi, and shengren 
are conventionally considered as where they are situated on the moral spectrum, it should make 
more sense to say that their differences lie on the spectrum of the quality of communication. 
 There are several important ways by which the Xunzian sages communicate. First, they 
communicate through speeches (or the absence of them) in appropriate timing (K6.11): 
Speaking when it is appropriate to do so is knowledge; remaining silent when appropriate 
is also knowledge. Hence knowing when to remain silent is as important as knowing 
when to speak. Therefore, a sage, though he speaks often, constantly observes the social 
categories appropriate to what he discusses. An exemplary person, though he speaks but 
seldom, constantly accords with the established models (fa)…176 
Second, they communicate through social practices and customs that they establish (or they 
decide to follow) (K19.18): 
                                                
175 Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, 62-3. 
176 言而當、知也，默而當，亦知也，故知默猶知言也。故多言而類，聖人也；少言而法，君子也…。《荀
子‧非十二子》 
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… the ancient Kings and sages established the focus [of the funeral rituals], so that 
people could be regulated according to a definite interval. As soon as the patterns of 
social practices were established, then mourning was to be put aside [after the period of 
time of twenty-five months].177 
Third, they communicate through promoting formal music (K20.6-7): 
… Music was enjoyed by the sage-kings; it is capable of making the hearts-minds of the 
people charitable; it resonates with human experience in a profound way; and it alters the 
manners and customs of the people…. If the people have the emotions of love and hate 
but have no means of responding with joy and anger, then there will be disorder…. 
Therefore, [the ancient Kings] cultivated people’s conduct and attuned the music so the 
realms under their governance became well-ordered.178 
Fourth, they communicate through observance of ritual propriety (li) and appropriateness (yi) 
(K23.7): 
Ritual propriety and appropriateness are made possible by the sagely conduct… Sages 
accumulate their thoughts and master their skills in order to set ritual propriety and 
appropriateness, upon which models and standards are based.179 
Fifth, they communicate through attuning names (K20.6-7): 
When the heart-mind resonates with the proper ways, when explanations resonate with 
the heart-mind, when words resonate with explanations, and when names are 
appropriately attuned and the effective communication is expectable, the concrete human 
                                                
177 故先王聖人安為之立中制節，一使足以成文理，則舍之矣。《荀子‧禮論》 
178 樂者，聖王之所樂也，而可以善民心，其感人深，其移風易俗…。夫民有好惡之情，而無喜怒之應則亂
… 故 [先王] 修其行，正其樂，而天下順焉。《荀子‧樂論》 
179 凡禮義者，是生於聖人之偽也…聖人積思慮，習偽故，以生禮義而起法度。《荀子‧性惡》 
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experience is expressible…Such are the discursive discriminations and explanations of 
the sage.180 
Sixth, they communicate through penalties and executions (K5.18): 
Should a sage-king arise, his first task would be to execute [the most dominant of 
villainous people] and only then deal with thieves and robbers.181 
In the Foucaultian sense, the Xunzian sage is an author and executer of social disciplines, 
capable of instituting social organizations and using social resources and tools to shape the 
conduct of the members of the society. Hence contemporary scholars are usually skeptical about 
the plausibility that a Xunzian administration may not be so different from an authoritarian or 
dictatorial government, even under the reign of a sage. 
 Nevertheless, neither an authoritarian leader nor a dictator is a sage. Xunzi makes a clear 
point concerning the qualitative differences between a petty political leader and a sage (K18.2): 
…[A]lthough it is possible for a state to be taken by force, it is impossible for all under 
the heavens (tianxia) to be taken by force. Although it is possible to take over a state by 
stealth, it is impossible to take over all under heavens by stealth…. Although a state is 
something a petty man can possess, nonetheless it is inevitable that he will lose it. All 
under heavens is the greatest of all, and only a sage can possess it.182 
These qualitative differences between a petty political leader and a sage are associated with their 
capacities and competence (K18.2): 
                                                
180 心合於道，說合於心，辭合於說。正名而期，質請而喻…是聖人之辨說也。《荀子‧正名》 
181 夫是之謂姦人之雄。聖王起，所以先誅也，然後盜賊次之。《荀子‧非相》 
182 …可以有奪人國，不可以有奪人天下；可以有竊國，不可以有竊天下也。 …國者、小人可以有之，然而
未必不亡也；天下者，至大也，非聖人莫之能有也。《荀子‧正論》 
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Since all under the heavens is the heaviest burden, only the strongest person will be able 
to bear it. Since it is the largest realm, only the most discriminating will be able to 
allocate social roles properly. Since it is most populated, only the acutest will be able to 
harmonize it. Only a sage is fully capable of fully meeting these three conditions.183 
On the ground of capacities and competence, one can claim that sages know how to rule while 
petty political leaders do not. 
 The Xunzian sages must have a long and generally positive resume of how capable they 
were in communicating with people, and how they responded to emerging events when they 
were recognized as scholars and then exemplars. Even though Xunzi usually pairs the sage and 
the king, sages do not need to possess supreme political power in order to be effective.184 For 
example, they can be effective when serving as ministers (K13.1): 
There are sham ministers, presumptuous ministers, meritorious ministers, and sage 
ministers…. They are able to honor their lords and love the people; they are capable of 
carrying out the governmental ordinances and education to effectively transform the 
people just as a shadow follows its object; they respond (ying) immediately whenever 
they encounter changing circumstances with the quickness and speed of an echo. They 
draw inferences from the categories by analogical extension and connect things with 
comparable cases in order to handle those cases for which there is neither paradigm nor 
model, so that even the most minute matters are regulated and properly presented. Such 
                                                
183天下者，至重也，非至彊莫之能任；至大也，非至辨莫之能分；至眾也，非至明莫之能和。此三至者，
非聖人莫之能盡。故非聖人莫之能王。《荀子‧正論》 
184 Xunzi even distinguishes sages who did not gain a position of power (e.g., Confucius and Zigong) from sages 
who did (e.g., King Shun and King Yu). See K6.8-9. 
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are sage ministers. Accordingly, one who employs sage ministers will become a 
king…185 
There are several recurrent themes when it comes to Xunzi’s characterizations of the qualities of 
a sage: highly reliable, responsive, and inclusive,186 respectful to social order, extremely 
effective in governing people based on love, and good at drawing distinctions so that people can 
follow. Moreover, most, if not all, of the actions of the Xunzian sages seem to be effortless and 
spontaneous,187 just like the Daoist notion of non-coercive actions (K8.11): 
Re-establishing the models of the Hundred Kings as easily as he distinguishes white from 
black, responding appropriately to changing circumstances as easily as counting one and 
two, acting in accordance with the disciplinary requirements of observing ritual 
proprieties in such a way that he is totally at ease with them as though he were merely 
moving his four limbs, seeking the occasion to establish the meritorious in his 
accomplishments as though he were proclaiming the four seasons, with efficacies he 
levels different aspects of governance and harmonizes the common people, consolidating 
countless of the masses as if there were a single person. This person may be called a 
sage.188 
The skillfulness and effortlessness of sagely conduct is the presentation of the first important 
types of knowledge discussed in the previous chapter: knowing how. Even though the skill sets 
                                                
185 有態臣者，有篡臣者，有功臣者，有聖臣者…。上則能尊君，下則能愛民，政令教化，刑下如影，應卒
遇變，齊給如響，推類接譽，以待無方，曲成制象，是聖臣者也。故用聖臣者王…。。《荀子‧臣道》 
186 The responsiveness and inclusiveness of the exemplary person is captured in the expression of “inclusive 
response (jianshu兼術)”. See K.5.15. 
187 See also K5.18, where it is stated, “The discriminations of the sages involve no prior consideration and no 
planning beforehand, yet whatever they express are appropriate, fitting into the patterns and categories [of the 
society]. In raising up issues or in setting them aside, in removing them or shifting them, they respond (ying) to the 
changes in inexhaustible ways.” Original passage in Chinese see note 170. 
188 脩百王之法，若辨白黑；應當時之變，若數一二；行禮要節而安之，若生四枝；要時立功之巧，若詔四
時；平正和民之善，億萬之眾而搏若一人：如是，則可謂聖人矣。《荀子‧儒效》 
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that a sage possesses are much more sophisticated than reliably performing a single task (say, 
riding a bicycle), those skill sets are of no doubt a kind of knowing how. And yet what underlies 
the effectiveness and skillful performance of the Xunzian sages is another type of knowledge: 
knowing who. 
 What does it take to be a person good in communicating? Given that communication 
happens among a group of people who are communicating, knowing others is a fundamental part 
of effective communication: “discoursing” effectively is knowing others and knowing oneself.189 
In fact, knowing people (zhiren知人) has been identified as an important category of knowing 
since the beginning of the Confucian tradition: 
The Master said, “Someone who does not understand the propensity of circumstances 
(ming) has no way of becoming an exemplary person (junzi); someone who does not 
understand the observance of ritual propriety (li) has no way of knowing where to stand; 
a person who does not understand language (zhiyan) has no way of knowing people 
(zhiren).” 190 
From our understanding that exemplars are good communicators moving towards sagacity on the 
spectrum of communicational quality, and that ritual propriety and formal language are 
sophisticate forms of structured communication, it is much more likely to be the case than not 
that this passage refers to one thing rather than three separate conditions. Restated, becoming an 
exemplary person involves understanding the propensity of circumstances, the observance of 
ritual propriety, and the proper use of language. In understanding the propensity of 
circumstances, the exemplars cannot only be responsive but also respond well to emerging 
                                                
189 “Discoursing effectively (zhiyan)” is an important theme that runs through the Analects, the Mengzi, and the 
Xunzi. See also the Mengzi 2A2. 
190 See the Analects 20.3. 
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events and changes; in understanding the observance of ritual propriety, they can situate 
themselves appropriately within the social context; and in understanding the proper use of 
language, they can communicate effectively. This passage demonstrates how language, 
communication, and knowing people are associated with each other from the perspective of 
Confucius. 
 In order to stay away from the self/other dichotomy that does not belong to the Confucian, 
including the Xunzian, sensibility, it is of pivotal importance to note here that knowing people is 
also knowing one’s own person.191 People know each other, neither as pure intellect nor as 
disinterested thinking things, but as persons playing particular social roles in certain kinds of 
communal practices. In knowing others, a person learns the social locations of other people in 
relation to his or hers, as well as the social embeddedness that they share. This kind of 
knowledge increases its volume by sharing life stories and experiences, demonstrating certain 
skills, participating in communal events, performing rituals or music, involving in emotional and 
physical conflicts with verbal exchanges, as well as dealing with communal crises together. In a 
significant sense, what the Xunzian sage-kings do is all about setting up a refined stage for 
people to know and to communicate with each other. Those sage-kings, being virtuosic 
communicators themselves, dedicate themselves to facilitating and fostering quality 
communication instead of being conversation-stoppers. 
 Knowing people does not aim at any kind of disembodied objectivity; its goal is neither 
to transcend contingency, particularity, and historicity, nor to achieve a “view from nowhere,” 
professional disinterestedness, and political neutrality. Knowing who does not exclude 
                                                
191 This could be a reason, at least partially, why expressions similar to the Delphic maxim “know thyself” did not 
particularly stand out in Chinese tradition. 
134 
 
subjectivity and emotions, because how a person responds to things and events emotionally 
speaks volumes about this person, and how a community responds to emerging circumstances 
emotionally speaks volumes about this community. Therefore, in the Confucian tradition, it 
should be worrisome if a person has neither intention nor motivation to know others.192 
 Similar to skill knowledge and dissimilar to propositional knowledge, knowing people is 
necessarily embodied, value-laden, socially embedded and saturated, and—inevitably—not 
claiming infallibility. In other words, it would be a mistake, based on the assumption that my 
analysis is warranted, to think that Xunzi attempts to make any universally valid claim about 
governance, sociopolitical life, knowledge, or conduct. Xunzi’s claims, assertions, and 
prescriptions are based on his particular historical as well as sociopolitical context. However, not 
carrying many positivist-empiricist traits does not make Xunzi’s thinking less philosophical. 
 Before moving on to discuss several significant aspects associated with the Xunzian 
concept of knowledge, such as metaphor, imagination, and wisdom, I would like to conclude this 
chapter with a series of conversations between Confucius and his disciples recorded in the Xunzi 
(K29.7): 
Zilu entered, and the Master said, “You, what are wise persons like and what are 
consummate persons like?”  
 Zilu replied, “Wise persons cause others to know him, and consummate persons 
cause others to love him.”  
 The Master said, “You, you deserve to be called a scholar (shi).”  
Zigong entered, and the Master said, “Si, what are wise persons like and what are 
consummate persons like?”  
                                                
192 The Analects 1.16. 
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 Zigong replied, “Wise persons know others, and consummate persons love 
others.”  
 The Master said, “Sir, you deserve to be called a scholar-exemplar (shi-junzi).”  
Yan Yuan entered, and the Master said, “Hui, what are wise persons like and what 
are consummate persons like?”  
 Yan Yuan replied: “Wise persons know themselves, and consummate persons 
love themselves.”  
 The Master said: “You deserve to be called a bright exemplar.”193 
Bear in mind that a sophisticated Confucian understanding of interpersonal relationship is that it 
is a characteristic built-in rather than added-on in our being-in-the-world. In the scenario 
presented here only Yan Yuan was able to achieve it. Also, realizing that contemporary readers 
of this story do not have the interpersonal knowledge that Confucius and his disciples had for 
each other, this story is not meant to preserve any fixed truth in the sense that deductive logic 
does. Nevertheless, this record does give readers a hint, or an inspiration, pointing to a possible 
way through which we can be associated with each other, after we respond to it by re-
contextualizing ourselves in our historicity, social embeddedness, and particularities. 
    
 
                                                
193 子路入，子曰：「由！知者若何？仁者若何？」子路對曰：「知者使人知己，仁者使人愛己。」子曰：
「可謂士矣。」子貢入，子曰：「賜！知者若何？仁者若何？」子貢對曰：「知者知人，仁者愛人。」子
曰：「可謂士君子矣。」顏淵入，子曰：「回！知者若何？仁者若何？」顏淵對曰：「知者自知，仁者自
愛。」子曰：「可謂明君子矣。」《荀子‧子道》 
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Chapter 5 
Metaphor, Imagination, and Wisdom  
 
Imagination is not at all an alternative to perception  
 but an ingredient of perception.   
It’s encapsulated within the framework of perception. 
--Paul Ricœur 
 
 In the previous chapters, I demonstrated the incompatibility between Xunzi’s epistemic 
model that aims at skillful responsiveness and the conventional epistemic model that is based on 
representation (Chapter 2). I also pointed out that ignoring this incompatibility will lead to 
interpretative problems in translating Xunzi’s passages, as demonstrated by my refutations of the 
realist interpretation of Xunzi’s doctrine of zhengming (Chapter 3). In this chapter, I reinforce the 
distinction between representation and responsiveness. I intend to further investigate the 
treatments that metaphor, imagination, and wisdom received in the context of positivist 
epistemology and classical Confucianism. While they were generally overlooked and 
marginalized in an epistemic tradition that prioritizes representation, metaphor, imagination, and 
wisdom became inextricably linked to the prioritizing of responsiveness in classical 
Confucianism. 
 The starting point and guiding passage for this chapter is from the “Jiebi (Dissolving 
Partiality)” Chapter of the Xunizi. It states (K21.11): 
Hence, the human heart-mind (xin) is like a pan of water. If you place the pan upright and 
do not stir the water up, the mud will sink to the bottom, and the water on top will be 
clear and pure enough to see your beard and eyebrows and to examine the patterns on 
your face. But if a slight wind passes over its surface, the submerged mud will be stirred 
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up from the bottom, and the clarity and purity of the water at the top will be disturbed so 
that it is impossible to obtain the correct impression of even the general outline of the 
face. Now the heart-mind is just like that. Thus, if you lead it with the patterns of things 
and events, nurture it with purity, and not allow mere things to “tilt” it, then it will be 
adequate to determine right and wrong and to resolve any doubtful points.194 
The use of water in this passage fits the general scheme of this chapter. This water metaphor195 
references wisdom; but imagination is necessary in order for the metaphor to make sense. In 
contrast to the fact that metaphor, imagination and wisdom merely occupied marginalized places 
no later than the epistemic turn that marked the dawn of modern philosophy, reading the Xunzi 
in an appropriate way will require reinstating all three of them. Since the capacity to use 
metaphor and imagination is an aspect of wisdom, the unifying virture, I will start with metaphor 
and imagination, and conclude with a discussion on wisdom as an intellectual virtue. 
I. 
Metaphor and the Xunzi 
 
 In comparing the intellectual traditions in ancient Greece and classical China, an 
established caricature is that ancient Greek philosophers placed an exclusive emphasis on logic 
while Chinese philosophers focused on rhetoric. One of the most important underlying 
assumptions of this “Greek logic/Chinese rhetoric” distinction is that logic is intimately 
associated with truth-seeking and certainty while rhetoric prioritizes achieving persuasion. As 
Lloyd and Sivin explain, many ancient Greek theories were built on “the idea that reality is 
                                                
194 故人心譬如槃水，正錯而勿動，則湛濁在下，而清明在上，則足以見鬒眉而察理矣。微風過之，湛濁動
乎下，清明亂於上，則不可以得大形之正也。心亦如是矣。故導之以理，養之以清，物莫之傾，則足以定
是非決嫌疑矣。《荀子．解蔽》 
195 Let us, for now, follow Aristotle’s assertion that simile is a category of metaphor. More specifically, similes are 
unpacked metaphors. See Aristotle, Treatise on Rhetoric III, 4, 1406a20; III, 4, 1406b25-26; III, 4, 1407a14-15; III 
10, 1410b17-18, III; 11, 1412b34-35; III, 11, 1413a15-16. 
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hidden at some deeper level than human senses can apprehend”; thus logic rather than rhetoric 
was highly valued in order to penetrate reality.196 Metaphor, categorized as part of the rhetorical, 
is conceived to be a decorative device expressing a thought in a non-systematic way that is not 
rooted in truth and reality. Following this line of reasoning, many scholars further assume that 
philosophical texts in classical China—whose authors demonstrated no sign of avoiding the use 
of metaphors—are closely related to rhetorical persuasion rather than solid rational 
argumentation. I intend to go beyond this oversimplified view and enhance our understanding of 
both metaphor and the Xunzi. 
The Peirce-Slingerland Approach 
 Even though applying the conceptual lens of a logic/rhetoric split seems to promise a 
sense of ideal clarity and effective evaluation by dismissing what appears to be epistemically 
unreliable (i.e., rhetoric and metaphor) and maintaining focus on what is systematic and purely 
intellectual (i.e., logic), this established split between logic and rhetoric, though seemingly 
useful, cannot remain unchallenged. A different way of understanding can be achieved through 
introducing some alternative ways to think of the relations between logic and rhetoric. Within the 
discipline of modern logic, for example, our comprehension of the relationship between logic 
and rhetoric will be very different from a Peircean (rather than a Fregean) perspective that treats 
logic and rhetoric not as non-overlapping polar opposites but as more intimate relata.197 
Articulating the Peircean treatment, J. E. Tiles states: 
Rhetoric is concerned with persuasion, which is the activity of encouraging other people 
to draw or accept inferences; logic is concerned with drawing better than worse 
                                                
196 Nathan Sivin and Geoffrey Lloyd, The Way and the World: Science and Medicine in Early China and Greece 
(New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2002), 8. 
197 This Peircean treatment is favored by Aristotle. 
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inferences. It is regrettable but true that one’s skill in encouraging others to draw or 
accept inferences does not guarantee the quality of one’s inferences, and skill at drawing 
better inferences does not bring with it an ability to ensure that others will follow. But the 
overlap between logic and rhetoric is obvious if the place that inference has in each 
enterprise is identified.198 
Hence the Peircean critique of the logic/rhetoric split is that the split falsely assumes there are 
two kinds of mutually exclusive modes of persuasion: logical and logic-free. The former is 
associated with rational argumentation, while the latter is but a cover-up for a lack of rationality. 
The overlap between logic and rhetoric implies that the division between logical persuasions and 
logic-free persuasions does not capture the complexity of human communication. Fallacies, for 
example, usually categorized as logic-free persuasions, have some logical elements in terms of 
the structure of reasoning. Even if people are able to find cases that are purely logical or logic-
free, the fact that there are black and white does not entail that there are no shades of grey in the 
spectrum. Thus the Peircean view is that the logic/rhetoric split is over-simplified when it comes 
to understanding human communication in a concrete social context. The logic/rhetoric split 
does not do justice to an understanding of how humans communicate. 
 Coming close to the Peircean approach and identifying the related literal/metaphorical 
split applied to the shaping of the “logical West” in opposition to the “rhetorical China” as a 
“false dichotomy,” Edward Slingerland observes: 
The basic problem with these analyses is that they ultimately take for granted the 
“Western” assumption that the literal versus metaphorical distinction really means 
                                                
198 J. E. Tiles, “Logic and Rhetoric: An Introduction to Seductive Argument,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 28 no.4 
(1995): 300. 
140 
 
something: that is, that there is a class of words or expressions—the “literal”— that 
convey an abstract, amodal meaning that, in turn, refers in some direct way to categories 
in the world. These “literal” meanings can then be contrasted with “metaphorical” 
expressions that merely coordinate or juxtapose one domain with another, but do not 
necessarily tell us anything about the world.199 
Slingerland takes the Enlightenment ideal of disembodied reason and literal representation of the 
world as nothing but “philosophical conceit,” which asserts that philosophical or scientific 
discourse functions on an entirely abstract, propositional level.200 To follow this philosophical 
conceit is to fall under the influence of emotionally-laden images (in this case, a flawless mirror 
and perfect reflections or representations) that urge readers to favor a particular way of thinking 
above another, leaving few—if any—other legitimate ways to view it. 
 The Peirce-Slingerland approach comes close to the underlying reason for Xunzi’s 
pervasive employment of metaphors. The dissolution of both the logic/rhetoric split in the 
broader context of human persuasion and communication and the literal/metaphorical dichotomy 
in the field of human cognition enables us to see the continuity in the seemingly distinctive 
features of human communication. The hallmark of the Peirce-Slingerland treatment is 
contextualization: there must be broader contextual fields from which the divergence of the 
literal and the metaphorical—as well as the logical and the rhetorical—emerges; and the 
divergence is not essentially meaningful outside of its contextual fields. Saying that there is a 
red/violet split in a rainbow is not meaningful if the spectrum of visible light is disregarded. 
Metaphor and Context Sensitivity 
                                                
199 Edward Slingerland, “Metaphor and Meaning in Early China,” Dao 10 no.1 (2011): 6-7. 
200 Ibid., 7, 24. 
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 In light of this literal-metaphorical and logical-rhetorical continuum, the pervasive use of 
metaphors in classical Chinese texts can be understood in a different way than the one-sided 
“rhetoric China” interpretation. Starting from the 1930s,201 scholars of Chinese philosophy and 
intellectual history have shared a growing consensus that metaphors play an essential role in 
argumentation in early Chinese thought.202 For instance, Kuang-ming Wu makes clear that 
“argument by metaphor… [is] the central and typical mode of argumentation in China.”203 
However, even though the close connection between metaphor and argumentation in the Chinese 
intellectual tradition is recognized, the articulation—in a way that makes sense for an audience 
outside of the Chinese tradition—of how metaphors actually function is still a work in progress. 
Even if we adopt a model of a literal-metaphorical and logical-rhetorical continuum, a pressing 
question to be addressed is: what are the sources of persuasiveness of argument by metaphor? 
 Sarah Allan, a pioneer in studying metaphors in ancient Chinese texts, offers some 
insights in her analyses of “argument by analogy”: 
The fondness of Chinese philosophers for analogy as means of argumentation is well 
known. The use of analogy is often dismissed as a rhetorical device. However, once we 
recognize this assumption that common principles governed the natural and human 
worlds, then we can see that argument by analogy—the primary method of argumentation 
                                                
201 Arthur Waley can be regarded as one of the first scholars who contributed in noting the relationship between 
metaphors and argumentation in early China. See Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (New York: 
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1939). 
202 The works on the Zhuangzi by Harold Oshima (1983) and Robert Allinson (1989) may be seen as the 
continuation of this approach that inspired more scholarly discussions in the 90s. 
203 Kuang-ming Wu, “Spatiotemporal Interpenetration in Chinese Thinking,” in Time and Space in Chinese Culture, 
ed. Chun-chieh Huang and Erik Zurcher (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 35. 
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in ancient China—had a more serious purpose. It was used and achieved its validity 
because of the assumption of a real parallel.204 
Like a metaphor, an analogy associates two or more images or conceptual items together. Allan’s 
argument is that a serious purpose will be revealed, provided that the readers can “get the point”; 
that is, ascertain the connections between or among the analogical items. In terms of the 
imagery—or, in Allen’s term, the root metaphor—of water, it is further stated that “They [i.e., 
the physical movements of the water] were manifestations of universal principles. If they 
[ancient Chinese] could properly understand these principles, then they could use them in 
governing the world and bringing order to it, or simply in fulfilling their personal potential.”205 
 Nonetheless, readers trained in Western academic disciplines may find anything but 
“validity” and “universal principles” in these analogies and metaphors widely employed in 
ancient Chinese philosophical texts. Since any serious purpose may fail to reveal itself, it implies 
that it is possible for readers to miss the connections between or among the analogical items. 
This phenomenon is notable because it does entail that those “universal principles” that Allan 
refers to are not universal—in the sense of being context-independent—at all. From the 
perspectives of readers trained in Western academic disciplines, a more accurate description 
must be that those principles are highly localized and historicized. Without having much 
knowledge of the local and historical context, argument by analogy or metaphor is ineffective. 
 If my assessment in Chapters 2 and 3—that water is associated with responsiveness 
rather than representation, and that the main role that language plays is as a significant 
communal resource that responds to emerging situations rather than as a mirror that reflects 
                                                
204 Sarah Allen, The Way of Water and Sprouts of Virtue (Albany: State University of New York Press), 23. 
205 Ibid., 61. 
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reality—are warranted, then the central issues underlying the use of metaphors in the Chinese 
intellectual tradition have everything to do with context-sensitivity rather than universal validity. 
In other words, a necessary condition for responses to be appropriate is to be context-sensitive. 
Even though the looseness by virtue of the non-correspondence characteristic in the metaphorical 
structure may result in a failed metaphor, successfully understanding a metaphor relies on 
developing familiarity with linguistic practices, history and shared experience; that is, concrete 
contexts in certain places and time. Instead of the context-independent universality that Allan 
seems to suggest, in a literal reading of her assertions, analogies, and metaphors rely heavily on 
being context-sensitive. A metaphor without any contexts is doomed to fail and cannot be 
understood. In other words, the answer to the question of the sources of persuasiveness of 
argument by metaphor or analogy is that they spring from effective associations of shared 
experience of the contexts, not universal principles. Allen’s sense of the significance of analogy 
and metaphor in the argumentation of ancient China is largely right; but terms such as “validity” 
and “universal principles” tend to lead the readers in the opposite direction and are therefore not 
helpful. 
A Xunzian Example 
 In terms of context-sensitivity, there are three closely related features that successful 
metaphors share. First, they re-describe situations; second, they generate new perspectives and 
new meanings; third, they are associated with in situ imagination. 
 Using the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter as an example, Xunzi employs 
a pan of water as the metaphorical articulation of the characteristics of the heart-mind. Besides 
making his point more accessible given the everyday experience of the readers in the Warring 
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State period, Xunzi re-describes the responsiveness of the heart-mind by appealing to the 
responsiveness of water. One way that water responds to its physical surroundings is to reflect 
the general outlines of them—some even in detail—when it is not stirred; however, the stirred 
pan of water will give distorted reflections in responding to the external forces. The point that 
Xunzi really wants to make is that the human heart-mind is most responsive in determining right 
and wrong and resolving doubts when it is appropriately cultivated in relation to the contextual 
forces. The conceptual mapping can be articulated in the following figure: conceptual blending 
happens after the connection between the responsiveness of a pan of water and the 
responsiveness of the human heart-mind are established (see Figure 1). 
 By implicitly identifying the structural similarities between the natural tendencies of a 
pan of water and the human heart-mind, Xunzi is able to use a more commonsensical way—
through the metaphor of water—to re-describe the importance of the human heart-mind 
achieving equilibrium. No detailed mapping in terms of how the human heart-mind is like a pan 
of water is provided in the passage, suggesting Xunzi’s assumption that the task of persuasion is 
 
Figure 1: The conceptual mapping structure of Xunzi’s water metaphor in the “Jiebi” Chapter. 
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guaranteed by the metaphorical re-description at work here. In other words, Xunzi is confident 
that the metaphorical re-descriptions will carry the load of literal explanation. The metaphorical 
and the literal are not mutually exclusive. 
 Introducing a re-description is introducing a new perspective and, by extension, a new 
layer of meaning that expands the meaningfulness of the original narrative. Since the human 
heart-mind is identified as the focus of knowledge-and-wisdom (zhi), and the association 
between knowledge-wisdom on the one hand, and the root metaphor of flowing water, on the 
other hand, has been established no later than Confucius’ Analects, using water to articulate 
certain aspects of the human heart-mind is not a new strategy.206 What is relatively new in the 
context of the Confucian tradition, however, is Xunzi’s employment of still water instead of 
flowing water for conceptual mapping. This approach generates a new layer of meaning on top 
of the already established narratives while at the same time reinforcing them. Such a process 
shapes culturally specific habits of thinking, as well as using metaphors. This is one aspect that 
makes the context-sensitivity of metaphors significant. Without appropriately grasping and 
embracing the historicity and locality of metaphors, communicational gaps will occur. 
Eventually metaphors will become nothing more than rhetorical devices after losing their socio-
cultural and historical associations, with merely limited—if any—efficacy of explaining things 
and affairs. From this standpoint, the strength of the literal language is exactly the weakness of 
metaphorical language; the “true meaning” seems to be well-preserved over time in the literal. 
Nevertheless it is possible to argue the other way around and say that literal expressions are but 
                                                
206 See the Analects 6.23. 
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dead metaphors.207 Granted, metaphorical expressions are relatively unstable; they tend to 
undermine existing cognitive habits with disruptions before creating new orders; and it is almost 
certain that the mapping mechanism will break down, if one is to push the metaphorical mapping 
far enough (e.g., the human heart-mind and a pan of water, after all, are not the same). But if a 
community is willing to take the risks of making errors, metaphorical expressions will be helpful 
in maximizing possible human experience by making it much more vibrant and colorful through 
experimenting with different combinations of images or conceptual items together. For Xunzi, 
providing argumentation and finding new metaphorical ways of expressing things are not 
mutually exclusive; they compliment each other. 
 Last, but not least, in situ imagination is necessarily involved in the making of metaphors. 
For Aristotle, being adept in making good metaphors (eu metapherein) relies on the capacity to 
contemplate similarities (to to homoion theôrein).208 Such a capability can only be taught to 
some extent. These similarities between the items connected by metaphors are not logically 
entailed in their inherent conceptual contents; through metaphorical expressions, these 
similarities are imaginatively pointed out before other members of a linguistic community can 
see them in communicating with each other. While the notion of imagination will be discussed in 
detail in the next section, for our current purposes, it is important to note the active role that 
imagination plays in the creative generation of metaphors. A person adept at using metaphors 
must have the capability of imaginatively sensing the potential connections among unrelated 
                                                
207 This is not to say, however, that there is a level of metaphorical meaning distinct from literal meaning. Donald 
Davidson’s paper “What Metaphors Mean” provides certain insights in terms of meaning-making of metaphors. See 
Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean” in Critical Inquiry 5, no.1 (Autumn 1978), pp.31-47. Davidson observes that a 
metaphorical sentence is usually a false sentence, and that the profundity of the metaphorical expressions is not 
based upon the truth values of them but how these expressions are used pragmatically. I agree with Davidson that 
“metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, (p.32)” implying that the 
literal/metaphorical is a false dichotomy in terms of meaning-generation. 
208 See Poetics 1459a4-8. 
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things and events. By using metaphorical expressions to associate the unrelated, new 
perspectives are introduced, new meanings are generated, and situations are re-described. In Paul 
Ricœur’s words, imagination is the “ability to produce new kinds by assimilation and to produce 
them not above differences…but in spite of and through the differences.”209 Such creative and 
prospective benefits, however, cannot be dissociated from the retrospective disciplines. In order 
for the new metaphorical expressions to be effective, those adept at deploying metaphors must be 
knowledgeable in their communal contexts within established linguistic practices, everyday life 
experience, as well as in prevailing intellectual orientations. Shakespeare did not create new 
words; instead, he worked with the existing ones, combined them creatively, and maximized the 
potential possibilities. In other words, this kind of making metaphors and increasing possible 
meaningfulness is not created ex nihilo, but in situ. By the same token, Xunzi’s associating the 
human heart-mind with a pan of water is based on the shared experience of his community; the 
novelty does not come from the established narratives of the human heart-mind and the 
established practices of using a pan of water to see the details of one’s face, but from the creative 
metaphorical association of the two. 
II. 
Imagination and the Xunzi 
 
 Similar to metaphor, imagination belongs to the marginalized in the history of modern 
philosophy. Being the usual suspect since the dawn of modern philosophy, imagination has been 
associated with the unreal and the non-evidential. However, the cornerstone of the 
untrustworthiness of imagination was laid by Aristotle. And imagination has remained peripheral 
in philosophical discussions until some scholarly attention was invested on the overlapping 
                                                
209 Paul Ricœur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,” Critical Inquiry 5 no.1 (1978): 
148. 
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between imagination and morality in recent decades. 
The Aristotelian Framework 
 
 Aristotle’s distinction between “φαντασµατα (image)” and “φαντασια (fantasia, 
phantasia or imagination)” is philosophically decisive in the sense of its power of patterning 
successive thinking. In his work De Anima (On the Soul), Aristotle asserts that there is no 
thinking without an image. However, when it comes to imagination, Aristotle becomes much 
more conservative; as D. W. Hamlyn notes: “Imagination has an unsatisfactory halfway status 
between perception and the intellect and its exact position is never made clear.”210 In other 
words, imagination is defined by the negative space: it is not full and somewhere in the halfway. 
My interest here is to understand why these two paronyms—image and imagination—are 
distinguished in the Aristotelian tradition. 
 The difference between full cognitive faculties and imagination in Aristotle’s thinking, 
according to Michael V. Wedin, is that “[f]ull cognitive faculties…use images as the devices by 
which the object of the faculty is represented,” while “imagination has no object at all.”211 In 
other words, there are two kinds of images. Images of the first kind function in the cognitive 
process as representations of the external, objective world. Hence faculties associated with the 
first kind of image have ‘real’ references to the objective world. However, images of the second 
kind, that function in imagination, lack references to the external world and are therefore 
“unreal” and nothing but fantasies. And because they are fantasies yielding little knowledge, they 
are not complete in terms of cognitive function. As a consequence, “imagination” is disqualified 
                                                
210 D. W. Hamlyn. Aristotle’s De Anima, Books II, III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), xiv. 
211 Michael V. Wedin. Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 57-8. 
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as a full cognitive faculty because of its functional incompleteness.212 
 Distinguishing imagination from full cognitive faculties in the Aristotelian tradition 
presumes an unreal/real and a subject/object dichotomy. Imagination can never be completely 
real; it is necessarily subjective and its connection with the objective world is contingent. Such 
an understanding of imagination is very influential in the history of modern philosophy. An 
explicit example would be the Humean denial of the traditional idea of “self” by reference to 
imagination instead of senses and reason.213 The power of Hume’s argument depends upon the 
conventional negative connotations of how we understand imagination. Therefore, to associate 
the “self” with “imagination” is to deny the real and solid existence of the “self” in the objective 
world. 
 Kant also follows this Aristotelian distinction. In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant states that 
if a person “surrenders authority over himself, his imagination has free play…He cannot 
discipline himself, but his imagination carries him away by the laws of association; he yields 
willingly to his senses, and, unable to curb them, he becomes their toy.”214 Kant’s central 
concern here is the danger of solely depending on imagination without the oversight of 
rationality. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant further argues that “if…the highest good is 
impossible according to practical rules, then the moral law which commands that it be furthered 
must be fantastic, directed to empty imaginary ends, and consequently inherently false.”215 
Therefore, imagination for Kant also bears negative senses, denoting illusions, delusions, falsity, 
and deception. 
                                                
212 Ibid. 
213 Ted Honderich. Ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 395. 
214 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1979), 140. 
215 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 114. 
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 Even though the account above does associate imagination with cognitive vices, what 
thinkers following the Aristotelian framework agree on is not that imagination is completely 
negative but that cognitive success cannot rely on imagination alone. For Kant, “any activity of 
the mind is associated with the imagination, which needs to be kept carefully in check, for 
imagination generates fictions and whatever it contributes to a thought cannot be relied upon to 
represent its object correctly.”216 One of Kant’s major critiques of many philosophers’ works is 
that they are purely speculative, imaginative, and the subjects of these philosophical 
investigations may never represent anything knowable in reality. Therefore, a main goal of the 
Kantian enterprise was to limit philosophy to that which can be knowable and return philosophy 
from its flights of fancy. This is precisely the reason that Kant does not hold that imagination 
itself can bear the responsibility for guidance. The importance of reason is thus distinguished. 
Reason, in Kant’s philosophy as well as in Aristotle’s, is utilized either theoretically or 
practically. These two dimensions of reason—the limitation of theoretical reason and the 
validation of moral laws that would be applicable to all times and places—are Kant’s central 
concern in his critical period. The negative sense of imagination is imagination without the 
presence of reason. Kant indeed recognizes imagination as a required faculty for humans to 
move out of the state of animality. What Kant does not allow is letting imagination run alone like 
a headless chicken. In Steven Fesmire’s words, for Kant “reason without imagination is empty, 
imagination without rule-governed reason blind.”217 
 The Aristotelian framework provides philosophers a certain way to think of the image- 
imagination relations; and this framework is so influential that the philosophical imagination 
                                                
216 Mary Tiles and Jim Tiles, An Introduction to Historical Epistemology: the Authority of Knowledge (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 117 
217 Steven Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 62. 
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concerning imagination seems to be effectively confined. Nevertheless, this Aristotelian 
approach is not compatible with the Confucian framework that can be traced back to the Yijing. 
In order to understand Xunzi’s take, as far as imagination is concerned, laying out the differences 
between the Aristotelian and the Confucian modes of thought is necessary.  
Imagination in the Yijing: A Philosophical Context 
 There is little doubt that the key issue of the incompleteness of imagination in the 
Aristotelian tradition is representation. In ancient China, however, a different thinking pattern 
serves as the framework in which imagination is situated. Coming close to the image- 
imagination relations that Aristotle described, there is one particular term in the Yijing that 
generated many meaningful associations with other notions shared by philosophers in classical 
China. This term is xiang象, originally a depiction of an elephant. Traditionally, xiang in the 
Chinese context has the following cluster of meanings: “to image or image(s),” “to figure or 
figure(s),” “to (be) present or presentation(s),” “to imagine or imagination,” “to symbolize or 
symbol(s),” and “phenomena.”  
 Although xiang is frequently rendered as “image(s)” in English, such a rendering is not 
comprehensive enough to convey the holistic sensibility of xiang. The main reason is precisely 
that the term “image” is already loaded with specific meanings since the time of Aristotle. In the 
Aristotelian tradition, images are associated with the nature of mental imagery and the act of 
perception. However, such a rendering fails to capture the sense that, in Chinese tradition and 
especially in the Yijing, xiang implies a process of figuring out the situation which presents itself 
through divination, as Willard Peterson points out: 
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Each sixty-four hexagrams has a name, most of which are words or terms referring to 
particular objects and activities which are involved in “figuring” (hsiang [xiang] 象) the 
situation revealed by the act of divination. The word hsiang [xiang], as used in the 
“Commentary,” is sometimes rendered into English as “image,” which connotes 
resemblance and implies an act of perception. Hsiang [xiang] often is the object of the 
verb “to observe” (kuan [guan] 觀), which supports translating hsiang [xiang] as image. 
However, hsiang [xiang] are independent of any human observer; they are “out there,” 
whether or not we look (cf. A1.5). Therefore, I find that English word “figure” comes 
closer to covering the meanings of hsiang [xiang] in the Commentary.” A figure is an 
image or likeness, but it is also a form or shape, a design or configuration or pattern, and 
a written symbol; “to figure” is to represent as a symbol or image, but also to give or 
bring into shape…[T]he figure of a given thing [is] perceivable; it is the figure, according 
to the “Commentary,” which is especially meaningful. In the Change the “figure” is 
elaborated by sayings and phrases which are notoriously enigmatic.218 
Given the fact that the hexagrams are applied as portentous figures that configure human 
behavior and experience, rendering xiang as “figure” or “to figure” does accurately convey the 
implication of this term in this passage, while the “image”-conjuring falls short. In addition, such 
a translation also makes the associated English terms such as “configuring” and “prefiguring” 
available to capture the dynamic meanings of xiang in certain contexts. 
 However, Peterson’s translation of xiang into “figure(s)” or “to figure”—even though 
such a translation works well in certain cases like Yijing with flexibility as well as accuracy—
                                                
218 Willard J. Peterson. “Making Connections: ‘Commentary on the Attached Verbalizations’ of the Book of 
Change,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42, no.1 (1982): 81. 
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cannot be a complete substitute for rendering xiang into “image(s)” or “to image.” There is a 
major difficulty for the “figure”-conjuring to cover some terms like “to imagine,” and 
“imagination”—in Chinese, xiangxiang想象 (thinking of xiang)—that are closely related to the 
“image”-conjuring. Therefore, it should be fair to say that neither the “image”-conjuring nor the 
“figure”-conjuring is a satisfactory solution to translate xiang. 
 While neither of these two translations can completely cover the other, both renderings 
fall short of sensitively highlighting the epistemological difference between the Chinese tradition 
and the Aristotelian tradition. On the one hand, as stated previously, the “image”-conjuring 
cannot be applied without qualification because the term “image” has been already loaded with 
specific meanings and implications since Aristotle’s time. On the other hand, however, 
Peterson’s suggestion, also based on the Aristotelian sensibility of perception which is very 
different from the ancient Chinese one, does not go much further in terms of distinguishing the 
underlying sensibility of xiang from the Aristotelian sensibility.219 By stating that “hsiang 
[xiang] are independent of any human observer; they are ‘out there,’ whether or not we look 
(my emphasis),” and that “‘to figure’ is to represent as a symbol or image (my emphasis),” 
Peterson overwrites the sensibility of inner relatedness and the sensibility of no first-order and 
second-order distinction that are distinctively Chinese. While inner relatedness suggests that 
there is nothing that can be independent of others, the lack of the first-order and second-order 
distinction implies “representation” is not a proper word to depict the Chinese worldview. 
                                                
219 The same kind of problem also appears in Arthur Waley’s translation of the Daodejing. In his note of ‘xiang’ in 
chapter 35, Waley states, “[s]trictly speaking the word means a mental image as opposed to concrete reality.” Such 
kind of sensitivity indeed makes a lot of sense in Aristotelian tradition. However, it carries little relevance to the 
underlying sensibility of xiang in Chinese tradition. 
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 In the third century BCE text Hanfeizi韓非子, there is an interesting passage concerning 
elephants and their association with imagining: 
Men rarely see living elephants [xiang象]. As they come by the skeleton of a dead 
elephant, they imagine [xiang想] its living according to its features. Therefore, it comes 
to pass that whatever people use for imaging [yixiang意想] the real is called image 
[xiang象]. Though Tao [dao] cannot be heard and seen, the saintly man imagines its real 
features [xing形] in the light of its present effects.220 
From this passage we may find the term xiang is closely related to cognitive activities, especially 
perception, image, and imagination. It seems to be amazingly close to the image-imagination 
relation in Aristotelian sensibility. However, Aristotle holds that images have to be 
representational in full cognitive faculties and hence imagination is functionally incomplete. In 
contrast, ancient Chinese thinkers would, as Hall and Ames state, regard images (or figures) as 
“the presentation rather than re-presentation of a configured world at the concrete and historical 
levels”; the former aims to absorb images in a rational and logical structure, the latter assumes 
that images carry the spontaneously self-expressive and creative force in an eventful world.221 
There is a profound sense that the emergence of images is powered by the creative cosmic 
processes. 
                                                
220 See Chapter Twenty “Jie Lao解老 (Commentaries on Laozi’s Teachings)” of the Hanfeizi. The English 
translation is quoted from: W. K. Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu: A Classic of Chinese Political Science 
(London : A. Probsthain, 1959), 193-4. 
221 Hall, David L. and Roger T. Ames. Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western 
Culture (New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 217. Please note that xiang involves in a series 
of the process of perception, such as qixiang氣象 or tianxiang天象 (The presentation of qi or tian), guanxiang觀
象 (observing phenomena or phenomenal images), xiangwu象物 (imaging or figuring events), and xiangxiang想象 
(imagining). 
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 If the images indeed emerge from the creative cosmic processes, they must also be 
fundamentally processual and context-sensitive. Wang Bi (226–249 C.E.), a distinguished 
interpreter of the Yijing, reminds the readers not to attach themselves to any of the three levels: 
Images (xiang) are the means to express meanings. Words (i.e., texts) are the means to 
explain the images (xiang). To yield up meanings completely, there is nothing better than 
images (xiang), and to yield up the meaning of the images (xiang), there is nothing better 
than the words. The words are generated by the images (xiang), thus one can ponder the 
images (xiang) and so observe what the meanings are. The meanings are yielded up 
completely by the images (xiang) and the images (xiang) are made explicit by the 
words…. The images (xiang) are generated by the meanings, but if one stays fixed on the 
images (xiang) themselves, then what this person stays fixed on will not be images 
(xiang) as we mean them here. The words are generated by the images (xiang), but if one 
stays fixed on the words themselves, then what this person stays fixed on will not be 
words as we mean them here.222 
Understanding language as processual and context-sensitive becomes persistent and influences 
schools of thoughts after the Yijing. Scholars sometimes would regard the positions taken 
towards language in Daoism and Chan Buddhism, among others, as “skeptical” because the 
expressions and contents of language are not to be trusted. Nevertheless, this inference seems to 
miss the point, if it is not completely wrong. Taking process as fundamental, expressing ideas 
and images through language has to be an art that requires mastering skills as well as 
spontaneity, rather than seeking fixed representational accuracy. Wang Bi’s passage did not 
                                                
222 Wang Bi, “Mingxiang明象 (Classifying the Images)” Chapter in Zhouyi Lueli周易略例. English translation is 
quoted from Lynn, The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi, 31-2, with 
my minor interpretative revision. 
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intend to show the one-way-reliance of language, images and meanings. Rather, these three 
levels of symbolism constantly co-constitute each other in the creative process. Meaning is 
always in the making and is influenced by the images and language expressions that people 
employ in the process of articulation.223 The efforts to align and optimize the multiple relations 
among meaning, image, language and the creative processes they are situated in thus become a 
central theme of Chinese philosophy of language. 
 Just as knowledge and wisdom are not separable in the notion of zhi, and heart and mind 
are continuous in the notion of xin, the notion of xiang includes the senses of the following: 
imaging, figuring, presenting, and imagining. As far as imagination is concerned, the notion of 
xiang indicates that it is a participatory process in figuring out what gradually presents itself. 
Thus imagination is not completely unregulated in the understanding in accord with xiang; the 
participation in the shared process of transformation configures and limits the possibilities, 
which leads to becoming knowledgeable and wise. For the sake of distinguishing xiang from the 
Aristotelian framework of image/imagination split, I will leave xiang transliterated, with remarks 
regarding which English term should be the best candidate according to the context of the 
occurrence of xiang. 
Imagination in the Xunzi 
 Now we are in a better position to understand what Xunzi may say about image and 
imagination. Before further analyzing key passages in the Xunzi, however, a brief summary 
concerning how the framework that the Yijing provides is distinguished from the Aristotelian 
interpretations of the image-imagination relationship will help. First, in the interpretative 
                                                
223 According to Whitehead, such process of meaning-making and expression-articulating is symbolism. See 
Whitehead, Modes of Thoughts, 62. 
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framework of the Yijing images are not primarily considered in terms of their reproductive roles, 
which merely provide us with re-presentations of things through perception; rather, images are 
presentations of the creative cosmic processes. Second, consequently images are regarded as 
emerging meanings, not replicas of absent things in the mind or weakened sensory impressions. 
Third, imagination, therefore, is a necessary part not only of perception, but of cognition and 
meaning-making.   
 A passage that I discussed in the previous chapter in the context of Xunzi’s doctrine of 
zhengming (attunement of names) can serve as an embodiment of these stances that the 
interpretative framework of the Yijing stands for; now I shift the focus to examine image, 
imagination, and meaning-making based on the current understanding of xiang (K22.8): 
The processes of disputing and explaining are xin (the heart-mind)’s xiang (imaging-and- 
imagining) of dao (normative path-making process). Xin is the chief artisan of 
articulating the normative path-making process; and the normative path-making process 
is the standard of effective governance. When xin becomes harmonious (he合) with dao, 
explanations harmonious with xin, and phrases harmonious with explanations, the 
attunement of names (zhengming) can be expected and the qualitative meanings of the 
discourse can be conveyed. Distinguishing differences can be made but not so as to 
introduce errors; analogical inferences can be made from proper categories, but not to the 
point of introducing fallacies. Then people’s listening will be harmonious with the 
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patterning discourse; and as people engage in distinguishing they will be able to examine 
events in an exhaustive way.224 
This rich passage is concerned with the cognitive (errors in distinguishing things and events and 
fallacies in analogical inferences), the socio-linguistic (conveying the qualitative meanings of the 
discourse to the people), and the political (effective governance). The key notions here, in 
addition to xiang, are xin and dao; both of them were discussed in Chapter 3 in the context of 
competence and skill knowledge. Another term, serving as the tone-setter of this passage, is he合 
(harmony). This character is a depiction of two mouths. Interpretations of the original meaning 
of he range from audio vibration (harmony of two voices), physical interaction (kissing), and 
communicational interaction (verbal exchanges); however, asserting that the character he is 
closely associated with harmonious relationship should be unmistakable. If the ideal state that 
Xunzi’s attunement of names aims to achieve is harmony in multiple layers of communal 
experience, then xiang—as emerging meanings recognized by participatory knowers who are 
capable of imaging, imagining, figuring, and configuring—must play a significant role in 
creating such harmony. 
 Focusing on the cognitive aspects of xiang, it is also crucial to note that in this passage 
terms such as fen分 (dividing) and bian辨 (distinguishing) have epistemic connotations. A 
philosophical interesting question to ask is: what kinds of insight can the non-representational 
notion of xiang and its harmonious state offer in an epistemic sense? And by extension, does 
being harmonious enable us to know better? 
                                                
224 期命也者，辨說之用也。辨說也者，心之象道也。心也者，道之工宰也。道也者，治之經理也。心合於
道，說合於心，辭合於說。正名而期，質請而喻，辨異而不過，推類而不悖。聽則合文，辨則盡故。《荀
子．正名》 
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 It is imaginable that Xunzi would remind us, with the metaphor of a pan of still water 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, that the dynamic balance—and therefore, harmony—
of the environing forces will allow xin to be responsive in the most effective way. And the best 
kind of knowledge will be achieved if xin is most responsive. Then the question becomes: what 
is the relationship between xiang and the responsiveness of xin? 
 The answer seems to lie in two kinds of complimentary functions of xin: the 
distinguishing and the unifying; xin is most responsive as both kinds of functions work together. 
Unlike fen and bian that are related to judgment of differences, breaking a thing or event into 
smaller parts, the function of xiang provides a unifying force through which similarities may be 
found. By not accepting the dichotomy between the representing and the represented, xiang 
compels us to explore the shades of grey between the verbal and the non-verbal [more 
explanations?]. In discussing the funeral rites, for instance, Xunzi states that “one uses objects of 
the living to adorn the dead and sends them to their grave as a great xiang (presentation) of the 
way they lived (K 19.16).”225 The living and the dead, like yin and yang, are categories that 
demonstrate both interdependence and difference; and yet they are unified in funeral rites 
through xiang as an imaginative presentation. Another example is associated with the 
establishment of the socio-political institutions; Xunzi cites an established teaching (K22.8): 
The highest standards are those that establish the boundary between what is truthful and 
what is not and that give rise to social class distinctions (fen), to the distinctions of the 
offices of the government, and of their names and symbols (xiang)—these are the 
regulation of the True King.226 
                                                
225喪禮者，以生者飾死者也，大象其生以送其死也。《荀子．禮論》 
226天下之大隆，是非之封界，分職名象之所起，王制是也。《荀子．正論》 
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I have to note here that the symbolic system can never be random. These symbols must be 
recognizable as presenting meanings under certain categories so that a symbol for a social class 
cannot be mixed with a symbol for a government office. Whenever distinction is at work, xiang 
functions as a unifying framework—through which similarities may present themselves or be 
observed—to build connections among the differences. Ricœur, whose theory of metaphor is 
based on a rejection of sense and representation, comes quite close to the understanding 
underlying the notion of xiang. “Imaging or imagining”, he states, “is the concrete milieu in 
which and through which we see similarities. To imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of 
something but to display relations in a depicting mode.” Here, the function of imagination and 
the function of the metaphorical process do not seem to be separable. Displaying relations in a 
depicting mode, in imagination as well as in metaphor, is one of the most effective ways to 
explore the shades of grey between the verbal and the non-verbal. 
 In recent decades, “moral imagination” has become a focus of scholarly attention. 
Notions such as “dramatic rehearsal”, “imaginative moral reasoning”, as well as “empathetic 
imagination”, and the roles that metaphors play in moral reasoning in disciplines such as 
philosophy, cognitive science, and psychology have been further explored.227 Given that no two 
moral situations are exactly the same, there are two ways of overcoming the differences. One 
way is to begin with normative moral rules and apply the same set of rules in different situations, 
no matter how counterintuitive an outcome may be. The other way is to extend an established 
approach in one situation to another analogically, metaphorically, or imaginatively. This way 
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necessarily entails that a person has to constantly think of how to respond to and participate in 
emerging situations in an appropriate manner. The Confucian approach belongs to the second 
category, as embodied in the following passage: 
The Master said, “There is nothing that I can do for someone who is not constantly 
asking himself: ‘What to do? What to do?’”228 
III. 
Wisdom (with Reference to Knowledge) and the Xunzi 
 
 Paralleling the previous discussion of metaphors as creative expressions of 
responsiveness in the context of linguistic practices, as well as of imagination as creative 
associations of depicted relations in the context of perception and conception, the Xunzian notion 
of zhi (identified as “knowledge” so far) entails creative expressions of responsiveness within the 
contexts of environing conditions and human affairs. There is another dimension of zhi, focusing 
on wisdom and practical responsiveness, that is too important to ignore. Yet before further 
articulating how both knowledge and wisdom can be captured in the notion of zhi, I would like to 
reiterate how knowledge and wisdom parted their ways in Greek philosophy. 
The Marginalization of Wisdom 
 Even though Plato did enlist wisdom as one of the cardinal virtues in the Republic and 
Aristotle described it as the most authoritative virtue (EN VI.13), wisdom underwent a similar 
process of marginalization to that of metaphor and imagination. The split of knowledge and 
wisdom—grouping knowledge with apodictic truth and certainty, and grouping wisdom with 
case-by-case responses to changing situations—was the starting point of the marginalizing 
process. Comparing to knowledge; wisdom was not adventurous enough in terms of truth-
                                                
228 The Analects 15.16. 
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seeking. Wisdom did not lead us to exciting discoveries that knowledge was able to offer. In 
short, wisdom gradually accumulated the qualities of “otherness” in relation to philosophy, even 
though it was the one from which philosophy received its name: 
With the melding of Greek metaphysics and the Christian tradition, increasing reverence 
for the theoretically and spiritually abstract meant that in the fullness of time, practical 
wisdom, rhetoric, and the aesthetic were relegated to the downside of a prevailing 
dualism. Philosophia, “the love of wisdom,” had for all intents and purposes, become 
philoepisteme, “the love of apodictic knowledge.” “Knowledge” and “truth” became the 
vocabulary of systematic philosophy, and “wisdom” became and still remains a largely 
obsolete term in the philosophical corridors of the Western academy.229 
Granted, one can argue that there are two kinds of wisdom recognized by ancient Greek 
philosophers. Sophia is theoretical wisdom while phronesis is practical wisdom. However, the 
point is both sophia—a virtue that comprises intellectual insight (nous) and scientific 
understanding (episteme)—and phronesis—the ruling virtue of the practical intellect—were 
marginalized together. Even if there has been a resurgence of interest in phronesis in virtue 
ethics and virtue epistemology in recent decades, few scholarly discussions focus on the ruling 
virtue of the theoretical intellect that Aristotle identified.230 
 Holding that wisdom is a significant epistemic virtue, Zagzebski lists a few 
considerations regarding how the importance and value of wisdom have been neglected in 
conventional epistemological theories.231 First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand 
                                                
229 Roger T. Ames, “What Ever Happened to ‘Wisdom’? Confucian Philosophy of Process and ‘Human 
Becomings,’” Asia Major 21 no.1 (2008): 50-1. 
230 Matthew D. Walker, “Rehabilitating Theoretical Wisdom,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2013): 764. 
231 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 22-3. 
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wisdom impersonally. In other words, personal relationships are part of the essential fabric of 
recognizing and understanding wisdom. Personal relationships imply troubling issues of social 
judgment and partiality. But knowledge—as broadly construed in the development of 
epistemology—is supposed to be impersonal and impartial; knowledge transcends personal as 
well as social relations, and is therefore free from any communal contexts. Hence associating 
wisdom with the epistemic appears to be an oxymoron. 
 Second, there does not seem to be any accumulation and acceleration of the growth of 
wisdom in the ways that knowledge does. Even though both the growth of knowledge and the 
growth of wisdom are inseparable from the growth of persons in their communities and 
environments, there is an important difference: wisdom seems to neither accumulate nor 
accelerate on the scale of human history. Wisdom ceases to exist with the passing of wise people 
while knowledge—at least the propositional part of it—remains. People can write books 
regarding the historical developments of knowledge in certain disciplines; but there is no book 
on the development of wisdom.232 It is possible for a person to become knowledgeable by being 
taught from the most updated knowledge of an era; however, it is implausible—if not completely 
impossible—for a person to become wise simply by learning “cutting-edge wisdom”, which is 
suspicious because this term may refer to nothing. It follows that studying and theorizing 
knowledge is much more meaningful and fruitful than studying and theorizing wisdom. 
 Third, as a consequence, wisdom does not seem to be analyzable and is therefore 
excluded from epistemological theories focusing on beliefs and propositions. Wisdom resists and 
even defies analyses in the sense that it seems to keep changing all the time. There are few ways 
                                                
232 This is a corresponding point made by François Jullien. See Jullien, Un sage est sans idée: Ou l'autre de la 
philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1998), 10. 
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to evaluate whether a person is wise or not other than focusing on whether this person is able to 
reliably deliver qualitative outcomes at the proper time based on contextualized conditions. A 
wise action in context C1 at a certain time T1 does not automatically translate into a wise action 
done in context C2 at time T2. The expressions of wisdom are many; but even the generalization 
of these expressions may not be very helpful in pinpointing what wisdom really is. In short, 
wisdom is not an appropriate object of knowledge. 
 Interestingly, the very reasons for the exclusion of wisdom from conventional 
epistemology explain how wisdom and knowledge are intimately associated with each other in 
ancient China. In previous chapters, I have argued that both skill knowledge (knowing how) and 
interpersonal knowledge (knowing who) have to be included in considering the notion of zhi (I 
will translate it as “knowledge-wisdom hereafter, unless the textual context strongly refers to one 
but not the other). Both kinds of knowledge are context-sensitive, resisting analyses in the sense 
that they seem to keep changing all the time, and cannot be understood in impersonal ways. The 
process that marginalized wisdom in philosophy also marginalized knowing how and knowing 
who. Through grouping skill knowledge and interpersonal knowledge with wisdom, it is not 
surprising at all that Chinese intellectual tradition was perceived as more akin to wisdom 
literature than philosophy. 
Wisdom and Partiality in the Xunzi 
 In classical Confucianism—including the thoughts of Xunzi—there was no split between 
knowledge and wisdom. On the contrary, knowledge-wisdom was perceived to be a continuum. 
The best way to demonstrate that one is knowledgeable is through making wise judgments 
constantly, no matter how commonsensical they are. Xunzi states: (K2.3): 
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To recognize as right what is right and as wrong what is wrong and follow through in 
one’s conduct are called zhi (knowledge-wisdom). To regard as wrong what is right and 
as right what is wrong and follow through in one’s conduct are called yu (stupidity, 
foolishness).233 
An implication of the knowledge-wisdom continuum is that there is no split between knowledge 
and conduct. Having the ability to position oneself in a certain way as an occasion arises and 
being capable of working through it entails knowledge. Knowing and responding to emerging 
situations appropriately and wisely are regarded as a unifying quality, in the notion of zhi, that 
exemplary persons (junzi) have (K3.5): 
In venerating the virtues in others or in celebrating others’ excellences, exemplary 
persons do not engage in flattery or toady after others. In correcting and criticizing others 
in blunt terms and in pointing out their faults, exemplary persons do not engage in 
backbiting or slander…. That exemplary persons bend and unbend as the occasion 
demands and that they are flexible and tractable like rushes and reeds is not because of 
fear or cowardice. That exemplary persons are unyieldingly strong and fiercely resolute 
and that there is nothing in them that has not been made straight are not because of pride 
or haughtiness. Being able to sense what is appropriate to change in response to situations 
is based on exemplary persons’ knowledge (zhi) of fitting a variety of occasions, whether 
curved or straight.234 
Even though many interpreters agree that translating “zhi” as “knowledge” or “knowing” is a 
better approach than translating it as “wisdom” in the last sentence of this passage, there is no 
                                                
233 是是非非謂之知，非是是非謂之愚。《荀子‧修身》 
234 君子崇人之德，揚人之美，非諂諛也。正義直指，舉人之過，非毀疵也。…與時屈伸，柔從若蒲葦，非
懾怯也。剛強猛毅，靡所不信，非驕暴也。以義變應，知當曲直故也。《荀子‧不茍》 
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doubt that the context is about wise conduct and practices. Zhi unifies the totality of human 
experience and understanding; and while in certain contexts translating zhi in one way 
(knowledge) or the other (wisdom) is definitely more appropriate, readers should bear in mind 
that knowledge and wisdom are never separated in the notion of zhi. 
 For Xunzi the opposite of zhi is not falsity, but partiality and bias that lead to unwise 
practices. In fact, Xunzi dedicates a whole chapter—“Jiebi (Dissolving Partiality)”—in 
discussing the opposite of this epistemic, and ultimately, ethical, value.235 The first sentence of 
the opening paragraph reads “[i]t is a common flaw of humans to be partial to a limited 
perspective and insist on their biases without recognizing the comprehensive patterns 
(K.21.1).”236 Xunzi further states how pervasive this problem is in human experience and 
practices (K21.2): 
What makes for partiality? One can become partial by merely focusing on desire or 
aversion, by merely focusing on either the beginnings of things and events or their ends, 
on either what is remote or what is near, on either broadness or shallowness, on either 
antiquity or contemporary. Since each of the myriad things evokes a different partial 
response, it is implausible not to become obsessed with these partialities. This is the 
shared flaw of the functioning of xin (heart-mind).237 
There is no doubt that Xunzi identifies xin (human heart-mind) as the main target in which the 
dissolution of partiality is only made possible through its cultivation. As demonstrated in Chapter 
3, for Xunzi xin, as a social phenomenon, cannot be limited to a single individual. The 
                                                
235 I have to note here that, since knowledge and conduct are perceived as a continuum, the epistemic and the ethical 
are not regarded as separate categories in Xunz’s philosophy. 
236 凡人之患，蔽於一曲，而闇於大理。《荀子‧ 解蔽》  
237 故為蔽？欲為蔽，惡為蔽，始為蔽，終為蔽，遠為蔽，近為蔽，博為蔽，淺為蔽，古為蔽，今為蔽。凡
萬物異則莫不相為蔽，此心術之公患也。《荀子‧解蔽》 
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cultivation of xin is a communal project through and through. The Xunzian notion of xin cannot 
be brought into proper focus without any reference to the communal context. 
 The antidote for partiality is for the communally cultivated hearts-and-minds to recognize 
and comprehend the overall patterns of things and events, which Xunzi often employs the terms 
dao (path-making) and li (patterned coherence) to describe. The character dao is a depiction of a 
person treading a path, while the character li is an image of the patterns of jade. Both of them, 
while entailing recognizablity and comprehensibility to certain extent, strongly suggest a process 
of unfolding through participation. A path is made only when creatures—including humans—
tread on it; similarly, the beautiful patterns of jade are to be appreciated after the hard work of 
artisans. Neither dao nor li can be said to be purely objective because human participation, not 
observation, is a necessary part of them; but they are not completely subjective, either, because 
of the communal involvement. In other words, the process of dissolving partiality is a 
community making its way to become both knowledgeable and wise. Being partial and biased 
does not entail that what is held is not true. Holding on truth in a biased way that leads to 
partiality, however, is definitely an epistemic and ethical vice for Xunzi. 
Just Add Water 
 The grouping of knowledge-wisdom (zhi), path-making (dao), and patterned coherence 
(li) has strong epistemic implications in the Chinese intellectual tradition. Even in contemporary 
Chinese language, the term “zhidao知道” means “to know” and “lizhi理智” refers to 
“rationality.” Another important grouping is to relate zhi with the images of water. Zhi has been 
associated with flowing water since the birth of Confucianism: 
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The Master said, “Wise (zhi) persons enjoy flowing water; those consummate in their 
conduct (ren) enjoy mountains. The wise are active; the consummate are still. The wise 
find enjoyment; the consummate are long-enduring.”238 
Flowing water is responsive, dynamic, and accommodating in its action; and the qualities of zhi 
can hardly be shown as a knowledgeable-and-wise person just standing still. Textual evidence 
demonstrates that Confucius himself is a person fond of meditating on water.239 Now, employing 
notions of path-making, patterned coherence, and water to triangulate zhi, what classical 
Confucians looked for in their pursuit of knowledge-and-wisdom will become clear. First, what 
we usually experience of treading on a path, of appreciating the patterns of a piece of jade, and of 
meditating on the water flow is concerned with snapshots of processes. However, these limited 
perspectives of individual processes seem to point to a much greater, long-lasting, and 
continuous process: humans in their own finitude cannot determine its beginning or ending. Thus 
all the three key notions associated with zhi are related to an indivisible totality. It resists any 
analysis because analyzing necessarily involves breaking the sense of undifferentiated wholeness 
apart, which leads to many faces of partiality. Therefore, the notion of zhi implies that the 
desirable goal of accumulating knowledge is to achieve wisdom. 
 Second, there are certain “unifying features” shared by the making of a path, emergence 
of patterns, and the ways water responds to its environing conditions. As two narrow paths come 
together, the experience of treading on the new path is not fundamentally changed. When smaller 
jade patterns merge into bigger ones, the objects of aesthetic appreciation are still patterns. And 
as creeks flow into a huge river, it is still the flowing water that a person meditates on. By the 
                                                
238 See the Analects 6.23. It should be noted that the wise (zhi) and the consummate (ren) are not mutually exclusive 
categories. 
239 See the Analects 9.17, Mencius 4B.18, and Xunzi K28.5. 
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same token, wisdom unifies different aspects of human experience and makes them whole. In 
Zagzebski’s words, “[w]isdom not only unifies the knowledge of the wise person but unifies her 
desires and value as well.”240 
 Third, the presentations of a path, jade patterns, and flowing water suggest participatory 
negotiations of forces, human or non-human. Modern technologies allow us to build roads and 
bridges with precision and scale that people living centuries ago could not have imagined; 
however, engineers still have to take the characteristics of the landscape into consideration. The 
patterns of a piece of jade may have been formed hundreds of thousands of years ago; but it takes 
an incredible amount of work for artisans to carve the jade out according to the way it was 
formed and reveal its patterns. The flow of the water is in accord with the geographical features 
of the area that it passes by. In a similar way, people with knowledge-and-wisdom find their 
ways to be constructive in a manner responsive to the conditions in which they are situated. 
 In short, zhi, with its unifying features that incorporate different aspects of human life 
into a whole, aims at being responsive to emerging situations based on a comprehensive 
appreciation of totality. Zhi has both epistemic and ethical implications; and yet aesthetic 
qualities are also an irreducible part of it. The communal project of zhi is not purely reactive, 
even though achieving zhi does enable some community members—usually recognized as 
exemplary persons—to be responsive in an appropriate manner (K3.5): 
Being able to sense what is appropriate to change in response to situations is based on 
exemplary persons’ knowledge (zhi) of fitting a variety of occasions, whether curved or 
straight. An Ode says: 
As they move to the left, move to the left, 
                                                
240 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 23. 
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exemplary persons move with appropriateness. 
As they move to the right, move to the right, 
Exemplary persons possess what is needed. 
This says that exemplary persons are competent to respond to the changing situation 
appropriately, whether bent or straight.241 
A more important aspect of zhi is to be both creative and appreciative in the sense that more 
values and meaningful associations are made in the process of becoming wise-and- 
knowledgeable. And those who are the most creative and appreciative will become cultural 
heroes and sages in the community (K3.9): 
Sages to be sure are wise and knowledgeable; but were they to lack of creativity (cheng), 
they could not transform the people.242 
The ability to transform the community and its members in creative ways is the hallmark 
of a sage in the Chinese intellectual tradition. It is neither incoherent nor surprising when we 
encounter a knowledgeable person who is not creative; but it is at least surprising—and perhaps 
incoherent—to say that a wise person is not creative. Creative interventions of the sage 
presuppose certain constructive capabilities in sensing possible scenarios; and such capability is 
intimately related to imagination and metaphorical processes. 
 
In this chapter, metaphor, imagination, and wisdom—all marginalized in the 
development of the Greek and European philosophy—are reexamined in the broad field of the 
Chinese intellectual tradition in which Xunzi’s thinking was situated. That all of them play 
                                                
241 以義變應，知當曲直故也。詩曰：「左之左之，君子宜之；右之右之，君子有之。」此言君子以義屈信
變應故也。《荀子‧不茍》 
242 聖人為知矣，不誠則不能化萬民。《荀子‧不茍》 
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significant roles in classical China suggests distinctively different thinking orientations: the 
pursuits of context-sensitivity, local efficacy, and participatory processes instead of context-
transcendence, universal conformity, and formal principles. Considering the fact that metaphors, 
imagination, and wisdom all require human interactions to operate, any further investigations 
will inevitably return to people-in-communities. To be more precise, it may not be much 
concerned with people in general (even though they are necessary parts of communities), but 
with those who make qualitative contributions to the communities via their conduct that becomes 
normative in some way. One interesting question to ask, then, is how does Xunzi—among other 
thinkers in classical China—think of normativity in the absence of transcendent and abstract 
principles? In the next chapter, I return to the Xunzian notion of person-in-relationships in 
searching for meaningful answers. 
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Chapter 6 
Exemplars as Sources of Normativity for Knowledge and Conduct 
 
Scholar-apprentices cannot but be strong and resolved,  
For they bear a heavy charge and their path is long.  
Where they take exemplary conduct as their charge, is it not a heavy one?  
And where their path ends only in death, is it not indeed long?  
--Zengzi 
 
 This project began with an investigation of the Xunzian notion of personhood; now I 
return to this very notion in searching for sources of epistemic normativity from the perspective 
of Xunzi. In the previous chapters I explored various dimensions that are crucial for an 
appropriate understanding of the Xunzian notion of zhi (knowledge-and-wisdom), including skill 
and expertise (in Chapter 3), linguistic practices and interpersonal knowledge (in Chapter 4), as 
well as metaphor, imagination, and the very notion of wisdom itself (in Chapter 5). None of 
these dimensions can exist on their own without appealing to a community of knowers—a fact 
that is highly coherent with Xunzi’s “person-in-relationships” as the starting point of 
philosophizing. I intend to make a virtue epistemological turn in this chapter and focus on the 
qualities of good Xunzian knowers and how exemplary Xunzian knowers become sources of 
normativity. 
 Unlike epistemological atomism that focuses merely on an isolated knower out of the 
communal context, Xunzi never turns away from a community in which persons as community 
members interact with each other in their roles and relationships. If Xunzi’s point is taken 
seriously, knowledge and wisdom must be communal achievements that cannot be claimed by an 
individual in any primary sense. It is not to say that there are no wise or knowledgeable members 
in the community; there are. Nevertheless, these wise and knowledgeable persons become 
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exemplars and the highlights of what they have done gradually become part of the communal 
narratives. Knowing, in other words, has to be part of people’s conduct. In the Xunzian thinking 
system, epistemology and ethics are unified through the quality of exemplars’ conduct. And the 
norms of the community are based on these exemplars. 
 Claiming ethical and socio-political normativity in the Xunzi to be person-based is 
relatively uncontroversial. From the Xunzian perspective, there are some people who are 
qualitatively different from others in a community. The differences between distinguished 
persons (ren) and commoners (min) are not much related to individual talents but the process of 
personal cultivation in the communal context. For those who are inspired by the exemplary 
legacies of distinguished persons, Xunzi’s recommendation is to follow their models (K 21.15): 
Hence scholar-apprentices should take sage kings as their teachers and the regulations of 
the sage kings as their models. By seeking out the general categories and guiding 
examples of the sage kings, the scholars pattern themselves after the models of the sage 
kings and strive to make themselves into the xiang (presenting images) of the 
distinguished persons. Those who devote their attention and efforts to achieving this goal 
are shi (scholar-apprentices); those who come close to realizing the models of the sage 
kings are junzi (exemplary persons); and those who realize the models of the sage kings 
are themselves shengren (sages).243 
This passage demonstrates that certain kinds of emulation are necessary, that the social locations 
of scholar-apprentice, exemplary persons, and sages are associated with their degrees of 
realization of the models set by the sage kings. Furthermore, in an important sense, the ultimate 
                                                
243故學者以聖王為師，案以聖王之制為法，法其法以求其統類，以務象效其人。嚮是而務，士也；類是而
幾，君子也；知之，聖人也。《荀子‧解蔽》 
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goal is to admire, appreciate, and emulate how the sage kings conduct themselves. In other words, 
distinguished persons (such as sage kings) are themselves normative in the ethical and socio-
political context. Furthermore, Xunzi makes it clear that the models that the sage kings set are 
merely derivative; the sources are their exemplary conduct (K12.1): “Thus, the models cannot be 
established alone, nor can its categories apply themselves in particular instances. If proper 
persons are obtained, then the models and their categories will survive; if such persons are lost, 
then they will perish….Junzi (exemplary persons) are the wellsprings of the models.”244 Some 
passages in the Confucian texts even metaphorically refer to these distinguished persons as 
celestial bodies;245 the faces of tian are these exemplars. Now, does this pattern apply to the 
epistemic realm as well? 
 The answer lies in the passage right before the first quotation from the Xunzi cited at the 
beginning of this chapter; it demonstrates that categories, guiding examples, and the models that 
sage kings were able to configure are based on their epistemic capacities (K 21.15): 
In general, being able to know is a natural tendency of humans; being knowable is the 
patterns of things and events. In employing the human capacity to know and inquiring the 
patterns of things and events that are knowable, we are still incapable of knowing 
everything even to the end of our lives if no boundary to the search is fixed. Although we 
may make countless attempts to recognize general patterns, in the end our effort will be 
insufficient to encompass the transformations and changes of myriads of things and 
events; then we and the fool will be as one… Thus, learning inherently has a boundary. 
Where is its boundary? I say that it is at ultimate sufficiency. Who has achieved this 
                                                
244故法不能獨立，類不能自行；得其人則存，失其人則亡。…君子者、法之原也。《荀子‧ 君道》 
245 See, for example, the Analects 19.24. 
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sufficiency? I say that those sage kings have done so. Sagacity consists of a 
comprehensive grasp of roles and relationships; true kingship consists of a 
comprehensive grasp of regulations.246 
In exploring the boundary of human knowledge, Xunzi did not appeal to a detailed analysis of 
human rationality like Kant did. Instead, the Xunzian prescription was to follow the exemplary 
conduct of the paradigmatic sage kings, their own persons and the models they were able to set 
up.247 This approach comes close to the development of virtue epistemology in recent decades. 
I. 
Virtue Epistemology and Core Epistemic Virtues in the Xunzi 
 After decades of debates on epistemic justification in responding to the “Gettier Problem” 
that posed a threat to the traditional tripartite concept of knowledge as justified true belief, virtue 
epistemology emerged in the 1980s with a distinctive shift of focus from the qualities of beliefs 
and the possible structures of an ideal rational belief system to the qualities of knowers. Ernest 
Sosa, in his article “The Raft and the Pyramid,” proposed that, in order to resolve the dispute 
between internalism and externalism, there is a need to investigate something deeper than 
epistemic structure so that what confers epistemic value on beliefs can be brought to focus.248 
What Sosa suggested was a virtue-centered investigation. The primary sources of epistemic 
values and the primary targets of epistemic evaluations are, therefore, knowers and their 
communities. Among the various approaches that virtue epistemologists have developed—
                                                
246凡以知，人之性也；可以知，物之理也。以可以知人之性，求可以知物之理，而無所疑止之，則沒世窮
年不能篱也。其所以貫理焉雖億萬，已不足浹萬物之變，與愚者若一。…故學也者，固學止之也。惡乎止
之？曰：止諸至足。曷謂至足？曰：聖王。聖也者，盡倫者也；王也者，盡制者也；兩盡者，足以為天下
極矣。《荀子‧解蔽》 
247 Learning from the legacies of the paradigmatic sage kings, their exemplary conduct, and how they patterned the 
world leads not to objective knowledge (in the sense of we know a thing A in itself) but to relational knowledge (in 
the sense of how does this thing A relate to the community where I live).In other words, knowledge is concerned 
with relational rapport in the community as much as with objects to be known. 
248 Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5(1980): 3-25. 
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including virtue perspectivism (by Sosa), virtue reliabilism (by Goldman, Greco, Sosa), and 
virtue responsibilism (by Code, Hookway, Montmarquet, Zagzebski). Two shared convictions 
are: first, virtue epistemology is a normative discipline; and second, the focus of epistemological 
investigations should be on understanding epistemic norms, value and evaluation.249 The notion 
of “intellectual virtues/vices” thus becomes a highlight of inquiries because these virtues and 
vices are relevant properties of knowers. 
 According to Christopher Hookway, there are two types of dispositions that can be called 
intellectual virtues: the first type is concerned with reliable, knowledge-generating faculties (e.g., 
perception, deduction, and understanding a language), while the second type is associated with 
traits of cognitive character that regulate inquiry and deliberation (e.g., open-mindedness, 
conscientiousness, and epistemic humility).250 Hookway notes that virtue reliablists—such as 
Greco and Sosa—take the first type of intellectual virtues (also known as faculty-virtues) as 
paradigmatic, while virtue responsibilists—like Zagzebski, Baehr, and Montmarquet—take the 
second type of intellectual virtues (also known as trait-virtues) as the starting points of their 
investigations. There are a variety of approaches developed by virtue epistemologists. Some 
simply focus on articulating what the intellectual virtues are; some of them start with an 
idealized and individualized knower without much consideration of the epistemic community; 
others are willing to explore the situatedness of knowers in their communities. Among them, I 
find the development of Zagzebski’s project resonating with Xunzi’s philosophy in an interesting 
and remarkable way. 
                                                
249 Greco, John and John Turri, “Virtue Epistemology,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/epistemology-virtue/>. 
250 Christopher Hookway, “How to Be a Virtue Epistemologist,” in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and 
Epistemology, ed. M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 183-202. 
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 According to Zagzebski, intellectual virtues “can be defined in terms of motivations 
arising from the general motivation for knowledge and reliability in attaining the aims of these 
motives;” therefore, an intellectual virtue can be distinguished from a moral virtue “on the basis 
of the motivational component of the virtue.”251 In other words, virtues are teleological; and 
intellectual virtues aim at specific ends, including knowledge, understanding and wisdom. Then 
it is possible to say that epistemic vices are motivated by another set of driving forces and, as a 
consequence, prevent knowers’ from achieving epistemic good. 
Core Intellectual Virtues in the Xunzi 
 When employing “intellectual virtues” as a conceptual lens and applying it to Xunzi’s 
philosophy that consistently focuses on the paradigmatic exemplars, it is important to ask: What 
kind of intellectual virtues do the ideal knowers share? Xunzi tends to articulate the epistemic 
excellences through the responsiveness of xin (K 21.8): 
How do humans know? I say that it is because of xin (the heart-mind). How does xin 
know? I say by its being xu (open), yi (continuous and focused), and jing (sustaining 
equilibrium)… Being open, continuous, and harmoniously tranquil is called “da 
qingming (great acuity)”. In achieving this state a person is able to observe, 
communicate, and assign a myriad of things and events to their proper positions… The 
acuity and brightness of this person is comparable to the sun and moon; the greatness of 
this person fills the eight poles. Such a person is truly what is meant by “daren (Great 
Person).” How indeed could this person even be partially obscured?!252 
                                                
251 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 166. In a different context in discussing exemplarism, Zagzebski has revised the 
notion of virtue towards Aristotelian rather than Kantian theories. See the third section of this chapter. 
252人何以知道？曰：心。心何以知？曰：虛壹而靜。心未嘗不臧也，然而有所謂虛；心未嘗不〔滿〕兩也
，然而有所謂壹；心未嘗不動也，然而有所謂靜。人生而有知，知而有志；志也者，臧也；然而有所謂虛
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The ideal knower—“Great Person” in Xunzi’s term—is highlighted here, together with three 
important qualities or virtues of the heart-mind: openness (xu), continuity and focus (yi), and 
sustained equilibrium (jing). These three terms are closely associated with the Daoist 
vocabularies, indicating dynamic creative processes. 
 Many scholars chose to translate xu as “being empty” or “emptiness.” Nevertheless, 
“open” or “openness” is closer to the original meaning of this character. According to the 
Shuowen Lexicon, xu is the depiction of a huge hill; it is not necessarily empty, but it must be an 
open place. Xunzi explains (K 21.8): 
The heart-mind never stops storing; nonetheless it possesses what is called openness…. 
Humans from birth have epistemic functioning (zhi). Having epistemic functioning, there 
is memory. Memories are what are stored, yet the heart-mind has the characteristic called 
openness. Not allowing what has previously been stored to interfere with what is going to 
be received in the heart-mind is called openness.253 
In other words, openness is the capability to sort out experiences in such a way that makes 
accommodating new experiences possible. The openness of xin prevents biased interpretations 
and partiality from happening so that a knower can be responsive to emerging situations and new 
experiences. Another significant aspect of this openness is that it allows a falliblist hermeneutical 
posture possible. Memories are neither truths nor facts, but are constructive interpretations of 
experiences. It is always possible for a person, or a group of people, to remember things in a 
                                                                                                                                                       
；不以所已臧害所將受謂之虛。心生而有知，知而有異；異也者，同時兼知之；同時兼知之，兩也；然而
有所謂一；不以夫一害此一謂之壹。心臥則夢，偷則自行，使之則謀；故心未嘗不動也；然而有所謂靜；
不以夢劇亂知謂之靜。虛壹而靜，謂之大清明。萬物莫形而不見，莫見而不論，莫論而失位。…明參日月
，大滿八極，夫是之謂大人。夫惡有蔽矣哉！《荀子‧解蔽》 
253心未嘗不臧也，然而有所謂虛…。人生而有知，知而有志；志也者，臧也；然而有所謂虛；不以所已臧
害所將受謂之虛。《荀子‧解蔽》 
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mistaken way. The openness of the heart-mind enables people to be aware of such a limitation 
and to actively engage the hermeneutical process to approximate the truths. 
 Yi, like the word “one”, is ambiguous in the sense that it could mean unity, continuity, 
and even harmony. However, the Shuowen Lexicon associates this particular character with 
“focus” or “concentration.” Xunzi states (K 21.8): 
The heart-mind never stops multi-tasking; nonetheless it possesses what is called 
focus…. From birth the human heart-mind has awareness. Having awareness, there is a 
capacity to distinguish differences. Recognizing differences requires knowing at least two 
aspects at the same time. Recognizing at least two aspects at the same time entails multi-
tasking; nonetheless the heart-mind has the characteristic called concentration.  Not 
allowing one aspect to interfere with another is called concentration.254 
Thus concentration is the capacity to focus on one aspect without interference by other kinds of 
information. While maintaining a general awareness of the background, the capacity of 
concentration allows a knower to focus on the most important task at hand. 
 Jing is usually translated as “still” or “stillness”. Nevertheless, this is a mistake. Even 
though in contemporary Chinese this character is closely associated with audio experience, 
denoting a noise-free—but not a sound-free—situation, its original meaning was actually related 
to visual experience. The Shuowen Lexicon identifies jing as “careful examination of the 
appropriateness of colors.” Thus the meaning of this character indicates appropriate interactions; 
that is, dynamic balance. As a consequence, translating jing as “being tranquil or “sustained 
equilibrium” is much more adequate. Xunzi further clarifies (K 21.8): 
                                                
254心未嘗不〔滿〕兩也，然而有所謂壹…。心生而有知，知而有異；異也者，同時兼知之；同時兼知之，
兩也；然而有所謂一；不以夫一害此一謂之壹。《荀子‧解蔽》 
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The heart-mind never ceases to be active; nonetheless it possesses what is called 
sustained equilibrium…. When the heart-mind is asleep, it dreams. When it relaxes, it is 
still active of its own accord. When it is employed in a task, it plans. Thus the heart-mind 
never ceases being active; nonetheless it possesses the characteristic called sustained 
equilibrium. Not allowing dreams and other intense experiences to bring disorder to 
epistemic functioning (zhi) is called sustained equilibrium.255 
Restated, sustained equilibrium is the capability to remain properly balanced even if a knower 
undergoes intense and dramatic episodes. By allowing dreams to be part of the discussion and on 
equal footing with “real” experiences, Xunzi seems to recognize the emotional disturbances and 
psychological obstacles that having dreams—as well as having “real” experiences—may result 
in. Achieving tranquility and equilibrium never entails being free from distractions and 
disturbances; it implies, however, the capability of maintaining balance in dynamic interactions 
in spite of distractions and disturbances. 
 An interesting observation is that even though openness, concentration and sustained 
equilibrium are related to memory, on-going cognitive processes and perception (“faculty-
virtues” in short according to some virtue reliablists), what Xunzi emphasizes through 
articulating these three qualities or virtues of cultivated xin is the sustaining capabilities that keep 
faculty-virtues functioning properly. In this sense Xunzi’s characterization of the “great acuity” 
that openness, concentration and sustained equilibrium serve as irreplaceable pillars is intimately 
concerned with “trait-virtues” that virtue responsiblists tend to advocate. Of course, in promoting 
intellectual excellence or flourishing it is more likely than not that both faculty-virtues and trait-
                                                
255心未嘗不〔滿〕兩也，然而有所謂壹…。心生而有知，知而有異；異也者，同時兼知之；同時兼知之，
兩也；然而有所謂一；不以夫一害此一謂之壹。《荀子‧解蔽》 
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virtues are required. However, it should be unmistakable to point out that possessing faculty-
virtues is necessary, but not sufficient in achieving great acuity. 
Epistemic Villains in Xunzi 
 Noting that openness (xu), concentration (yi) and sustained equilibrium (jing) are traits of 
the ideal knower identified as the Great Person (daren) in the Xunzi, readers may expect that 
there are some highlighted intellectual vices as well. Nevertheless, the Xunzian investigations 
did not advance much understanding regarding what intellectual vices are. Xunzi did, however, 
identify a particular group of people that we may call “epistemic villains.” And the identification 
of this group of people may be traced to the Analects of Confucius. Confucius calls this group 
the “village worthy (xiangyuan)” and describes this group as “excellence under false pretenses.” 
Mencius further explains that a common trait of this category of people is that they are good at 
cosmetic works that falsely present themselves as exemplars and therefore are actually 
hypocrites: 
“If the entire village praises him as an honorable man,” says Wan Zhang, “and 
everywhere he goes he acts as an honorable man, why would the Master regard him as 
claiming excellence under false pretenses?”  
“If you want to condemn the village worthy,” said Mencius, “you have nothing on 
him; if you want to criticize him, there is nothing to criticize. He chimes in with the 
practices of the day and blends in with the common world. Where he lives he seems to be 
conscientious and to live up to his word, and in what he does, he seems to have integrity. 
Everyone in his community likes him, and he even sees himself as being right. Yet one 
cannot walk the path of Yao and Shun with such a person. This is why the Master says 
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that he claims excellence under false pretenses. The Master said, ‘… I dislike the village 
worthy lest he be confused with the excellent.’ The exemplary person simply reverts to 
the standard. Where the standard is upheld, the common people will flourish, and where 
they flourish, there will be no perversity or ugliness.”256 
According to this passage, the kind of hypocrisy that the village worthy practiced is exceptional: 
it is not an easy task to please all the members of a community. The village worthy not only 
looks consistent from the perspective of untrained commoners, but also causes experienced 
experts to misidentify them as exemplary. As good and promising as the village worthy looks, 
they take few actions towards further developing their communities and their conduct bears no 
fruit while their focus is to please everyone; these are decisive signs that distinguish them from 
exemplary persons. In short, the poor quality of conduct—a failure of authenticity and 
genuineness—leads a person to be identified as a village worthy. 
 Hypocrites are usually regarded as moral villains. But in a particular passage Xunzi 
associates them with epistemic villains. Their viciousness seems to be concerned with both their 
character-traits and the social locations that they occupy. Xunzi states (K 6.14): 
The ancients called “scholar-recluses” those who possessed the fullest excellences, who 
were able to sustain equilibrium (jing), and who cultivated uprightness, knew (zhi) the 
propensities of things and events, and distinguished themselves in their communities. 
Those who today are called “scholar-recluses” lack competence (neng) but are said to be 
capable, and lack knowledge-and-wisdom (zhi) but are said to have it. They are insatiably 
                                                
256 See the Mencius 7B37. 萬子曰：「一鄉皆稱原人焉，無所往而不為原人，孔子以為德之賊，何哉？」曰：
「非之無舉也，刺之無刺也；同乎流俗，合乎汙世；居之似忠信，行之似廉潔；皆悅之，自以為是，而不
可與入堯舜之道…。心臥則夢故曰德之賊也。孔子曰：『…惡鄉原，恐其亂德也。』君子反經而已矣。經
正，則庶民興；庶民興，斯無邪慝矣。」《孟子‧盡心下》English translation is quoted from Ames and 
Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, 238-9. 
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profit-minded but feign desirelessness. They are false and secretly foul in conduct but 
forceful and lofty in speaking about integrity and prudence. They take extraordinary as 
the ordinary, behaving eccentrically and without restraint, out of conceit and self-
indulgence.257 
There are indeed certain serious epistemic concerns expressed in this passage. Major indicators 
are words such as tranquility (jing, as an intellectual virtue mentioned above), competence (neng, 
as an important way of understanding the notion of knowledge in classical China discussed in 
Chapter 2) and knowledge-and-wisdom (zhi); all of them are unmistakably epistemic markers for 
Xunzi. One of the central concerns is dissonance of a term and its shift of meanings. However, 
Xunzi’s worries seem to be more specific: they are about false presentations in normative roles 
or social locations. “Scholar-recluses”—in contrast to “scholar-officials” who have active socio-
political duties—are those who do not serve any official posts yet are still considered as the 
exemplary in their communities. Like the village worthy that Confucius and Mencius denounce, 
these “scholar-recluses” are experts of cosmetic works, appearing to be consistent through and 
through, and well-respected. And yet, like the village worthy, these “scholar-recluses” who claim 
to know bear no epistemic fruits and they are incompetent to lead their communities anywhere in 
the realm of knowledge-and-wisdom. 
 The identification of the communal categories of village worthy and scholar-recluses 
indicates that the Confucians are fully aware of the pitfalls of the formation and transformation 
of the communal dynamics, for better or for worse. The opposite of a virtuous person is not just a 
vicious person but a vicious person pretending to be virtuous, epistemically or morally. 
                                                
257古之所謂處士者，德盛者也，能靜者也，修正者也，知命者也，箸是者也。今之所謂處士者，無能而云
能者也，無知而云知者也，利心無足，而佯無欲者也，行偽險穢，而彊高言謹愨者也，以不俗為俗，離縱
而跂訾者也。《荀子‧非十二子》 
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II. 
Rethinking Skillfulness: Propositions or Acquaintance? 
 
 Interestingly, both virtuous knowers and epistemic villains in the Xunzi possess certain 
kinds of skill sets and practice their skills in a reliable way as they move from one social location 
to another. While virtuous knowers have the general motivation for knowledge, epistemic 
villains, pretending to have such motivation, aim for communal appraisals and their personal 
gain. These villains pay no attention to and have no heart-mind for knowledge, and their conduct 
may result in profoundly negative impacts to their communities in the epistemic sense. In other 
words, the moral problematic of people in normative roles or social locations expressed in their 
conduct could lead to epistemic disasters. 
 Setting the skillfulness of the epistemic villains—that in itself may not have many 
epistemic qualities beyond excellent discernment of communal dimensions—in the Xunzi aside, I 
intend to further articulate the skillfulness aspect of zhi and its relation to propositions and 
acquaintance. Insofar I have presented propositional knowledge (knowing that), skill knowledge 
(knowing how), and interpersonal knowledge (knowing who) as three distinctive branches of 
knowledge; I have also argued that, in an important sense, the skill and interpersonal dimensions 
of zhi are non-propositional in nature and not completely reducible to knowing that. The 
question at this moment is: how does Xunzi claim any cognitive import regarding the skillfulness 
aspect—the cultivation of which constitutes a significant part of intellectual virtues other than 
epistemic motivations—of zhi, if a general sense of reality and truth are to be kept? 
Skillfulness and Propositional Knowledge 
 In their essay “Are ‘Old Wives’ Tales’ Justified?” Dalmiya and Alcoff suggest two 
alternative ways of arguing for the cognitive import of some skillful practices: the first is 
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involved in working “within the traditional framework of the supremacy of the factual and 
thereby of the propositions and truth,” while the second is concerned with a complete rejection of 
the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief.258 In articulating a possible case for 
the first alternative, they further introduce a propositional formulation of skill knowledge “S 
knows how to do x” as “if q, then do r.”259 Such a reference to proposition(s) is to satisfy the 
requirement of propositions within a traditional epistemic framework. Nevertheless, even if we 
accept this conditional formulation as a possible connection between skill knowledge and 
propositional knowledge, certain kinds of circularity still seem to be inevitable. The first kind of 
circularity is associated with revisiting the conceptual structure again and again. As long as the 
framework sharply distinguishes knowing from doing, and knowledge from conduct, all the 
propositional formulations—no matter how many layers exist at the meta- level—merely prolong 
the inevitable: meeting the unbridgeable gap between knowing and doing. Assuming that the 
open-minded epistemologist allows both the proposition p in the formula “S knows that p” to 
include “if q, then do r”, and the possibility of applying p to achieve certain goals, there is still a 
disconnection between the intellectual grasping of this p together with its potential applications 
and the practical capability to achieve the goals. A skillful three-point-shooter on the basketball 
court may have cognitive grasp—according to the traditional epistemic framework—of the 
proposition “if the defenders are two steps away from me, then I shoot the ball”; but the 
capability of nailing three-pointers does not seem to be intimately related to this cognitive grasp. 
“If q, then do r” in this case—possibly generalized from numerous interactions with the 
defenders—may have improved the success rate of making three-pointers, such a generalization, 
                                                
258 Vrinda Dalmiya and Linda Alcoff, “Are ‘Old Wives’ Tales’ Justified?”in Feminist Epistemologies (New York: 
Routledge 1993), 239. 
259 Ibid., 237. 
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however, cannot replace the constant practice of shooting balls from three-point-line. Now, the 
open-minded epistemologist may accept the claim that the accurate assessments of both q and r 
are also associated with conditional propositions; that is, “if a1 and a2 and a3, then q” as well as 
“if do r, then do b1 and b2 and b3.” But the gap between knowing and the actual capability of 
carrying out actions towards a desired goal are still unbridgeable. “Knowledge-that, even if 
present,” in Hetherington and Lai’s words, “is not enough to spark or activate the knowledge 
how into action on the given occasion.”260 Furthermore, we can totally imagine that there is 
another talented and skillful three-point-shooter who never had this “if q, then do r” mode of 
thinking and is speechless—when confronted with the question concerning the best timing to 
shoot the ball. Are we ready to say that the first shooter knows how in a cognitively superior way 
in comparison with the second shooter, because the former has formulated a rule-like conditional 
proposition? Or, alternatively, do we claim one of them is a better knower, judging by their skills 
of nailing three pointers, because this shooter has a higher percentage of making the shots? 
 Suppose we follow the reasoning of determining the better shooter based on their records 
of making shots—that is, success rate—then we encounter the second kind of circularity problem: 
threshold. Since knowing how does not entail 100% success, the notion of probability must be at 
play here. Then the question becomes: how should the threshold be set in order to distinguish a 
good knower and an average knower from a bad knower? At first glance, it is not difficult to 
claim that the setting of the threshold depends on the context and environing conditions. 48% is a 
great record for a three-point shooter but horrible one for shooting free throws. And the same 
48% record usually indicates a player who only plays games outdoors—where a variety of 
                                                
260 Stephen Hetherington and Karyn L. Lai, “Knowing-How and Knowing-To,” in The Philosophical Challenge 
from China, ed. Brian Bruya (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2015), 280. 
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factors such as wind, temperature, and humidity come into play as well—to be a better shooter 
than a player who merely plays games indoors, assuming the defensive intensity of their 
opponents is about the same. If there is no objection regarding the requirement that the threshold 
needs to be context-dependent and context-sensitive, then the next question is: are there reliable 
ways for us to set the threshold without any controversies? One way of doing it is to set the 
threshold at the level at which 10% of the population of the set members (or members in a 
community) can reach. However, there is still a certain arbitrariness in setting 10% as the 
watershed. Why not the top 12.5% of the population? How about 20%? Thus, using a second 
threshold to determine the value of the first threshold also seems to lead us to an infinite regress, 
because we may need a third, a fourth, and even more to determine what we mean by success. 
 In the Xunzi, there do not seem to be any concerns regarding the gap between knowing 
and doing, neither is there a need to transform skills into propositions or to standardize the 
thresholds to distinguish the successful and the unsuccessful. Knowing in the Xunzian sense 
requires authentication in practice, and authentic conduct is the goal to be achieved. In many 
cases, therefore, the explicit and representational forms of knowledge are what Xunzi intends to 
stride across, especially when it comes to the ideal knower (K 12.8): 
Thus the ideal ruler [i.e., the son of tian] does not look yet sees, does not listen yet hears, 
does not deliberate yet knows (zhi), does not move yet accomplishes: rather like earth he 
sits alone and people follow him as though they were of a single body with him, just as 
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four limbs follow the dictates of the heart-mind. This is called the Grand Embodiment 
(daxing大形).261 
Deliberation (lu) is an explicit form of reasoning that is closely related to knowledge-and-
wisdom (zhi) in the Xunzi.262 Textual evidence also demonstrates that accumulative practices of 
this kind of explicit reasoning play a significant role in the formation and transformation of 
knowledge-and-wisdom. Nevertheless, the key for the Xunzian ideal knower seems to 
exclusively emphasize a certain kind of cultivated awareness without the emergence of explicit 
and representational forms of reasoning rather than being concerned with reasoning through the 
explicit and representational. The highest state of knowledge-and-wisdom aims at cultivated 
spontaneity and what this kind of spontaneity does is exactly skipping the stage of propositional 
reasoning (K 17.5): “Thus achieving the Great Delicacy (dacao大巧) consists of what is not 
done; achieving the Great Knowledge-and-Wisdom (zhi) lies in what is not deliberated (lu).”263 
If this is really the case, does it imply that Xunzi rejects the formulation of knowledge as 
justified true belief in conventional epistemology? 
 According to the suggestions of Dalmiya and Alcoff, it is possible to take the second 
path—a complete rejection of the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief—and 
claim that skillfulness is neither about propositional formulation nor quantitative assessment; it is 
about the unique qualities of a person that are not completely representable, assessable or 
reducible to the previous two measurements that lead to circularity. Then the question becomes: 
                                                
261故天子不視而見，不聽而聰，不慮而知，不動而功，塊然獨坐而天下從之如一體，如四胑之從心：夫是
之謂大形。《荀子‧君道》See also K24.1. 
262 At least 12 out of 46 occurrences of “lu” in the Xunzi are in the term of “zhi-lu”, knowingly deliberating or 
deliberating to know. 
263故大巧在所不為，大智在所不慮。《荀子‧ 天論》 
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how does Xunzi retain a sense of truth and reality—assuming that the notion of zhi still connects 
with both of them—as this second path is chosen? 
Skillfulness and Knowledge by Acquaintance 
 In “Constructing Polanyi’s Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather than 
Knowing by Representation: Some Implications,” Dale Cannon suggests an alternative way of 
understanding skillfulness that may better explain what Xunzi intends to achieve by skipping the 
explicit and representational in reaching the sophisticated state of knowledge-and-wisdom. 
Cannon treats skillfulness as some kind of cognitive contact with the reality that is relationally 
known through first-hand familiarity and rapport.264 In other words, skill knowledge is a form of 
knowledge by acquaintance from Cannon’s perspective. 
 For Cannon, Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing—aligning itself with Thomas Reid and 
William James—is a project of re-location. It is a shift from the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm that 
prioritizes methodological skepticism to “the commonsense context of [our knowing’s] tacit 
relatedness to the realities we know.”265 Such a shift is necessarily involved in an epistemic 
awareness of one’s limited perspective being inescapably partial, finite, and fallible, while at the 
same time one’s knowledge primarily being personal, relational, and indwelling. Knowledge by 
acquaintance is in this sense concerned with first-hand familiarity with the known. As a 
consequence, knowledge by representation—including propositional knowledge—is thus 
considered to be acquired second-hand. 
 What distinguishes first-hand from second-hand knowledge is that the former cannot be 
made explicit by articulation: 
                                                
264 Dale Cannon, “Constructing Polanyi’s Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather than Knowing by 
Representation: Some Implications,” in Tradition & Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical (29.2), p.28. 
265 Ibid., 32. In Polanyi’s own terms, it is a shift in philosophical orientation from critical to post-critical. 
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We can, of course, call attention to [knowledge by acquaintance], speak of it, and 
describe it. And we can speak of what we have come to learn through the acquaintance. 
But to “articulate it” is to create something else on its basis – namely, a representation 
which is not itself the relationship which acquaintance is. It is to create a “map” of the 
“territory” with which one is acquainted…. Knowledge by representation is possession of 
a map…. Knowledge by acquaintance, though, is not itself possession of a map; it is 
direct familiarity, a direct relationship of first-person rapport with the territory. How good 
our acquaintance knowledge is will depend on many things: how thorough our 
acquaintance, how and in what different ways we have interacted with what we are 
acquainted with, etc. It might be acquired in part with the help of a map. It serves as the 
basis on which we intelligently utilize a map. And it may be a basis on which maps are 
constructed – indeed, quite readily, as we draw up an account for reflection and/or 
communication what it is we have become acquainted with. But it is not itself possession 
of a map, for we can possess a map without any acquaintance for ourselves with the 
territory. Possession of a map, no matter how accurate the map, is never equivalent to 
knowledge by acquaintance of the territory, no matter how much we may suppose that it 
suffices.266 
Following Cannon’s metaphor of a map, first-hand acquaintance of the territory requires people 
to walk around and through it, to feel and to dwell in it, and to incorporate the embodied 
experience as their own; such kind of acquaintance of the territory cannot be gained merely by 
reading a map. What Xunzi attempts to prescribe in achieving knowledge-and-wisdom is 
ultimately to acquire the first-hand familiarity of the territory without appealing to any map, even 
                                                
266 Ibid., 33. 
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though possessing a map was at one point helpful for becoming familiar with the territory. 
Knowledge by acquaintance for Xunzi, then, is both the root and fruit of developing zhi. Such an 
emphasis on first-hand familiarity and acquaintance naturally leads to looking up to wise 
exemplars who have made contributions to the communal knowledge in their conduct as 
epistemic paradigms. Zhidao知道, usually translated as “knowing the way,” is actually 
acquainting oneself with the paths that the exemplars of the community have made. This kind of 
knowledge is ultimately embedded in the communal history, socio-political situations, ongoing 
conflicts, unspeakable struggles, and quality of communication. It is in this sense Xunzi does not 
appeal to any abstract principles or conceptual models—epistemically, morally, and even 
politically-- (K12.1): “Thus, the models cannot be established alone, nor can its categories apply 
themselves in particular instances. If proper persons are obtained, then the models and their 
categories will survive; if such persons are lost, then they will perish….Junzi (exemplary persons) 
are the wellsprings of the models.”267 
 Both Polanyi and Heidegger have argued that non-representational knowledge comes 
prior to representational knowledge and makes representational knowledge possible. Polanyi 
states, “No map can read itself. Neither can the most explicit possible treatise on map-reading 
read a map.”268 The point is that the mediation of non-representational knowledge (the first-hand 
familiarity and competence of map-reading) is needed in order for representational knowledge 
(the map) to work. Heidegger, who conceives of understanding in practical terms, also asserts 
that the competent performance of practical tasks precedes and makes possible the 
                                                
267故法不能獨立，類不能自行；得其人則存，失其人則亡。…君子者、法之原也。《荀子‧ 君道》 
268 See Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 30. 
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representational knowledge that.269 The reasoning is that the accuracy, and therefore the proper 
functioning, of representational knowing is essentially grounded in humans’ competent 
interactions with the environing conditions; and these kinds of competent interactions, according 
to Cannon, are in themselves non-representational and have everything to do with first-hand 
familiarity and acquaintance. The Polanyian and Heideggerian thinking, in this particular regard, 
resonates with the Xunzian presupposition that knowledge by acquaintance is the root of 
developing zhi. 
 Few contemporary scholars trained in the western academy would go so far to agree with 
Xunzi that first-hand familiarity and acquaintance is also the fruit of the development of 
knowledge.270 But there are certain considerations regarding sophisticated forms of competent 
performance that, when refined, seem to part ways with knowledge by representation. John 
Searle, for example, points out that rules and principles in the instructions for learners of how to 
ski tend to become less and less relevant as their skill level reaches sophistication.271This kind of 
embodied knowledge, when refined, manifested in competent skillfulness in responding to the 
environing conditions, does not appeal to any representational rules or principles. In fact, the 
absence of these representational rules or principles is exactly the significant sign of reaching the 
state of refinement. 
 Xunzi’s epistemic aim is achieving “trained spontaneity” in knowledge-and-wisdom, and 
the efforts invested in this developing process must be communal. Xunzi did not provide much 
                                                
269 Taylor Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 207. 
270 Stating that first-hand familiarity and acquaintance is the fruit of the development of wisdom, however, may be 
much more acceptable. 
271 John Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 
150. 
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reasoning to justify the primacy of knowing by acquaintance. His taking the primacy of knowing 
by acquaintance for granted, however, is a resonant voice of the shared attitude of the classical 
Chinese thinkers. I will use the following example from the Zhuangzi to articulate what Xunzi 
might have in mind before introducing exemplarism as a conceptual lens: 
Cook [Ding] was carving an ox for Lord Wen-hui. As his hand slapped, shoulder lunged, 
foot stamped, knee crooked, with a hiss! With a thud! The brandished blade as it sliced 
never missed the rhythm, now in time with the Mulberry Forest dance, now with the 
orchestra playing the [Jing-shou].  
“Oh excellent!” said Lord Wen-hui. “That skill should attain such heights!”   
The cook put down his knife and replied: “What your servant cares about is path-
making (dao), I have left skill behind me. When I first began to carve oxen, I saw nothing 
but oxen wherever I looked. Three years more and I never saw an ox as a whole. 
Nowadays, I am in touch with the daemonic in me, and do not look with the eye. With 
the senses I know where to stop, the daemonic I desire to run its course. I rely on the 
patterns of tian, cleave along the main seams, let myself be guided by the main cavities, 
go by what is inherently so. A ligament or tendon I never touch, not to mention solid 
bone. A good cook changes his chopper once a year, because he hacks. A common cook 
changes it once a month, because he smashes. Now I have this chopper for nineteen 
years, and have taken apart several thousand oxen, but the edge is as though it were fresh 
from the grindstone. At that joint there is an interval, and the chopper’s edge has no 
thickness; if you insert what has no thickness where there is an interval, then, what more 
could you ask, of course there is ample room to move the edge about. That’s why after 
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nineteen years the edge of my chopper is as though it were fresh from the 
grindstone...”272 
Even though this passage is not Xunzi’s own writing, some important insights that Zhuangzi 
offers in this story seem to be the keys to understanding Xunzi at a deeper level. First, even 
though skills are differentiated from dao, a holistic and not completely analyzable process with 
which normative claims are associated in the Chinese intellectual tradition, they are nonetheless 
the means to achieve dao. Second, there is a sense of “reality” that bodily movements respond to 
and skills are applied to. Third, the process of the refinement of skills is identical with the 
process of becoming more and more acquainted with reality in a relational manner. 
III. 
Acquaintance, Reality, and Exemplarism 
 
 If my analysis in the previous section is warranted, then the primary aspect of 
knowledge-and-wisdom that Xunzi endorses comes in a form of acquaintance rather than 
representation. As a consequence, Xunzi does not take any belief-centered approach and remains 
foreign to conceptualizing knowledge as justified true belief (J-T-B). Instead, the Xunzian 
treatment of zhi focuses on building relational rapport by acquainting oneself with the aspect(s) 
of reality that a knower actively engages (usually together with other knowers). What 
distinguishes a good knower from others, then, is the competence that the good knower cultivates 
over time through a specific kind of knowing by acquaintance that requires intentionality 
towards cultivation of virtues and refinement of skillfulness.273 
                                                
272 See the Chapter Three of the Zhuangzi, “Yangsheng Zhu (What Matters in the Nurture of Life).” English 
translation, with minor interpretative modifications of mine, is quoted from A. C. Graham, Chuang Tzu: The Inner 
Chapters (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 63-64. 
273 It is possible for good knowers not to reveal their competence in public and to remain unknown in their 
communities. A Chinese saying, “the great recluse is concealed away even in the market place大隱隱於市,” 
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Knowledge by Acquaintance and Reality in the Xunzi 
 Does knowledge by acquaintance come with any criteria in the sense that the J-T-B are 
for the conventional formulation of knowledge? The answer is positive. According to Cannon: 
For a person to be acquainted with x requires (i) that the person have confidence in their 
familiarity with x, (ii) that the person’s alleged familiarity be an actual relationship of 
familiarity with x (i.e., be in responsive rapport with how x is), and (iii) that the person be 
able to convincingly establish for others her acquaintance with x, e.g., by introducing 
them in person to x, or otherwise doing and saying things that reflect a directly familiarity 
with x. 274 
Three key elements of Cannon’s formulation of knowledge by acquaintance are: personal 
confidence, relational rapport as well as responsiveness, and communally verifiable competence. 
All these elements can be found in the text of the Xunzi on the empirical learning process to 
become sages (K 8.17): 
Not having heard something is not as good as having heard it; having heard it is not as 
good as having seen it; having seen it is not as good as knowing it; knowing it is not as 
good as putting it into practice. Learning reaches its terminus when it is fully put into 
practice. Putting it into practice leads to understanding. Those who understand become 
sages.275 
According to Xunzi, learning is a process of gaining familiarity through active engagement. Such 
acquaintance is cultivated through skillful practice that is not separable from understanding. A 
                                                                                                                                                       
demonstrates an understanding that a person with remarkable qualities can choose to live with common people 
without being recognized.  
274 Cannon, “Tacit Knowing,” 33-4. 
275故天子不視而見，不聽而聰，不慮而知，不動而功，塊然獨坐而天下從之如一體，如四胑之從心：夫是
之謂大形。《荀子‧君道》See also K24.1. 
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person’s familiarity with some persons, things, or events through demonstrating reliable and 
skillful responsiveness is an indication of this person’s knowledge rooted in certain kinds of 
cognitive contact with reality that this person is part of. Thus, Xunzi’s subscribing to knowledge 
by acquaintance implies neither that Xunzi cancels out the existence of what is out there, nor that 
there is no cognitive contact with what is real. The Xunzian grasping of reality is not through 
representing it in a flawless way and processing the propositional information intellectually but 
to gain personal familiarity with it through embodied engagement that does not separate the 
intellectual from the non-intellectual. Or, restated, intelligent practice is the key to unlocking the 
Xunzian notion of zhi: there is no separation between thinking and acting in the production of 
knowledge-wisdom. 
 To fully appreciate Xunzi’s viewpoint, though, does require giving up the supremacy of 
propositions as well as the representational formulation of truth and reality that directly 
contributes to a stubborn epistemic conviction that explicit, representational knowledge is the 
only sort of knowledge in regard to reality. In Personal Knowledge, Polanyi’s proposal for a 
paradigm shift from critical to post-critical orientation in philosophy is resonant with the 
Xunzian approach. The critical orientation, based on adopting methodological skepticism, 
represses and debilitates the powers that enable people to go beyond individual’s distortions and 
achieve cognitive contact with reality.276 On the contrary, being aware of the inescapable 
fallibility and limitations of these powers, post-critical orientation in philosophy adopts the 
inverse methodological strategy and recognizes the general reliability and productive outcomes 
of methodological believing.277 Such an awareness leads to a commonsense conception of reality 
                                                
276 Xunzi associates partiality of one’s knowledge-and-wisdom with distortion (qu曲). See K 21.5. 
277 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 264-8. 
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as well as epistemic humility. Reality, thus conceived, is not merely thought of, reflected on, and 
talked about, but also can be acquainted with, acted upon, shaped, and known through non-
propositional and non-representational approaches. 
 Xunzi has never been a proponent of the supremacy of representational and propositional 
knowledge; rather, the sophisticated state of “trained spontaneity” that Xunzi strives towards 
tends to prioritize knowledge by acquaintance. Instead of distancing oneself from the subject 
matter and relating to it impersonally, subjectivity constantly plays a significant role in the 
Xunzian way of philosophizing. Such an emphasis on subjectivity—together with personal 
acquaintance—leads to Xunzi’s highlighting the central importance of directly referencing 
exemplars who are also communal norm-makers. At this point, bringing in Zagzebski’s moral 
exemplarism will expand our understanding in the notion of truth that Xunzi may have had in 
mind. 
Zagzebski’s Moral Exemplarism and the Xunzi 
 In the paper “Exemplarist Virtue Theory” Zagzebski outlines a moral position that she 
terms “exemplarism.”278 This position comes remarkably close to Xunzi’s overall approach, as it 
combines a virtue theory with exemplars, emotions (especially admiration), and linguistic 
reference. Zagzebski’s exemplarism is foundational in structure;279 and the foundation of 
exemplarism is the exemplar (the paradigmatically good and admirable person) who is the 
referent of other significant aspects, such as virtue, right act, good outcome, and good life. 
                                                
278 Zagzebski, “Exemplarist Virtue Theory,” Metaphilosophy 41 no.1-2 (2010):41-57. 
279 The most attractive feature of foundationalist moral theories is that the foundations themselves provide 
justifications to moral practices. Such a requirement for justifications, according to Zagzebski, did not exist before 
the modern era. See Ibid., 47. 
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 There are three distinctive elements of exemplarism that Zagzebski proposes: linguistic 
reference, emotion, and virtue. 
1. A theory of direct reference: Zagzebski chooses the Putnam-Kripke theory, 
“particularly in the form in which it was used to define natural kind terms,” for 
referencing exemplars.280 This element allows us to identify an instance, an item, 
or a person by “pointing” without knowing exactly the nature of the referent. Both 
Kripke and Putnam believe that we are capable of constructing a definition 
linking up with the nature of the referent, even though we do not know its nature. 
For example, we are able to refer to a certain drinkable and transparent liquid that 
keeps us hydrated as water without knowing that its molecular composition is 
H2O. This theory grants the continuity of referential relations within a linguistic 
community before and after discovering the molecular composition of water. By 
the same token, we can refer to someone as exemplary without knowing what 
exactly makes this person exemplary. 
2. The general trust-worthiness of the emotion of admiration: The link between an 
exemplar and other people’s desire to imitate them is admiration. Zagzebski holds 
that the emotion of admiration, like our memory and vision, does not guarantee 
certainty; but they are generally reliable, as long as we use them conscientiously. 
In other words, “we are usually right only if we can generally trust our disposition 
to admiration.”281 The beauty of this element lies in its connection to practice, in 
which the possibility of misidentification must always be taken into account while 
                                                
280 Ibid., 49. 
281Ibid., 52. 
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remaining active. Restated, it is not necessary to stop admiring and imitating 
certain persons even though the possibility of misidentification exists. 
3. An “exemplarized” reformulation of the concept of virtue: according to 
Zagzebski, “a virtue is a trait we admire in an admirable person. It is a trait that 
makes the person paradigmatically good in a certain respect.”282 This 
reformulation is based on indexical reference to a paradigmatical exemplar and 
this element serves as the conceptual glue that ties the previous two elements 
together. 
One of the characteristic features of exemplarism (so far as a moral theory) is that it saves 
significant conceptual space for contingency. The flip side of allowing members of a linguistic 
community to identify an instance, an item, or a person by “pointing” without knowing exactly 
the nature of the referent is to leave room for contingent and a posteriori truth that is established 
only after the fixation of the linguistic terms and the referents through empirical investigations. 
Unlike the strict representational theory of meaning that Eno, Schwartz, and Goldin promote in 
interpreting Xunzi’s doctrine of zhengming (a position that I rejected in Chapter 3), the Putnam-
Kripke theory in semantics is flexible enough to accommodate the following aspects at the same 
time: (A) the necessity of contigent and a posteriori truth, (B) the disconnection between 
competent language users’ successfully pointing to the right things and other members’ 
incapability of identifying those things, and (C) misidentification and revision.  
 In the context of referring to an exemplary person, these aspects of Zagzebski’s use of the 
Putnam-Kripke theory of direct reference have important implications: 
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(a) There is no contradiction between not having a ready-made definition of 
exemplariness and identifying exemplary persons. The Putnam-Kripke theory of 
direct reference does not require an exemplary person to satisfy a description 
given in advance. Pointing to a person as exemplary first and finding out how or 
what makes this person exemplary later is therefore compatible. This person’s 
exemplariness not only can be, but must be established in the process of becoming 
acquainted through the development of relationships between this exemplar and 
other members in the community. The truth of the exemplariness of this person 
can be contingent and is necessarily established a posteriori. Restated, process is 
a necessary part of understanding why and how a person is exemplary. 
(b) There is no contradiction between competent language users’ successfully 
pointing to exemplars and other members’ inability to identify them. It is not 
necessary for every member of the linguistic community to be able to identify a 
person as exemplary, as long as some competent experts and their judgment can 
be relied on. Depending on experts’ judgments actually entails both epistemic 
authority and epistemic trust. 
(c) There is no contradiction between the possibility of competent language users’ 
misidentification (i.e., being mistaken in their expert judgment) of exemplars and 
trusting our generally reliable capability (e.g., emotion of admiration) in 
identifying such people. The exemplariness of people is revisable. 
These implications have significant resonance with Xunzi’s notion of becoming a sage. First, in 
the Xunzi there is no ready-made description that serves as an evaluative standard to determine 
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which persons are exemplary and which persons are not. The exemplariness of shi (scholars), 
junzi (exemplary persons), and shengren (sages) is different in degree; and there are sub-
categories that Xunzi identifies in distinguishing different exemplary aspects at roughly the same 
stage of development of exemplariness.283 However, not having any pre-fixed standard does not 
prevent the practice of identifying exemplars from happening. The emergence of exemplary 
persons is part of the process of communal development that is contingent in nature, in this sense 
there is no absolute path.284 Second, even though Xunzi does not explicitly explain the processes 
regarding the emergence and identification of exemplars, socio-political authorities and 
communal institutions are likely to play crucial roles. Socio-political authorities, in the context of 
the Xunzi, include epistemic authority because the classical learning that a Xunzian exemplar-to-
be has to master must be taught by other established exemplary persons who have put their 
knowledge of classical learning into practice.285 Furthermore, epistemic authority cannot 
function in a community without people’s epistemic trust. On the one hand, what the authority 
says is meant to be listened to and followed by community members who are not as competent as 
exemplars; on the other hand, as the next point demonstrates, authority is constantly challenged. 
Third, misidentifying a village worthy as exemplary is not only possible, but also inevitable. 
Competence and communal inter-subjectivity do not imply certainty. Therefore, making 
mistakes in misidentifications is part of the process in establishing contingent and a posteriori 
truths. Given that there is no ready-made definition for exemplariness, whatever definition 
people adopt must be revised and negotiated as the community develops. It means that 
                                                
283 For example, tongshi, shengchen有通士者，有公士者，有直士者，有愨士者，有小人者。《荀子‧不苟》 
284 From this perspective, associating sheng with a regulative ideal is mistaken. 
285好法而行，士也。《荀子‧修身》  /  彼學者，行之，曰士也。《荀子‧儒效》》  /  故學者以聖王為師，案
以聖王之制為法，法其法以求其統類，以務象效其人。嚮是而務，士也。《荀子‧解蔽》 
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authorities of the community have to be challenged in some ways. Even though there are merely 
limited methods of challenging authorities identified in the Xunzi,286 the fact that ways of 
challenging authorities are not absent from the discussion demonstrates that the structure of 
power and trust is not static but in flux. Nevertheless, just because exemplars (and village 
worthies alike) emerge from this dynamic system in which complete certainty is not guaranteed, 
reliability becomes crucial. As long as people’s capability of identifying exemplars—including 
the functioning of the emotion of admiration—is generally reliable, there is no reason to abolish 
such practice in a community. 
 An easy criticism, as one can imagine, is that Zagzebski’s moral exemplarism is much 
more descriptive than prescriptive. While fitting some of the commonsensical moral practices 
well, exemplarism seems to have few prescriptions concerning what a person should do other 
than following the moral exemplars. However, as Zagzebski notes, “the ways in which the 
exemplar are admirable, and hence imitable, can be used to give us both a way of understanding 
significant moral concepts and a way of making ourselves and our lives conform to the 
admirable.”287 But what kind of conformity is this? Furthermore, can the resonance between 
Zagzebski’s moral exemplarism and the Xunzi be extended to the epistemic realm?  
Epistemic Exemplars and Epistemic Normativity 
 There are two reasons that support the epistemic extension of moral exemplarism in the 
Xunzi for a better understanding of zhi (knowledge-wisdom): First, in the Xunzi there are few, if 
any, distinctions between a socio-political exemplar, a moral exemplar, and an epistemic 
exemplar. Even though, as aforementioned, there are sub-categories that Xunzi identifies in 
                                                
286Remonstration (jian諫) is one of the established methods, even though it is closely associated with the political 
context. 
287Zagzebski, “Exemplarist Virtue Theory,” 54. 
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distinguishing different exemplary aspects at roughly the same stage of development of 
exemplariness, the number of these sub-categories drastically decreases when it comes to the 
ultimate stage sheng, sagehood. The underlying assumption seems to be that the most 
sophisticated, or ideal, exemplar is exemplary in all aspects of the socio-political, the moral, and 
the epistemic.288 Second, there are important notions in moral philosophy that apply to the 
domain of intellectual inquiry. In the context of a community of knowers, exemplars and 
normativity—like virtue—are two of them. I would like to outline the key components of 
Xunzian epistemic exemplarism, based on Zagzebski’s theory of moral exemplarism, with 
reference to my articulation of zhi (knowledge-wisdom). 
 (A) Reality and Acquaintance: Even though Xunzi never denies the existence of reality 
broadly construed, he does not subscribe to any singular description of it, either. More 
importantly, what distinguishes Xunzi from mainstream non-skeptical epistemologists since the 
beginning of the modern era is the issue concerning how reality is grasped and how knowledge is 
generated. While the latter generally holds that reality is grasped by our cognitive faculties that 
lead to true beliefs that are somewhat justifiable, the Xunzian way of grasping reality is through 
acquainting oneself with it, working on it, shaping it, and building relational rapport with it. Two 
significant consequences of this understanding of grasping reality are: first, reality is processual 
and in dynamic flux; second, explicit, representational descriptions are not effective in capturing 
reality. Therefore, even though Xunzi does not eliminate explicit and representational reasoning 
from the developmental process of knowledge-wisdom, the most sophisticated level of zhi can 
only be characterized as trained spontaneity or cultivated responsiveness. A primary way to 
demonstrate a person’s knowledge-wisdom is through performing skills in a spontaneous and 
                                                
288 It is possible to argue that a virtuous knower must be also a caring and just knower in the Xunzi. 
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responsive way that artfully transforms certain aspects of reality as experienced by other 
community members. Reality invites participation; and human participation yields to fruition 
(shi). As necessary as describing reality is in human communication, new and novel descriptions 
must be generated all the time in responding to the unfolding process. As a result, coordination 
between reality and language has to be constantly adjusted and established terms and linguistic 
practices have to be attuned. In this sense Xunzi states, “name-notions have no intrinsic 
appropriateness (K 22.2g).”289 
 (B) Linguistic Reference: I think that Zagzebski’s reformulation of the Putnam-Kripke 
theory of direct reference is by far the best candidate in pinpointing the Xunzian approach in 
understanding the relationship between language and reality. If what is real is constantly 
changing, sticking to any fixed descriptions or depictions of a particular snapshot of reality is 
ineffective at best. More serious consequences include futility rather than fruition, disorder rather 
than order, and distraction rather than concentration; all of these lead to disintegrations within a 
community. Assuming it is the case that pursuing representational descriptions is not the way to 
proceed, simply “pointing to” a person, an item, or a direction may be flexible enough. In the 
Xunzi, the aim of pointing to someone or something is not to establish universality but to pursue 
appropriateness (K 6.?): “speaking when it is appropriate is being knowledgeable and wise (zhi), 
and keeping silent when it is appropriate is also being knowledgeable and wise; therefore, 
knowing when to keep silent is like knowing how to utter language.”290 This passage shows that 
as a person’s knowledge-wisdom reaches sophistication, pragmatics has primacy over semantics. 
It is not to say that uttering a true sentence is not important, but that uttering such a sentence at 
                                                
289名無固宜。《荀子‧正名》 
290言而當、知也，默而當，亦知也，故知默猶知言也。《荀子‧非十二子》 
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the appropriate time and in the appropriate occasion is even more significant for the community. 
The latter belongs to the category of exemplary conduct.291 
 (C) Epistemic Paradigms and Truth: Like what Zagzebski says about the moral exemplar, 
Xunzian exemplars can foster an understanding of significant epistemic notions and can serve as 
sources of inspiration that make members in the community conform to their conduct through the 
emotion of admiration. Exemplars are historically and culturally situated. Prioritizing the 
significance of exemplars and making their significance fundamental entails that communal 
contexts can never be ignored. Epistemic virtues in the Xunzi such as openness, concentration, 
and sustained equilibrium are not grasped primarily through the intellect, but through interacting 
with the conduct of exemplars in the community. Dao, the collective path that preceding 
exemplars made through their conduct that led the community forward, becomes a normative 
notion. In the Xunzi, the notion of dao can never be separated from humans, especially those who 
are exemplary. Dao and its normativity are therefore not unconditional, ahistorical, and a priori. 
This Xunzian sense of normativity is revisable and does not make a universal demand. The 
human heart-mind that has the capability of zhi (acquainting with) dao must be cultivated 
communally. The objects of learning in the Xunzi—including reciting the classics, reading the 
Book of Rites, models set up by preceding exemplars, communal proprieties, as well as living 
exemplars and their conduct—are not exclusively related to purely intellectual pursuits. All 
things considered, the truths associated with the Xunzian way of grasping reality by acquaintance 
are a posteriori and contingent. As a consequence, learning these truths is not about acquiring 
                                                
291 Thus, immediately after the previous passage of the primacy of pragmatics, Xunzi states, “Therefore sages are 
those who are able to create categories with more linguistic utterances…” 故多言而類，聖人也；少言而法，君子
也。《荀子‧非十二子》 
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true propositions but cultivating a certain kind of competence292 that aims at reliable spontaneous 
responsiveness. Such competence expresses itself in the exemplars’ virtuous conduct; and their 
exemplary conduct that makes practical impact on the development of the community attracts the 
admiration and willingness of other community members to follow. 
 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to re-establish a few cases that distinguish Xunzi’s 
philosophy from modern epistemology as well as its legacy, and reaffirm some claims that I have 
made in previous chapters. This task was done by introducing three new dimensions in 
contemporary epistemology, developed in recent decades, that have important resonance with 
Xunzian thoughts. First of all, by associating Xunzi with virtue epistemology, I argued that the 
Xunzian notion of zhi is not belief-based but person-based. A person is never an isolated knower 
in the Xunzi. Rather, the Xunzian notion of the person is always person-in-relationships or 
person-in-community. A deeper investigation of the primary intellectual virtues and epistemic 
villains in the Xunzi highlights the role that community plays. Second, by relating skillful 
competence to knowledge by acquaintance, inspired by Cannon’s interpretation of Polanyi’s 
post-critical epistemology, I claimed that the Xunzian way of grasping reality is not primarily 
through explicit and representational propositions but through building relational rapport by 
active engagement. Through developing first-hand familiarity with the known, Xunzi’s epistemic 
goal is to achieve reliable spontaneous responsiveness rather than representational accuracy. 
Third, by connecting Xunzi’s emphasis on exemplary persons to Zagzebski’s moral exemplarism, 
I extended Zagzebski’s interpretative framework to the epistemic realm and identified that the 
                                                
292 In the Xunzi, there is an established association between learning (xue) and competence (neng). See K 6.12 and K 
30.8.: 少而不學，長無能也。《荀子‧法行》  /  不知則問，不能則學。《荀子‧非十二子》 
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Xunzian epistemic normativity does not imply universality and the Xunzian notion of truth must 
be a posteriori and contingent. I believe that all three cases are characteristically the epistemic 
stances of Xunzi, as far as knowledge-wisdom is concerned. 
 A potential consequence of setting up this kind of contrast is the danger of radical 
polarization. I have to emphasize, however, that for Xunzi the poles do not have to be mutually 
exclusive. Rather, it is a matter of prioritization. Prioritizing the significance of a virtuous 
knower does not entail that there is no place for beliefs; and prioritizing knowledge by 
acquaintance does not imply the absence of propositional and representational knowledge in the 
Xunzi. By the same token, stating that the Xunzian pursuit of a posteriori and contingent truth 
cannot be taken as a refusal to a priori and necessary truths. However, if my analyses are 
warranted, the epistemic landscape in the Xunzi is not shaped by the mainstream ways of 
formulating knowledge since the dawn of the modern era in Europe. The aftermath will be 
outlined in the epilogue with concluding remarks of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 7   
Epilogue 
 
Those who know themselves do not blame other people;  
those who understand the propensity of things do not complain about tian.   
--Xunzi 
 
 This dissertational project is concerned with an intellectual journey that unfolded, as I 
gradually learned and grew as a student in comparative philosophy. There are components that 
resemble traditional scholarship in the Chinese language, which made my study of classical 
Chinese texts possible. There are sentences that a native English speaker would not utter, even 
though they are not ungrammatical in a textbook. I choose to keep them as reminding markers of 
this journey. 
 Before proceeding any further, I would like to provide a brief review of the path of this 
journey, with considerations of a few legitimate objections that challenge the effectiveness of 
this comparative project. 
I. 
Review of the Chapters 
 
 This dissertation has demonstrated a way to map the epistemic landscape of Xunzi in 
relation to contemporary epistemologies in recent decades. Beginning with the historical and 
philosophical contexts in which the Xunzi as a philosophical text was situated, the first chapter 
makes a case that several noticeable developments in contemporary epistemologies, especially 
those in virtue epistemology, have made this project of reexamining the Xunzian epistemic 
stances possible. The primacy of exemplary persons in the Confucian tradition may serve as a 
bridge as the focus of epistemic evaluation has gradually shifted to virtuous knowers and their 
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communities in virtue epistemology. 
 The second chapter thus turned its attention to the Confucian notion of person, in relation 
to its Cartesian and Kantian counterparts. This chapter demonstrated that epistemic atomism—a 
position that endorses epistemological inquiries to start with a ready-made, self-sufficient and 
rational knower—was based on the Cartesian and Kantian models of person. It also pointed out 
that the Xunzian model of person is different from what both Descartes and Kant conceived. One 
decisive difference is that for Xunzi, relationship is a built-in, rather than an add-on, feature of a 
person. In order for a person to know, from Xunzi’s perspective, there must be other knowers in 
the knowledge-seeking community. 
 The third chapter focused on the first significant aspect of Xunzi’s concept of knowledge: 
knowing how. For Xunzi, knowing is a faculty of the human heart-mind that cannot be 
exclusively associated with a discrete individual. On the contrary, the human heart-mind emerges 
from concrete interpersonal interactions and knowing is intimately related to intentional 
cultivation of competence and skills in the communal context. An effective way to show that a 
person is knowledgeable is to demonstrate the competence of doing tasks in a reliable way. In 
other words, to know is to know how. Such focus on skill cultivation aims at responding well 
instead of representing well. As a consequence, water becomes an important metaphor because 
of its responsiveness. Mirror—associated with the notion of knowledge as accuracy of 
representation—is not as appealing to Xunzi as to Descartes and Kant. 
 The fourth chapter addressed the second important aspect of Xunzi’s concept of 
knowledge: knowing who. Because, in the context of community, interpersonal knowledge can 
hardly be achieved without language, Xunzi’s doctrine of zhengming (attunement of names) took 
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the central stage of the first half of the chapter. A popular realist interpretation of the doctrine of 
zhengming, based on representational accuracy, was rejected because it led to many 
interpretative problems. A hermeneutical interpretation, based on the understanding of 
appropriate responsiveness, was suggested for explanatory efficacy. Then the focus of the 
inquiry was shifted to understanding sages as ideal knowers and effective communicators. The 
skillfulness and effortlessness of conduct, as well as the dedication to facilitating and fostering 
quality communication in the community are the hallmarks of sages. The doctrine of zhengming 
is concerned with communicating well; and excellent communication leads to knowing each 
other well. An irreducible part of becoming an exemplary knower is this interpersonal 
knowledge: knowing who. 
 The fifth chapter targeted metaphor, imagination, and wisdom, as all of them played 
influential roles in the text of the Xunzi. Interestingly, metaphor, imagination, and wisdom 
underwent certain degrees of marginalization, especially in epistemological discussions since the 
Enlightenment era through recent decades. One significant reason was that they do not deliver 
accurate representations that link to the metaphor of mirror and the logic/rhetoric divide. Instead, 
metaphor, imagination, and wisdom are context-sensitive as well as narrative-dependent. All of 
them point to a characteristic that Xunzi sought in exemplars: responsiveness. 
 The sixth chapter turned to virtue epistemology and examined the core intellectual virtues 
in the Xunzi. It also identified a special notion that Xunzi noticed: “epistemic villain,” which is 
still yet to be developed in virtue epistemology. Given the fact that both epistemic exemplars and 
villains are skillful in some ways, this chapter thus aimed at a further examination of what skill 
knowledge was about in the Xunzi. It was demonstrated that not only knowing who but also 
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knowing how are forms of knowledge by acquaintance. Becoming knowledgeable and wise is a 
process of gaining familiarity through active engagement with people, things, affairs and events. 
Intelligent practice is the key to unlocking the Xunzian notion of zhi: there is no separation 
between thinking and acting in the production of knowledge-wisdom. Nevertheless, since the 
pursuit of knowledge-wisdom (zhi) focuses on reliability rather than certainty, there is an 
element of fallibilism that Xunzi had to embrace. 
II. 
Some Objections 
 
 While I am aware of the fact that every theoretical move in comparative philosophy usually 
triggers more questions than the answers that this move may provide, I consider the following 
three major objections that will challenge the knowledge by acquaintance/representation divide, 
as well as the turn to exemplarism at which I attempt to arrive. 
Objection 1: Knowledge by Representation Cannot Be Replaced by Knowledge by Acquaintance  
 
 If my interpretation of the notion of zhi (knowledge-wisdom) in the Xunzi is warranted, 
knowledge by representation was considered as neither the root nor the fruit of knowledge-
wisdom from Xunzi’s perspective. Nevertheless, this does not entail that knowledge by 
representation is unimportant and insignificant, because Xunzi did mention some forms of 
representational knowledge (e.g., reflective thinking and deliberation) that are by no means to be 
taken lightly in traditional Confucian education.293 
 Were Xunzi able to witness some of the success of modern science and modern 
education, his insistence of quan (comprehensiveness) would probably have required him to 
revise the proportion of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by representation in 
                                                
293 See, for example, the Analects 2.15 and 4.17. 
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education. However, I tend to think that Xunzi would not change his basic position: exemplars in 
science and education, instead of any particular piece of knowledge or philosophical formulation 
of knowledge, are the sources of epistemic normativity. The accuracy of representational 
knowledge cannot replace the exemplary conduct of the epistemic leaders of the community. 
 Saying that knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by representation compliment each 
other may be too simplified, even from Xunzi’s perspective. If I am right about Xunzi’s stance 
that epistemic exemplars are sources of normativity even in contemporary science and education, 
then the Xunzian view is actually that knowledge by acquaintance consummates knowledge by 
representation. Therefore, a Xunzian suggestion to the contemporary educational system would 
be investing more time not only to study those scientific and educational exemplars, but also to 
be with them and inspired by them whenever it is possible. 
Objection 2:  The Xunzian Intellectual Virtues Could Actually Be Intellectual Vices 
 Xunzi cannot readily be regarded as a virtue epistemologist in the technical sense; and I 
do not think that identifying openness (xu), focus and concentration (yi), and sustained 
equilibrium (jing) as “intellectual virtues” is completely uncontroversial. 
 It is possible, even likely, for Xunzi’s discussion of the Great Acuity to collapse under 
cross-examination by contemporary academic standards, because there was no consideration of 
any counter-examples in establishing openness, focus and concentration, as well as sustained 
equilibrium as necessary components of the Great Acuity. A person may appear to be open 
without any organizing epistemic principles. Such openness will lead to epistemic chaos and 
therefore should be considered as an intellectual vice rather than a virtue. By the same token, 
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focus and concentration can be a form of narrow-mindedness or stubborn bias; and sustained 
equilibrium is plausibly indistinguishable from epistemic indifference. 
 Nevertheless, given that the Great Acuity is indeed an epistemic state of ideal 
responsiveness that results from being open, focused, and achieving sustained equilibrium, 
categorizing them as intellectual virtues (with caution) is a move that enables engaging 
conversations between Xunzi’s philosophy and contemporary epistemological discussions. I am 
intentional in following the principle of charity, allowing what Xunzi considered as 
unproblematic and positive in the epistemic sense to be articulated with terminology in virtue 
epistemology. I do think that, in order to establish openness, focus and concentration, as well as 
sustained equilibrium as intellectual virtues in the technical sense, more work has to be done on 
top of the limited description recorded in the Xunzi. 
Objection 3:  Xunzi’s Philosophy Does Not Bring New Elements to Virtue Epistemology 
Even though, as aforementioned, Xunzi cannot readily be regarded as a virtue 
epistemologist in the technical sense, I proffer that Xunzi’s philosophy could contribute to the 
further development of virtue epistemology. The notion of “epistemic villain,” for instance, may 
become a viable concept to strengthen Zagzebski’s exemplarism. 
 If our goal is to understand how people live their epistemic lives in an epistemic 
community, simply focusing on exemplars is not enough. There are many counter-currents that 
may undermine the efforts of epistemic exemplars. And as we can learn from history, virtues and 
the virtous do not always prevail. Therefore, studying the interaction between the villainous and 
the virtuous delivers a much more comprehensive picture when an epistemic community comes 
to focus. 
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 According to Xunzi, an epistemic villain is a hypocrite in the epistemic sense, occupying 
a normative communal location yet claiming to know without actually knowing what is claimed. 
There are two indexes in effect here: epistemic reliability and ethical questionability. These two 
indexes map out four possibilities and an epistemic villain in the Xunzian sense must be both 
epistemically unreliable and ethically questionable. In other words, claiming to know without 
knowing by itself does not necessarily make any person an epistemic villain. Recognized 
madmen may claim to know many things that they do not really know and they do not usually 
pose any threat to a community as far as knowledge and wisdom are considered. Epistemic 
villains must share a component of being “ethically questionable,” no matter how this term is 
defined. If it is the case, an epistemic exemplar may have to be an ethical exemplar at the same 
time. Such a characterization, whether proved to be true or not, will enrich the discussion of 
epistemic exemplarism and enable us to determine whether the conventional boundary between 
epistemology and ethics needs to be maintained. 
III. 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 In choosing “person” as the conceptual lens that provides a specific viewpoint for this 
project, I mentioned that both authors and readers need to be aware of the tensions, temporality 
and limitations once a conceptual bridge is built. In a sense, projects in comparative philosophy 
are profoundly metaphorical. They are metaphorical because by linking two or more different 
philosophical systems together, the philosophical situatedness is re-described, new perspectives 
are introduced, and novel associations are created in imaginative ways. Following Xunzi’s 
reasoning, this by no means entails that such projects are meaningless. 
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 While I do think that the philosophy of Xunzi has some insights to contribute to the 
contemporary discussions of virtue epistemology, the main purpose of this dissertation is to map 
the epistemic landscape of Xunzi with the coordinates of contemporary epistemologies. I have 
established that knowing how (in Chapter 3) and knowing who (in Chapter 4) are two prominent 
types of knowledge in the Xunzi and categorized both types as knowledge by acquaintance (in 
Chapter 6). Such knowledge, like wisdom, is difficult to understand impersonally. Considering 
that the Xunzian notion of person-in-relationships (ren) cannot be interpreted as an atomic 
existence (there is no ren without the matrix of min), knowledge-and-wisdom (zhi) has to be 
communal. Those persons who “know better” thus distinguish themselves and become exemplars 
in their communities. 
 This community-based notion of knowledge-and-wisdom, on the one hand, and 
communication, on the other hand, are two sides of the same coin. Knowledge-and-wisdom is 
demonstrated and communicated through exemplars’ conduct in responding to emerging 
situations, through communal and socio-political institutions (e.g., language, schools, rituals), as 
well as through verbal communication and writings. Appropriate responsiveness requires 
context-sensitivity; and context-sensitivity is usually acquired through communal learning. The 
content of such learning, as characterized in the Confucian texts, mostly aims at contingent and a 
posteriori truth that is established only after the fixation of the linguistic terms and the referents 
through empirical investigations. 
 An almost inevitable consequence of Xunzi’s exclusive reliance on his version of 
exemplarism is: a community flourishes and decays, or—in some cases—lives and dies, with its 
exemplars. The epistemic fruit can be fragile and short-lived. One of the most effective ways to 
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preserve it is to share the epistemic fruit through communal education in which exemplars are 
not only trail-blazers of the epistemic paths, but also the transmitters of what they are able to 
achieve. The epistemic and moral qualities of a community and of its exemplars co-define each 
other. 
 I would like to point out the gaps yet to be bridged as the current project reaches its end, 
with the hope that further, more extensive work can be done on the basis of this dissertation. 
Even though Zagzebski’s exemplarism and the Xunzian version share remarkable similarities, it 
seems to be the case that Zagzebski insists to operate on a belief-based system and Xunzi does 
not. It is not clear whether Xunzi would completely reject the role that true beliefs play in 
contemporary epistemologies with the assertion that it is all about conduct because, in an 
important sense, it does seem to be the case that Xunzi would regard trusting the exemplars by 
believing what they believe to be rational, or in accord with the coherent pattern (li). This is 
indeed a gap, but a gap with potential opportunities as an appropriate bridge can be found.  
 The second gap is the gap between individual beliefs and the beliefs shared by a 
community. As a normative discipline, one of the assessments that epistemology provides 
focuses on the beliefs, as well as the belief system(s), held by an individual. If we accept the 
Xunzian stance that knowledge is communal, the next question will be: is there any way to 
assess the quality of any belief held by a group of people? Related questions include, but are not 
limited to: Is the assessment fundamentally the same when it is applied to a belief held by an 
individual with when it is applied to a belief held by a group? Does the size of rational members 
in a community plays any role in epistemic justification when it comes to a belief they shared? 
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 The third gap is between beliefs shared by a community and the communal (or even 
socio-political) institutions. Should these institutions, playing an active role in shaping epistemic 
norms and in imposing them, be held accountable and included in epistemic evaluations? If the 
answer is negative, what are the justifications that we have for not doing so? If the answer is 
positive, how can this task be done? 
 These are the questions beyond the scope of the current project. Nonetheless, they will 
provide guidance for future investigation if we take Xunzi’s essential insight, that knowledge is 
communal, seriously. 
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